1. Ray McGovern, who has been serving as A/NIO/USSR pro tem, has developed the attached interpretation of
the Gromyko visit, which is
decidely more optimistic than the mainline of the material we have been
sending forward, and my own view. He makes a significant case that
Chernenko is leading a
contentious effort toward a new opening. As indicated by his remarks at
the staff meeting, George Kolt is leaning a bit in this direction.
2. On the totality of evidence, I continue to believe that the best case
is as we have made it. There may be an exploratory element in the
Gromyko mission, but his main
aim is to try to put the Administration on the defensive. The Soviets
may still not appreciate how unlikely they are to be really successful
at this.
3. Ray’s argument has merit, however. Thus I want to send it forward to
you. At the same time, I’ll stick by the more pessimistic prognosis.
Moreover, I still would not absolutely rule out some sort of negative
surprise.
4. At this point, it seems fruitless to anticipate Gromyko’s performance over the next
three days unless we get some truly dramatic reporting about his script.
There are doubtless a variety of high-level US-Soviet interactions now taking place in preparation for
the meetings with Gromyko that
give the policymakers a better insight into the immediate future than we
can. If Gromyko comes in more
amiably than we have forecast, the President will have the instincts and
time to pick up his cue, I would bet. What I’m afraid of is he’ll make
some “sneaky”, unacceptable proposal which we’ve failed to warn
about.
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared in the National Intelligence
Council2
Washington, September 25, 1984
SUBJECT
- Further Thoughts on Gromyko Visit
1. The very fact of Gromyko’s
visit here marks an important tactical turn in the Soviet approach
to the US—a turn spearheaded by the
ailing Chernenko and
supported by what appears to be a fragile consensus that could
evaporate with his passing from the scene.
2. We have only an imperfect understanding of how this change came
about. The Soviets may indeed have concluded that Mr. Reagan will be President for four
more years and are moving now to lay the groundwork for a better
working relationship. The political benefit accruing to President
Reagan, while presumably
undesirable in the Soviet leaders’ eyes, may have been played down
in their deliberations, with the rationalization that he is going to
win anyway—with or without a boost from Moscow.
3. We are not fully persuaded.
—It would seem, for example, totally out of character for the
Soviets to believe that they can expect to win concessions from
a formidable, committed opponent by doing him a gratuitous
favor—in this case a benign visit by Gromyko.
—For the four-more-years argument to prevail in Kremlin councils,
the burden of proof would have to be on those arguing that the
advantages of trimming sails before the US election (virtually ensuring a Reagan victory) clearly
outweigh the merits of hewing to the more obdurate, waiting
policy of the past spring and summer.
—The Soviets normally have a price (they don’t put much stock in
credit cards), and Gromyko presumably has his. And there is still
an outside chance that if he does not get satisfaction, the
Soviets will try to use Gromyko’s talks here to create a political
“defeat” for the President.
4. Most of the recent signs point in the opposite direction, however,
with Chernenko himself
spearheading Moscow’s more flexible, conciliatory approach. While he
continues to cast aspersions on Washington’s motives, his recent
statements are a marked departure from the acerbic rhetoric earlier
this year.
[Page 1000]
—On 5 September, shortly after the decision to send Gromyko, Chernenko talked about the need
“to infuse Soviet-US relations
with the elements of mutual trust that are so missing at
present.”
—In his Pravda “interview” on 2 September,3
Chernenko for the first
time raised the possibility of a connection between progress on
arms control in space and progress on other issues, including
INF and START. (Chernenko and his Politburo
colleagues have passed up several recent opportunities to
reiterate Moscow’s standard formulation about INF missile deployment being the
obstacle to resumption of talks.)
—Inserted into Chernenko’s
otherwise uninteresting speech today4 is the assertion that “there is no
sensible alternative” to the normalization of Soviet-US relations, phraseology
remarkably similar to President Reagan’s statement yesterday that “there is no
sane alternative” to negotiations on arms control and other
issues between the US and USSR.5
Chernenko went on to make
an unusually explicit allusion to the costliness of the arms
race. (Radio Moscow, in its initial reaction to the President’s
speech, took a much more negative line, claiming that he
continues to insist on US
military superiority.)
5. Turns in policy toward improving relations with the US have historically been highly
controversial among Kremlin leaders—and particularly when high-level
meetings are involved. The decision to send Gromyko was probably no
exception.
—It may, in some Byzantine way, have cost Ogarkov his job.6 (Ukrainian leader Shelest lost his in
1972 after he objected to the decision to go ahead with the
first Nixon summit just a few weeks after the US started bombing Hanoi and mining
Haiphong.)
—The fact that Soviet media have still not mentioned that
Gromyko will talk
with the President on Friday suggests that the subject remains
contentious. Soviet media also ignored the encounter at the
reception on Sunday evening.
—The bizarre way in which the Soviets handled the issue of ASAT talks over recent months
also suggests high-level division.
—In a recent conversation with a Western diplomat, a Soviet
official indicated that there are differences in Moscow on
dialogue with the US, and that
the decision to send Gromyko to meet with the President was a
particularly difficult one.
—Where Gromyko himself
stands in the apparent debate is not clear; most of the
reporting has him favoring a hard line.
6. If you think these musings are useful enough to send forward, we
could provide a version for the PDB
to carry tomorrow morning before Secretary Shultz meets with Gromyko.7
