Time: 2:00 p.m.
To obtain views of your advisors on US-Soviet relations and next steps in the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations. No decisions are
required.
You asked us to examine the significance of the change in leadership in the
Soviet Union and to determine what opportunities or problems might exist as
a result of that change. In particular, you asked that we assess what
opportunities or problems may exist in arms control.
None.
Based upon the flow of the meeting, you may wish to provide guidance on the
matters raised. However, no specific decisions are required at this
particular time.
Tab B
Paper Prepared in the Department of State4
US-SOVIET RELATIONS
Executive Summary
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to consider what we can expect from the
Soviets over the next 6–24 months and how we should attempt to steer
East-West relations in that same period. It concludes with a summary of
possible Soviet initiatives, suggested US responses, and possible US
initiatives. These conclusions are based on analysis of:
• the Andropov regime’s view of
the world situation and of how Soviet interests can be advanced;
• the strength of Andropov’s
political position and the resources and constraints that define what he
can attempt and achieve; and
• our view of American interests and what we would like to see the
Soviets do, stop doing, or abstain from doing insofar as their conduct
affects our interests.
This study is based on the long-term framework for US policy toward the
USSR established by NSDD 11–82.5
THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW
Assets and Liabilities
In assessing its inheritance, the Soviet leadership finds major gains and
assets:
• superpower status and global reach;
• a quarreling, economically shaky West;
• domestic political stability; and
• an economy strong enough to support massive military outlays while
keeping popular discontent within tolerable limits;
. . . as well as problems:
• discontent in Eastern Europe;
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• declining productivity, morale and economic growth (to below 2% percent
per annum);
• the Afghanistan predicament; and
• Western—especially American—rearmament.
With regard to military competition, the regime finds itself with:
• rough overall balance, with Soviet leads in ground forces, long-range
INF missiles, and ICBMs, as well as
reduced American advantages in naval and other power projection forces
and in military technology;
. . . but also:
• prospective loss of the Soviet advantage in INF, as well as American
strategic modernization and restored American naval and technological
supremacy.
Basic Choices
On balance, Brezhnev’s successors
will be sufficiently content with these conditions, unsure of how to
effect basic change, and sober about the consequences of unregulated
competition or direct confrontation with us that they will not be
inclined to depart from the country’s general historical course.
The leaders probably think the economy can sustain roughly the current
pace of military effort (4% per annum growth) and international
aggrandizement, but not much more. It would take a much graver economic
crisis than expected to force the regime to consider military and
international contraction, given that this would mean abandonment of
Brezhnev’s main achievement:
Soviet might and reach comparable to ours. At the same time, the
deteriorating economic situation will make the regime cautious about
taking on a larger military burden and new international liabilities. In
sum, the regime will opt for neither an expansionist surge nor broad
retrenchment.
Nothing in Andropov’s background
or character suggests that he would be predisposed to swing widely from
Brezhnev’s course. Moreover,
while his position in the leadership is strong—in part because his
colleagues want a strong leader—he is bound by consensus, and
particularly beholden to Ustinov
and Gromyko. These factors also
militate against major domestic or international shifts.
Foreign Policy Directions
This by no means implies passive continuity in foreign policy. The
difficulty of effecting domestic change could encourage foreign policy
dynamism, albeit within the framework set under Brezhnev. The Soviet leaders may see
more sophisticated, innovative, agile, and diversified diplomacy as the
best and cheapest way to undercut and pressure us,
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expand their influence, relieve internal
pressures, and perhaps cut the political costs of some of their more
exposed positions abroad. They may be contemplating a mix of selective
international “opportunity-seizing” and “loss-cutting,” but in both
cases with costs, risks and deviations kept to a minimum.
The new leadership, like the old, sees in Washington an Administration
that refuses to respect Soviet status and prerogatives as an equal
superpower, even while—in their view—exaggerating Soviet military
advantages. They see us as having raised the costs and risks of military
and international competition. However, they may doubt the
Administration’s ability to maintain a national consensus in support of
restoring American strength, or to forge a Western consensus around
Washington’s East-West outlook and policies. They doubt our willingness
to respond positively to anything less than a broad Soviet retreat,
which they will not contemplate.
For some in Moscow, this assessment of Washington calls for a more
confrontationist approach, an expanded Soviet military effort, greater
sacrifice, and less regard for Western public opinion. There may be
those at the other extreme who believe the USSR must deal directly with American concerns in order to
avert a level of competition and confrontation the country cannot
afford. However, while resource constraints will work against the
advocates of a major military and international surge, they will not
dictate retreat either. Thus, the view most likely to prevail is that
US-Soviet relations should be placed in a holding pattern until it
becomes clear whether or not this Administration’s strategic approach is
a passing phenomenon.
Thus, on the whole, with the possible exception of START, it is unlikely that the Soviets
see much percentage in making major concessions in the hope of
satisfying this Administration. They may probe our willingness to do
business with them, but their expectations will be low. They are more
likely to try even harder to put us on the defensive politically and to
stimulate a public and Allied backlash against our policies. In the
process, however, they might be induced to take some real if limited
steps that would partially meet our concerns.
With regard to arms control (notably START and INF), the Soviets have a definite interest in
somehow heading off unrestrained competition. Indeed, the leadership may
be less than sanguine about having to back up threats of stepped-up
Soviet military programs in the event that our effort continues. At the
same time, they doubt that we are genuinely interested in agreements
that take account of their concerns (e.g., cruise missiles), and their
military establishment is in a position to block “disadvantageous”
deals. The Soviets will therefore follow an integrated arms control
strategy combining propaganda with real but limited concessions, their
purpose being to cut off domestic and Allied
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support for our build-up while leaving open the
possibility of our addressing their concerns and thus reaching
agreements. To the degree they succeed in cutting off our support, they
will care less about actually reaching agreements with us, since they
could then avoid reducing their forces without fear of being forced into
an expanded military effort.
In general, the Soviet leaders may feel that Soviet interests are best
served by isolating and “outflanking” us as much as possible—that is, by
orienting their foreign policy away from US-Soviet relations, and by
trying to come to grips with some of their problems without reference to
us. This would enhance their freedom to ignore our concerns, their
ability to weaken our relations with others, and their ability to pursue
new initiatives. In INF, the direct negotiations with us are secondary,
indeed subordinated, to the task of turning Europe against deployments.
Even in START, where they must deal
with us, they will try to reach American public opinion over our
heads.
Trying to operate around the US over the next 6–24 months would represent
a necessary “tactical”—and, they probably hope, temporary—departure from
the Soviets’ basic emphasis on the centrality of the US-Soviet
relationship in managing world affairs.
THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON
Assessment
Our program to re-establish American ascendancy involves rearmament,
world economic recovery, respect for international law and order, and
the promotion of democratic values. Progress in achieving these goals
affects and is affected by our competition with the Soviet Union.
• The more successful we are in our overall program, the more able we
will be to induce more restrained Soviet conduct or, failing that, to
counter Soviet misconduct.
• The Soviets want to impede our program, mainly by dividing us from
those at home or abroad whose support we need for success.
The results we have achieved so far are mixed:
• We have succeeded in making the Soviets more cautious but we have not
caused them to retreat from existing positions.
• We have increased public awareness of the Soviet challenge here and
abroad, but we have not laid to rest questions about our own commitment
to better East-West relations—questions which the Soviets are quick to
feed.
Our Goals
Over the next 6–24 months, our chief aims toward the competition should
be:
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• to consolidate domestic consensus in support of sustained growth in
defense spending, and thus to convince the Soviets that they are not
witnessing a passing phenomenon;
• to prevent further Soviet encroachments;
• to reduce existing international problems caused by the Soviets, and to
increase the costs to the Soviets of those problems on which there is no
progress;
• to maintain control of the East-West agenda, the terms by which
problems are dealt with, and the standards by which Soviet behavior is
measured;
• to strengthen our general Western coalition and keep our coalitions on
specific issues intact;
• to reduce Western contributions to Soviet power and dependence on
East-West trade;
• to engage the Soviets constructively on issues where our interests
overlap; and
• to show that our approach to East-West relations is bearing fruit, in
the sense that both Soviet behavior and our competitive position are
beginning to improve.
Because the Andropov regime will
probably follow a more active and sophisticated foreign policy, oriented
away from addressing problems with us and on our terms, and because it
may find it easier to mollify others than to satisfy us, we need to
preserve our influence over the manner in which outstanding issues are
played out. This does not mean that we should alter our general stance:
we should remain in a broadly reactive posture, in the sense that only
genuine improvement in Soviet conduct will bring about more positive
American policies toward the USSR. At
the same time, in view of the Soviet policies we foresee, we may need to
take initiatives to maintain our coalitions and to maintain demanding
but attainable standards for Soviet conduct on outstanding problems.
Because we cannot force broad Soviet retreat, we should be selective and
opportunistic ourselves if we want to cause concrete improvement in
Soviet conduct in the next two years. To remain relevant regarding
international problems the Soviets would like to deal with without
reference to us (e.g., Poland, Afghanistan, Kampuchea), we have to be,
and appear to be, realistic in setting near-term goals. Our long-term
goals concerning such problems could become obsolete if we don’t define
the near-term progress we want. We should be true to our promise to
respond positively to real improvement in Soviet international conduct
and reasonable in recognizing what is real and what is not or else we
will lose our capacity to influence Moscow and to keep our partners with
us. We will assist the Soviets in their effort to isolate
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us if we are seen as staking
out rigid and maximal positions that we know cannot be a basis for
progress, however noble those positions might be.
Just as the Soviets may now try to outflank us, we have to be ready to
execute our own political flanking movements to ensure that they cannot
escape from our agenda of concerns and our standards for responsible
conduct and real progress. This means we should consider how to use not
only US-Soviet relations to induce improved Soviet behavior but also our
relations with other key actors, such as our European Allies, Japan,
China, ASEAN, Pakistan, and African
Front-Line States. Only if we frustrate Soviet efforts to divide us from
our support, at home and abroad, can we induce them to move from shadow
to substance as they attempt to reduce the costs to them of the problems
they have caused.
With regard to arms control, we should above all avoid being left in a
position in which Soviet programs are not limited while ours cannot be
sustained due to lack of public and Allied support. To the degree the
Soviets can convince our own and European publics that we do not want
progress, they may succeed in blocking our rearmament while avoiding
reductions and retaining their advantages. Our aim must be to avoid
being outmaneuvered in this way without compromising our principles of
reductions, equality and verifiability.
The Relationship of Short-term and Long-term
Goals
Even if we succeed over the next two years in preserving support for our
policies, in preventing new Soviet encroachments, and in reducing one or
more outstanding problems, the basic facts of US-Soviet relations will
persist: the Soviets will still have the means and incentive to
challenge our interests in the Third World; they will be able to
maintain the internal discipline needed to bear a massive military
burden; and they will continue to try to undermine support for Western
rearmament.
If we want to alter these facts fundamentally within the next two years,
the approach outlined above is inadequate. Some would therefore argue
that instead of trying to reduce existing problems, we should allow them
to get worse for the sake of weakening the Soviets. By this reasoning,
we should, for example, not help the Soviets find a way to put their
Afghanistan encumbrance behind them. We should not facilitate Vietnamese
withdrawal from Kampuchea, nor address Soviet objectives as part of the
give-and-take of arms control. And we should do nothing to avert turmoil
in Eastern Europe—much less in the USSR itself—that could relieve the Soviets’ burden.
Others believe that there are several basic flaws in this line of
reasoning:
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• It seriously underestimates the Soviets’ ability to cope with their
problems and to resort to extraordinary harshness to maintain control
and avoid defeat.
• It overestimates our ability to preserve essential support among those
at home and abroad who want to see outstanding problems solved, even if
the Soviets might stand to gain.
• It ignores our genuine interests in easing human suffering (whether in
Kampuchea or Afghanistan) and advancing reconciliation, justice, and
human rights (as in Poland).
• Most fundamentally, it overlooks the fact that we are in a dynamic
situation, dealing with volatile problems which could lead to dangerous
instabilities we may not be able to control. Southwest Asia and nuclear
arms competition are but two graphic examples. Simply put, while we may
be able to damage Soviet interests through uncontrolled competition, we
cannot be confident of safeguarding our own. Thus, we want to contain
and reduce conflict, even as we force the Soviets to pay a high price
for their misdeeds.
In sum, having advanced a set of goals for improved Soviet behavior, this
Administration should not and cannot now fail to seize whatever
opportunities present themselves to achieve them, even if the Soviets
can benefit from a lessening of the problems they have created.
Moreover, if we can show in the course of the next two years that we are
causing the Soviets to behave more responsibly, we will help to
establish a durable political basis for this Administration’s approach
for the rest of this decade and beyond.
[Omitted here is the remainder of the Executive Summary.]
