Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

267. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 20, 1984

SUBJECT

• 1985—Year of Decision for Arms Control

EUR’s recent paper on the next four years of US-Soviet relations noted that 1985 was likely to be a particularly critical year for nuclear arms control.² This memo explores in greater detail the issues and dangers we will face this coming year. Our focus is explicitly short-term: how do we cope with a potentially serious and immediate set of problems. But our proposals will also need to be examined in the light of the longer-term piece we are doing for you reviewing the strategic situation as it is likely to develop toward the end of this decade, and suggesting means by which arms control could enhance stability.

The Erosion of the Current Regime

The current arms control regime, the product of two decades of intensive US-Soviet negotiations, has proven relatively resilient, withstanding five years of mounting suspicion, intense recrimination, lack of new accords or even progress toward them. Yet an unraveling process is visible, and is likely to accelerate in the months ahead. In recent months we have formally accused the Soviets of violating both the accord which opened that arms control era—the 1962 Limited Test Ban Treaty—and the agreement which closed it—the 1979 SALT II accord—as well as many arms control agreements concluded in between (most notably the ABM Treaty, viewed by many as the single example of an arms control agreement that has worked).³ Further, there is in preparation a report to Congress that will charge the Soviets with further violations.⁴

For our part, the United States has not ratified or put formally into effect (as opposed to “not undercutting” as a matter of policy) any US-Soviet arms control accord since 1973, nor have we concluded any such agreement since 1979. As a new four-year Presidential term opens, no bilateral US-Soviet arms control negotiations will be underway.

This erosion of the existing arms control regime is likely to gather further momentum. The Soviets are likely to persist and expand their self-serving interpretation of commitments under existing (and for the most part, unratified) arms control agreements—if not renounce them altogether. We will find ourselves under similar pressures. The SALT II accord was intended to run only until the end of 1985, and we will need either to abandon our “interim” compliance with it, or explain why we are extending the term of this “fatally flawed” accord in the face of numerous allegations of Soviet noncompliance. We will face this decision at precisely the moment when the provisions of that agreement would require us to begin dismantling existing US systems. For it is in late 1985 that the launching of another new Trident ballistic missile submarine will require the dismantling of Poseidon submarines or Minuteman III ICBMs if the US is to stay under the SALT II limits of 1200 MIRVed missile launchers.

We are thus entering an increasingly vicious cycle in which each side’s suspicions of the other’s intentions and actions make that side less likely to adhere scrupulously to its commitments, in turn further stimulating the other side to reinterpret or disregard its commitments. Our commitment to SDI, for instance, will force us to break, abrogate, or renegotiate the ABM Treaty within a few years. It is not credible to assume that the Soviets will wait passively until we do so, particularly given their own very active ABM program and the role that defense plays in their strategic doctrine. By the same token, there is already strong pressure within and outside the Administration for us to abandon our compliance with SALT I and II on the basis of judgments—based frequently on ambiguous evidence—of Soviet violations.

Are “Existing Agreements” Worth Preserving?

In the light of the Soviet compliance record, and the continued military buildup on both sides which has been permitted under existing agreements, one must ask whether the current arms control regime is in fact worth preserving. The following considerations should guide our answer:

—The Soviet Union is still observing the majority of its nuclear arms control commitments, although as noted, the trend toward noncompliance with selective constraints is quickening. These commitments place meaningful, if modest, constraints on the size and capabilities of US and Soviet offensive and defensive nuclear forces: for example, a ban on deployed ABMs save for one site per side; a prohibition on increases in the numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers, including a requirement that older missile submarines be dismantled as new ones are deployed; a ceiling on the number of missiles with MIRVs and limits on the number of warheads per missile.

—By certain measures, these constraints have been more onerous for the USSR than the US. In observing SALT I limits, the Soviets have in the last few years been forced to dismantle recent-vintage Yankee missile submarines, whereas the US has only had to retire Polaris submarines that had reached the end of their serviceable life in any case; moreover SALT II limits have prevented the Soviets from putting 20–30 warheads on their heavy SS–18 missiles, or from building any new ICBM silos.

—The Soviet Union could respond more quickly than the US to a lifting of these restraints to expand substantially the number of its missiles and warheads. The Soviets have a more active production base to support deployment of a substantial number of additional MIRVed ICBMs in existing single-warhead ICBM silos, and could quickly test existing types of missiles with greater numbers of warheads, as well as rapidly expand their ABM coverage, as noted above.

—The resultant situation, were the restraints to be lifted, could be more dangerous, less stable, and more costly for both sides.

The arms control regime built up over the past two decades has one key attribute particularly worth preserving—enhanced predictability. The network of commitments, and the extensive communications required to arrive at and sustain such undertakings, have increased both sides’ understanding of the other’s force structure and future plans. In an earlier era, lacking such understanding, the United States was constantly reacting to unpleasant surprises—the Soviet Union’s first atomic weapons test in 1949, five years earlier than expected; the Soviet Union’s first H-bomb test in 1953, only a year after the first such US test; the 1957 launch of Sputnik; the bomber gap of the mid-1950s; and the missile gap of the early 1960s. Our understanding of Soviet strategic programs has improved to the point where militarily important developments are projected years in advance of their actuality. For instance, the mid–1980s’ “window of vulnerability” of the US ICBM force was foreseen by the mid–1970s. Although we were not able to “solve” this problem in the interval, we have had time to adjust our thinking and plans to the new situation.

Today, however, as a result of the absence of serious arms control dialogue with the Soviets since the late 1970s, and despite our vast intelligence collection efforts, our understanding of Soviet strategic intentions is again deteriorating. As one example, the Soviets are developing and will soon begin deploying mobile ICBMs. Yet we remain uncertain as to the form of mobility (e.g., rail, road, cross-country) or the numbers envisaged. This is information which should have been the by-product of the START talks. Another example is our lack of any real understanding of how the Soviets plan to deploy their air, ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. A third example is our current uncertainty as to when the SS–20 program will stop, with total numbers already nearly double our earlier predictions.

The uncertainties we and the Soviets face over each other’s space weapons and ballistic missile defense programs are even more extensive. Our knowledge of where the Soviets may be going in these areas is skimpy, and having given them some unpleasant shocks with our recent ASAT and ABM tests, we will, in the absence of serious talks, ourselves encounter comparable surprises sooner or later.

Other Obstacles to Arms Control

Predictability is a necessary prerequisite to stability, for if one has less confidence in the future evolution of the strategic balance, one is less able to judge what steps are necessary to assure stability. While arms control alone cannot provide stability or guarantee security, it can create a more structured context in which both sides can develop force postures with a higher confidence of meeting those criteria.

Yet Americans have constantly asked more of arms control. Since the days of the Baruch Plan⁵ and the open-skies proposal,⁶ American hopes for arms control have been excessive. Beyond helping to establish the parameters of our strategic problems, we have insisted unrealistically that arms control solve them. This Administration has further fed unrealistic expectations for arms control, proposing for instance to abolish an entire class of INF weaponry, to close the window of ICBM vulnerability, and to eliminate the throwweight gap. If we are to make any progress in this area in the coming years, we must bring our objectives, and our rhetoric, into line with the more modest results we can expect to achieve.

But even a more modest set of goals will be difficult to achieve in the environment of the mid-1980s. For a decade arms control has been moving slowly, and finally not at all, while technology has been developing apace. There are three principal areas where the challenge to arms control is becoming particularly acute:

—Technological developments are making it more difficult to define or categorize many new weapons, and hence to limit them effectively. The line between strategic and tactical, between nuclear and conventional, between offensive and defensive weapons is becoming increasingly blurred. Cruise missiles epitomize this trend: they can carry conventional or nuclear warheads; they can be launched from airplanes and from ground- and sea-based launchers; their range can vary substantially depending on the payload and fuel supply; they are, as a result, suitable for a wide variety of missions ranging from short-range anti-ship to strategic counterforce attack. In addition to cruise missiles, many other systems also fall into the “gray areas” between traditional arms control categories: US dual-capable aircraft deployed in Europe, which the Soviets sought to limit in INF as “forward-based” nuclear systems, but which we insisted could not be constrained because of their conventional mission; the Soviet Backfire bomber, which was developed and deployed for theater missions, but which has inherent intercontinental capability; and the SS–20, which is deployed as an intermediate-range missile, but could be modified to attain intercontinental range.

—New weapons technologies are becoming increasingly difficult to verify. The miniaturization, versatility and mobility of new weapons systems makes it difficult, if not impossible, to monitor their numbers, range or armament through “national technical means,” and in some cases, even through intrusive on-site inspection. Cruise missiles, again, are the prime example. While the number of cruise missiles deployed on aircraft can be monitored with some confidence, their tiny size and mobility make them difficult to count when deployed in ground-launched versions, and virtually impossible to count when deployed on surface ships or submarines (where they can fit in any torpedo tube); determining whether they carry a conventional or nuclear warhead is impossible without taking each missile apart. Verification problems just as formidable are emerging in other areas, as both we and the Soviets move toward deployment of mobile ballistic missile systems which rely on concealment and deception for survivability. While we have been able to monitor SS–20 numbers because of their deployment at centralized bases, the Soviets may be developing a rail-mobile launcher for the SS–X–24 ICBM that will be far more difficult to verify.

—The growth of third-country nuclear arsenals is making it more difficult to pursue limitations on a strictly bilateral basis. The Soviets have long sought to obtain compensation for British and French nuclear forces, and this emerged as one of the central issues that blocked the INF talks. By the 1990s, when UK deployment of MIRVed Trident missiles is complete, [3½ lines not declassified]. These developments will make it harder for us to insist on strict US-Soviet equality in arms control agreements, despite the validity of our position that UK and French forces fulfill a qualitatively different role from that of US nuclear forces (in particular, they do not provide a “nuclear umbrella” for the non-nuclear states of NATO), and thus cannot be treated as one-for-one equivalents of US forces.

Arguably, many recent developments in strategic weaponry—nuclear SLCMs, mobile ICBMs, new ABMs—can enhance deterrence, reduce the incentive to strike first, and thus reinforce stability. But the growing uncertainties created by the unrestrained introduction of these new technologies, especially in the current political climate, are stimulating new anxieties and suspicions, and thus uncertainty itself is becoming a source of additional tension and potential instability (as well as the cause of increasing public and congressional pressures for arms control results). Yet the problems of verification and definition are such that, even with the best will in the world, with an agreed agenda and sustained high-level commitment, the United States and the Soviet Union would be hard put to come up with sound and verifiable limitations on these weapons.

Restoring the Dialogue

Decisions taken by Washington and Moscow in the early months of 1985 will do more than set the pattern for another four years. Events in 1985 will determine whether the US and the USSR prove able to build upon the legacy of a generation in arms control, or whether we must begin again the slow process of constructing a wholly new structure for communication, mutual accommodation and restraint of defense programs.

The Soviet proposal for negotiations on space weapons offers one potential vehicle for a resumption of the US-Soviet arms control dialogue. We need, of course, not only a vehicle, but some fuel—that is, some substance for the dialogue. We have sent you our proposals for a comprehensive US approach to a Vienna meeting. EUR’s recommendation is for a three-year interim agreement on offensive and defensive systems, including:

—a three-year moratorium on all ASAT and ABM testing;

—interim reductions in offensive nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads along the lines of our START framework, perhaps expanded to encompass INF systems; and

—a commitment to open new nuclear arms talks encompassing both offensive and defensive systems, aimed at reaching accord by the end of the three-year interim agreement on deeper reductions and longer-term limits.

PM has recommended a somewhat different package:

—a limited-duration ban on testing of high- and low-altitude interceptors against targets in space;

—a short-duration moratorium on ASAT tests while talks proceed;

—an expression of U.S. willingness to go beyond our current START position along the lines of the earlier START concepts work, and to expand on last fall’s INF proposal, with a view toward concluding an early Valdivostok-style understanding on the outlines of a long-term offensive arms agreement; and

—a substantive discussion of future missile defense technologies with the possibility of negotiating specific limits in the longer term, but no immediate constraints on the SDI beyond those already contained in the ABM Treaty.

Unfortunately, it appears unlikely that we will have a Vienna forum for advancing a proposal along either of these lines this year. Indeed, much of next year could also be lost in sterile US-Soviet maneuvering over the modalities of resuming bilateral arms control talks. The President’s address to the UNGA in September offers an alternate venue to lay out such a new agenda for US-Soviet arms control;⁷ the interagency work going forward in preparation for Vienna could provide the basis for such a Presidential statement. Alternatively, you might put such a comprehensive proposal privately to Gromyko in September, as the suggested basis for more serious US-Soviet dialogue in the new year.

However the proposal is presented, we should not anticipate a positive Soviet response in the near term. But a set of realistic and attractive US proposals, along the lines cited above, could provide the basis for early resumption of the substantive dialogue in 1985. In particular, agreement on the main outlines of a long-term strategic arms reductions agreement, or negotiation of a shorter-term interim strategic accord involving more modest reductions, would provide the basis for dealing with the looming question of “interim” compliance before the problem of Soviet non-compliance and the momentum of our own defense buildup bring about the collapse of remaining restraints in the strategic arms field.

Preparing for the Worse

Even as we press for an optimum outcome—a resumption of serious US-Soviet negotiations on the basis of a meaningful and balanced US proposal—we also need to prepare for the situation more likely to obtain in 1985—an absence of meaningful communication on these issues between Moscow and Washington, declining compliance with existing commitments on both sides, accompanied by mounting pressures to abandon them altogether, and a quickening pace of technological and military developments which, while they may arguably reinforce our national security, will certainly generate a heightened sense of insecurity, which will in turn make a rational approach to arms control and defense planning all the more difficult.

In these difficult circumstances we will need to:

—elaborate the best possible case for further extending some or all of the SALT I and SALT II limits;

—deal with compliance issues in a way which does not further diminish Soviet incentives to fulfill their obligations;

—put forward publicly, even if the Soviets will not negotiate privately, a persuasive arms control agenda; and

—review the impact of our own evolving military programs upon the strategic balance.

We will also want to begin presenting a more modest vision of arms control. There will be a strong temptation to do just the opposite: to engage in public competition with the Soviets, each side touting ever more ambitious and unrealistic proposals. But if our rhetoric continues to feed the American public’s appetite for arms control, while our accomplishments fail to satisfy it, we will generate an eventually unmanageable counteraction—not against arms control, but against our management of it.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S, Lot Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, August 16–31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dobbins and Vershbow on August 17; cleared by J. Gordon (PM/SNP), R. Davis (PM/SNP), R. Dean (PM), and Palmer. An unknown hand wrote in J. Campbell (P) as an additional clearing official. Vershbow initialed for Dobbins. Forwarded though Dam. The memorandum was also slated to be sent through Armacost, but his name is struck through.
2. See Document 260.
3. See footnote 11, Document 159.
4. Reagan sent a report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements to Congress on October 10. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, p. 1493.
5. Bernard M. Baruch served as the U.S. representative at the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, where he presented a proposal to establish international oversight of atomic energy and prevent the unchecked proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of the 12 members of the UNAEC, the Soviet and Polish representatives abstained and prevented the adoption of the Baruch Plan. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. I, General; The United Nations, Documents 395–577.
6. For an explanation of President Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XX, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Document 48.
7. Reagan addressed the UN General Assembly on September 24. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 206. For the full text, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, pp. 1355–1361.