Attached is a paper setting forth alternative action plans for
U.S.-Soviet relations. It will provide useful background for our meeting
on the subject tomorrow.
Attachment
Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Staff2
Washington, March 1, 1984
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Program of Action for
1984
Background
The Soviets are holding to the position that it is up to us to make
the next step. Their main motivation is doubtless to bring pressure
to bear on us to make concessions in advance, in order to satisfy
public opinion. Other contributory factors may be that they are
unable to reach agreement on initiatives of their own, and—to a
degree—that they genuinely doubt our good faith in proposing
negotiations.
Their stance is unreasonable and we should avoid steps which
undermine important substantive positions.
Initiatives, however, are not necessarily the same as concessions.
The Soviet stance does not give us the opportunity to shape the agenda to our advantage by
carefully considered initiatives. There are some steps which are to
our net advantage; in other areas, largely cosmetic alterations on
our part could be used both to defuse domestic and allied pressures
and to attempt to elicit more substantial concessions on the Soviet
part.
We should also bear in mind that some of our positions are likely to
come under intense public and Congressional pressure in this
election year. Minor modifications in advance of that pressure can
preserve negotiating leverage which might be undermined if we stand
pat and the pressures grow.
A Fundamental Choice
We should decide at the outset whether:
(1) We will engage with low expectations and focus on the easier
peripheral issues.
(2) We will in fact attempt to achieve some major breakthroughs,
while recognizing that they may not be possible given the disarray
in the Soviet leadership.
[Page 664]
The first option (“Modest Scenario”) would require some expansion of
the dialogue and some steps in bilateral areas where solution favors
our long-term interests (e.g., exchanges, consulates).
The second option (“Ambitious Scenario”) would require, in addition,
some movement—either cosmetic or conceptual—in our arms control
positions. While concessions on basics are neither required nor
desirable, we must be prepared to concede enough in form to make it
possible for the Soviets to negotiate seriously. And we must be
prepared to consider innovative ways to achieve our basic
objectives.
The Modest Scenario
This would involve moving rapidly to resolve some bilateral issues
which are in our own long-term interest (exchanges agreement and
consulates in Kiev and New York), pressing for Soviet cooperation in
establishing better navigation aids on the airline route KAL 007 should have followed, trying
to settle other outstanding bilateral issues, and expanding the
dialogue into a number of regional and general topics. On arms
control, however, we would merely discuss the potential of our
existing proposals and wait for Soviet movement before changing any
of ours. On human rights, we would continue to make representations,
but would not offer concrete incentives (other than an improved
atmosphere) for better performance. An illustrative scenario is at
TAB A.3
The Ambitious Scenario
This would test the limits which might be achieved this year and
would include all the items in the Modest Scenario plus the
following:
(1) An attempt (initially in informal channels) to get START and INF off dead center by proposing a new START framework and indicating that,
in resumed negotiations, we would accept a modified
“Walk-in-the-Woods” solution to INF, to include some, but not all planned Pershing II
deployments. (This would address the most important immediate Soviet
concerns.)
(2) An attempt through private channels to agree on a series of
independent or joint steps by which the Soviets would take specified
actions in the human rights area, which would in turn trigger
certain actions by us on bilateral issues, provided the Soviets
refrain from going after additional “targets of opportunity” in the
Third World or on their borders.
Significant movement on these points would provide an adequate basis
for a successful summit meeting, which could produce renewed
[Page 665]
negotiations on START/INF and/or an agreed “work program” on other issues. If
the Soviets fail to move on any of them (as they well might), the
initiatives could be made public in late summer or early fall to
prove Soviet intransigence.
An illustrative scenario is at Tab B.4
PROS
—Would maximize whatever chances exist to make significant progress
this year.
—Could be used eventually, whether it works or not, to bolster our
public diplomacy.
—Could provide the basis for a successful summit.
—Since any alterations in our position would, for the most part, be
contingent upon prior or simultaneous action by the Soviets,
implicit concessions could not easily be pocketed.
—If successful, it would vindicate our policy of strength and could
be used to keep public support behind future efforts to deal
realistically with the Soviets.
CONS
—Soviets may not be either able or willing to make the hard decisions
rapidly enough to make it work.
—Premature leaks could endanger the whole process.
—Making proposals contingent upon Soviet actions does not totally
remove the danger that they would try to pocket changes in our
positions without corresponding changes in theirs.
—Even if successful, this course might lead to public euphoria, which
could undermine necessary support for our defense programs. It might
also be interpreted as a signal that we have written off
Afghanistan, Poland, and other important issues which would remain
unsolved.
Public Diplomacy
Whichever option we choose, it will be essential to minimize public expectations during the next few months.
If we raise expectations at this point, we hand the Soviets a
powerful lever to make our policy seem ineffectual just as the
result of their inaction. For several months to come we should be
very guarded in our predictions, both on the record and on
background, and should not encourage expectations either of a summit
or of major breakthroughs.
Such a stance would enhance the impact of a summit (if a productive
one can be arranged) and of any substantial progress in the
relation
[Page 666]
ship. In the
absence of major progress, however, it would permit us to explain in
late summer what we had attempted and to place the blame squarely on
the Soviets.
Recommendation:
I would endorse proceeding on the basis of the “Ambitious Scenario,”
bearing in mind that we will have to gauge each step we make as a
function of the quality of Soviet responses to earlier actions. In
short, we should maintain our policy of firmness and of making no
preemptive concessions but with evidence of good faith, “leaning
forward” to make clear our commitment to solving problems.5
