Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

289. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 2, 1984

SUBJECT

• Art Hartman’s 10/1 Lunch with Dobrynin

Art had another good session at lunch yesterday with Dobrynin who probed for our ideas on follow up on the meetings with Gromyko. Below is a fairly full rendition of the topics covered.

View of the Meetings: Dobrynin led off by asking Art about our sense of the meetings with Gromyko. Art said that they had come out pretty much as we had expected. The TASS statement on the last day noting the two sides had agreed to procedures for further discussions seemed about right. Dobrynin confirmed that Gromyko had instructed the wording of the TASS item.² While the timing just before the elections had been bad from the Soviet point of view, they had not wanted to miss the opportunity to talk. They too felt the talks had resulted in agreement on a way to manage things at this point. In an aside, Dobrynin described Gromyko’s UN speech as “about the same as usual.”³

Germany and Japan: Art expressed concern that Gromyko seemed to be nostalgic for turning the clock back to the forties in his comments on Germany and Japan. Dobrynin responded that Gromyko was a member of the older generation and felt strongly about this issue. Saying he did not doubt their sensitivity on the subject, Art said that it nevertheless seemed divorced from reality. If the USSR is run by people in this frame of mind, it could be dangerous. Dobrynin again laid the problem to age, noting people in Moscow were concerned about groups in Germany and Japan who seemed to support the Nazis and wanted to overturn our agreements. Art emphasized that the number of Nazi supporters was very small, adding that the real point was that the Soviet leadership seemed not to understand the present-day situation of two of the most powerful countries on the world scene. He reaffirmed our long-term position that does not oppose but puts off the question of a German reunification until the completion of a peace treaty and suggested the Soviets should also work out something on the Northern Territories with Japan.

U.S. Sincerity: Dobrynin then said that his leaders were not sure if our talk about better relations might not just be pre-election rhetoric, and that we would return to trying to force the Soviets to bend to our will after November. He added that they know what the President said in the meeting; they will now be looking at what he says after the election. Art replied the President was, of course, talking about policy after the election and asked what kind of affirmation the Soviets were expecting. Dobrynin said he was not suggesting anything specific, but that they would be looking for some sign post-election. Dobrynin then said that if confirmation was forthcoming after the election that the Presidents wants to move in the direction he outlined, then there would be a positive response from the Soviet side. Underscoring the election point, Dobrynin said at another juncture that they wanted the exchanges talks to move forward but would not sign anything until after the election.

Interim Restraint: Dobrynin brought up interim restraint, asking what the President had in mind in his reference. He read from the Soviet notes of the meeting to the effect that the U.S. might consider an interim agreement that provided a certain restraint on ASAT and simultaneously beginning discussion of strategic offensive weapons. Art promised to check our record and get back to him on the exact wording.⁴

Next Steps: Dobrynin then asked about next steps. Did we plan to send a group of people to Moscow or what? Art responded that this had not been decided, noting you had suggested it might be useful to have a group sort out the issues of arms control. Such a group could talk less formally than in an actual negotiation and avoid getting bogged down in details. Dobrynin pointed to Gromyko’s preference for diplomatic channels.

Dobrynin followed up by asking if we had in mind for you and Gromyko to get together again in the near future. Art referred to your comment that you would meet with Dobrynin and he would meet with Gromyko in the weeks ahead. He also suggested that it might take several meetings to decide what to do next. Art offered his personal view that we should not be too quick in this process—there would need to be some sorting out on both sides—and commented that we had the impression that there was some confusion on the Soviet part over the issues. He suggested that the discussions in the weeks ahead could be beneficial in moving toward a meeting between you and Gromyko early next year. Dobrynin conceded that there had been confusion in the Soviet proposal for outer space talks, adding that he himself had advised against putting a date in the Soviet proposal.⁵ But the Politburo had decided otherwise. He seemed to agree that it would be best to have some time to sort out our respective positions on the issues.

Upcoming Plenum on Agriculture: In response to Art’s query if he planned to return to Moscow for the upcoming Central Committee Plenum, Dobrynin said that he would not since it would be devoted to Soviet agriculture problems. He added that the USSR’s agricultural situation was not good. They were becoming convinced that much more needed to be done with irrigation and some heads might roll in this area. He also mentioned the possibility of other personnel changes, including specifically the Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev who is in very bad health.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Hartman. Forwarded through Armacost. Printed from an uninitialed copy. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 2.
2. For the September 29 TASS statement, see the Washington Post, September 29, 1984, p. A11.
3. See footnote 4, Document 287.
4. In his September 28 meeting with Gromyko, Reagan “wondered if we could not consider concluding an interim agreement with restrictions on anti-satellite weapons, and also an agreement on a process for reducing nuclear arms” (see Document 286). Reagan also addressed this in his UNGA speech: “We’ve been prepared to discuss a wide range of issues of concern to both sides, such as the relationship between defensive and offensive forces and what has been called the militarization of space. During the talks, we would consider what measures of restraint both sides might take while negotiations proceed. However, any agreement must logically depend upon our ability to get the competition in offensive arms under control and to achieve genuine stability at substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, p. 1360)
5. Dobrynin was referring to the June 29 Soviet proposal for negotiations in Vienna. See Document 233.