96. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
14798. Subject: Initial Call on Gromyko.
1. (C—Entire text)
2. Gromyko received the Ambassador at 10:30 October 21 for his initial, courtesy call. Gromyko was accompanied by USA Department Chief Komplektov and Viktor Sukhodrev, who interpreted. The Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM and Pol Counselor. As customary and requested, the Ambassador gave Gromyko a copy of the statement he will make when he presents his credentials (text [Page 332] below). Gromyko said that this would take place without delay and in the next few days.
3. Gromyko asked if there was anything the Ambassador wished to say and the Ambassador replied that the statement which he had just handed over contained the principles which he would follow in carrying out his mission. He had had long talks before leaving Washington. He thought the talks which the Secretary and Gromyko had in New York were a useful beginning. The two sides had exchanged more-or-less well known views. He hoped we could go forward from this, that we could proceed to discuss specific issues and make some progress toward positive solutions to them. The Secretary was looking forward to his next meeting with Gromyko early in the New Year.
4. The Ambassador said he knew from listening to Radio Moscow that there are some doubts on the Soviet side about the willingness of the Reagan administration to negotiate seriously on arms control and a large number of other issues. He could assure Gromyko that we are serious and that he will find us prepared in the coming negotiations, and at the next ministerial meeting, to discuss arms control, including strategic arms control. The careful preparations which the U.S. side was making were necessary in our system; Gromyko was a long time observer of the U.S. and he knew this. If we did not reach agreement among the various groups which are interested and involved in arms control matters, we would not be able to reach a good agreement in negotiations. The Soviet side should welcome our careful preparations, because when we reach agreement it will be one on which we can stand.
5. The Ambassador recalled that he had participated in the SALT process and, speaking personally, he thought that the disappointing results had come from waiting too long and having missed times when we could have reached an agreement earlier. Perhaps the sides had set their sights too high. If we had moved earlier, an agreement would probably be in effect today. He looked forward to discussing arms control issues with Gromyko and also the other issues which had been raised by the Secretary in his meetings with the Minister. He hoped that we could arrive at a better idea of how we see those issues, and reach solutions for them.
6. Gromyko said his attention was drawn to what the Ambassador had said about the American side being prepared for the meeting early next year. It would be good if the American side was ready, because up to now it had not been prepared to touch upon the substance of matters. This was apparent, and the Secretary had said so directly in their meeting. If the U.S. side will be prepared on substance, the Soviet side will be prepared, and that would be a small step in the right direction.
7. Gromyko said he would also not question what the Ambassador had said to the effect that it could have been possible, if both sides [Page 333] had desired it, to have prepared the SALT agreement earlier. For its part, the Soviet side had done everything required of it to cope with the tasks set before both sides in reaching agreement on SALT II. But this was past and he would like to hope that both sides would take that experience into account. Time does not stand still. Talks should not be dragged out, but should come to agreement. Practical conclusions should be drawn from past experience and concrete agreements should be reached in the future.
8. Gromyko said he believed the Ambassador shared his view that Moscow, like Washington, is a place where there is no lack of work for Ambassadors from major powers. This had always been the case and would be so in the future. He welcomed the Ambassador as an experienced diplomat who would find no lack of work in Moscow. This had always applied equally for Soviet Ambassadors in Washington, and every one of them felt he had quite enough work and a large field of it. He wished the Ambassador every success in fulfilling his very responsible duties in developing relations. He could always count on the cooperation of the MFA, and other agencies and departments of the Soviet Government. He would not be fettered by protocol or any other limitation—not overly fettered, he should say. The door would always be open at the Foreign Ministry.
9. Gromyko (after Komplektov whispered in his ear) said he would take the opportunity to call attention to the reply Brezhnev had given to a question (on limited nuclear war) asked him by a Pravda correspondent, which was published in that day’s issue of Pravda. The Soviet side would like to hope that Washington will approach with all seriousness the reply Brezhnev gave. Gromyko did not wish to dwell upon this but he called attention to it.
10. The Ambassador handed Gromyko the relevant text of the President’s remarks to the out-of-town editors on October 16,2 and said he hoped that after reading it Gromyko would agree that the President had not drawn the conclusions on nuclear war which Pravda attributed to him. As the President said, we do not believe that nuclear war is winnable and we strongly oppose it, the Ambassador said. He looked forward to discussing nuclear arms control with Gromyko in the future. He hoped that, while awaiting discussion on strategic arms control, we could proceed to discuss other issues which the Secretary had raised in his meeting with the Minister. Komplektov asked if the text of the President’s remarks which the Ambassador had handed over was a clarification of what the President had said on the 16th, and when the [Page 334] Ambassador replied that it was the verbatim text of those remarks, Gromyko said he understood, that the text which the Ambassador had given him was from the President’s meeting with the “provincial press” (the original source).
11. Gromyko said he well recalled his conversations with the Secretary. They were, of course, very useful, he agreed, but the substance of matters was only ahead; those conversations were only the beginning.
12. The Ambassador said Brezhnev’s letter to the President was appreciated for its expression of willingness to continue the dialogue. Rising to end the conversation, Gromyko replied that “we are in favor of that.”
13. The conversation lasted 30 minutes.
14. Following is text of the Ambassador’s credentials statement, a copy of which was handed to Gromyko. Begin text.
I have the honor to present Your Excellency the letter of credence by which the President of the United States accredits me as Ambassador of the United States of America to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Together with this I present the letter of recall of my predecessor, Ambassador Thomas J. Watson, Jr. It is both a professional and a personal honor for me to present my credentials as the 17th Ambassador of the United States of America to the Soviet Union. I come directly from service in a country with whose government our ties span over two centuries to a country with whose government we have had official contact for less than half a century. Yet nobody can doubt that the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is—and will remain for as far ahead as we can see—of fundamental importance to the peoples of our two countries and to the prospects of peace in the world.
The American and the Soviet people have much in common. Inhabiting a continental land mass, we share a frontier spirit and a sense of pioneering. We are hospitable peoples. We have never fought each other; indeed, we fought side by side in a great World War.
Nevertheless, our relationship has always been fraught with complexity and competition, and often with confrontation and hostility. We are divided, perhaps irrevocably, by political systems which differ in basic and immutable aspects. And we are divided—I hope not irrevocably—by attitudes and actions which may arise from those basic differences in our systems. Such divisions are particularly dangerous because they threaten global stability and peace.
My government is fully committed to reducing those divisions. We are opposed to sterile confrontations, to an arms race, to the absence of dialogue between our governments. We will work for a constructive East-West relationship, for genuine arms control, and for the resolution [Page 335] of disputes by negotiation. But those objectives can be reached only if each of us acts with restraint and in a spirit of reciprocity. We Americans will do so. And we urge the Soviet Union as well to review, in the light of these two factors, its policies and actions in the world.
In these circumstances, your government will find us, Mr. Chairman, ready to respect your status and your legitimate interests. You will find us ready to conduct a serious dialogue on a wide range of important problems. The agreement of Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko to meet early next year is, for our part, an expression of that readiness.
We are prepared to undertake with you a searching examination of ways to resolve the major issues dividing us. We have specific approaches to these issues—approaches which meet the legitimate interests of all parties. Let me list some of them:
—We will enter the talks on theater nuclear forces next month in a positive and constructive spirit.
—We are ready to begin SALT negotiations during the first half of next year. We will approach them with good will and with the conviction that they must be characterized by reciprocity.
—We have no wish for an expensive and dangerous arms escalation, but—in view of a major and unprovoked Soviet program to build up its military forces—we have no choice but to respond.
—When the Madrid meeting resumes next week, we will maintain our commitment to a conference to consider significant and verifiable confidence-building measures. And we remain convinced that progress in the military field must be balanced by progress on human rights.
—We strongly believe that we both have a responsibility to refrain from seeking unilateral advantages and from supporting—either directly or indirectly—the use of force, subversion, or terrorism. Our obligation, rather, is to work for moderate, lawful, and peaceful solutions in all areas of the world, and to leave sovereign peoples free to determine their own future.
—We believe the Soviet Union has a responsibility to deny support to Cuba for its efforts directed against sovereign governments in Africa and Latin America.
—On Kampuchea we urge the Soviet Union to persuade Vietnam to join an international conference aimed at a political solution.
—In Southern Africa, we believe that our two countries should have common objectives: an independent Namibia and an Angola free of outside involvement or threat.
—And in Afghanistan, we should set as common goals: an Afghanistan which is non-aligned, secure, and free of outside interference, and whose people are free to chart their own course.
[Page 336]This is a difficult agenda, but we are convinced that it must be addressed in a serious manner by both our governments. For our part, that is how we will address it, because we are vitally interested in the peaceful resolution of international tensions and in building a stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. If I did not personally share that vital interest, I would not have participated in earlier high-level meetings between our two governments, and I would not be standing here today. As President Reagan’s representative to your government, I pledge myself to the task of advancing our dialogue with you—a dialogue which is indispensable to progress in our bilateral relations and to enhancement of the prospects for peace. End text.