1. The precedent of an extended period for a new Soviet leader to consolidate
power does not apply. Andropov is a
“leader who has come to power with firm support in the Politburo at the
outset, and who has a mandate to act in both domestic
and foreign affairs.” He is supported by the military, the security
apparatus and powerful conservative elements of the Party.
The report concludes that the Soviet Union is likely to pose an even greater
threat to U.S. security as we are faced with a more active, intelligent,
adroit adversary—Andropov.
Attachment
Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence
(Gates) to Director of
Central Intelligence Casey
and the Deputy Director of Intelligence (McMahon)4
No. DDI # 9593–82
Washington, November 20, 1982
SUBJECT
-
Andropov: His Power and
Program
1. The emerging conventional wisdom seems to be that the USSR will now enter a period of collegial
rule in which continuity will be stressed and the new leaders will hold
back from significant policy changes for the near to medium term. In
this view, Andropov will be
preoccupied with internal matters such as improving the economy and any
new initiatives that do appear will likely focus on domestic affairs
rather than foreign policy. The immediate post-Khrushchev period is
cited as precedent for what will happen.
2. I believe that analysis is based on a misreading of the events of
recent days, Andropov’s
character, and history. In 1953, a number of new initiatives followed
the death of Stalin (and preceded Khrushchev’s consolidation of power)—a
purge of the KGB, an end to the
intra-party terror, the Virgin Lands program, a decision to end the
Korean War, and a mending of relations with the Yugoslavs. In 1964, the
new leaders swept aside a number of major changes Khrushchev had made in
the party organization, sharply raised investment in agriculture, began
the heavy military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, and actively began
to support North Vietnam’s effort to take over the South.
3. Andropov comes to power at a
time when there is a widely perceived need for renewal in the USSR—to get the economy moving again, to
get rid of corruption, to restore discipline, to reassert the idealism
of the Revolution and relatedly to reaffirm Russia’s mission
[Page 844]
ary/evangelical role at home
and abroad. Perversely, this often takes the shape of nostalgia for
Stalin. It is his forcefulness, toughness, decisiveness and ability to
move the country that the Party seeks in Andropov—believing they can have all that without the
old dictator’s less welcome attributes (such as a tendency to shoot his
colleagues).
4. The Soviet leadership appears to have decided last spring that
Andropov was the man to lead
the USSR out of its political and
economic doldrums after Brezhnev’s death. He was moved from the KGB back to the Central Committee
Secretariat, a more appropriate and acceptable launching point. I
believe that since then he has steadily consolidated his power and
begun, with his colleagues, to develop new initiatives and implement
certain of them—even before assuming power. As the Soviets say, “it is
not by accident” that in the last several months we have seen both a new
internal crackdown in the Soviet Union and also a major new initiative
in foreign policy—the effort to improve relations between the Soviet
Union and China. There also are indications that the military has been
asking for additional resources. In my judgment, Andropov has been behind the first two
of these initiatives and supported the third.
5. In brief, I believe the precedent of an extended period for the new
leader to consolidate power—as with Brezhnev after the overthrow of Khrushchev—does not
apply this time around. This view is supported by Andropov’s prompt appointment; his
clear authoritativeness during events surrounding Brezhnev’s funeral; his role and
“presence” in meetings with the principal foreign visitors; the quick
promotion of an old KGB colleague to
the Politburo; and his speeches at the Central Committee Plenum and
Supreme Soviet. This time we have a leader who has come to power with
firm support in the Politburo at the outset, has a mandate to act in both domestic and foreign affairs, and will do
so.
6. The nature of this succession and the character of Andropov himself argue strongly that he
will move promptly and broadly to tackle many of Russia’s problems. For
the first time in Soviet history, there has been a smooth succession
where the new leader has assumed power in an orderly way and probably
with greater leeway to make decisions than enjoyed by his predecessor.
Indeed, Andropov has been chosen
because he is a man who can make decisions and hopefully can end the
long period of drift, especially in internal affairs. He is on close
terms with the powerful conservative elements in the Soviet hierarchy
and is a man who can act with both intelligence and imagination on a
long list of pressing foreign and domestic issues. What we are likely to
see with Andropov is preservation
of the forms of “collegiality” but the absence of its paralyzing effect
on decisionmaking. All of the senior policymakers who might block
Andropov are dead or out of
power; those who remain, such as Ustinov and Gromyko, are
[Page 845]
closely allied with him; his presumed rival, Chernenko, appears (for now, at least)
to have been co-opted.
7. Given Andropov’s prompt and
apparently unchallenged accession to power, his personality and past
history, and the problems that face him, what might Andropov’s agenda resemble for the
coming period? On the basis of both 1953 and 1964, historical experience
would suggest that a number of changes or initiatives can be
expected:
Internal Affairs
—A continuation of the “vigilance” campaign and internal crackdown to
restore discipline, to give the impression of a strong hand at the top
again, to forestall any impression of internal relaxation as a result of
the succession, to keep the country well under control so that other
initiatives or reforms do not lead to unrealistic expectations or
spontaneous popular action, and to secure the home front for perhaps
severe measures to revive the economy.
—A major anti-corruption campaign by a man who is said to have a
reputation for being relatively “clean” among Soviet leaders. The
promotion of Aliyev to the Politburo further suggests action in this
area. It is plain that many of the present political problems in Poland
and Romania grow out of popular awareness and resentment of the
corruption of senior party officials. While Andropov would have to proceed carefully with this, the
KGB’s role in exposing the
corruption of Brezhnev’s family
early in the year is indicative of his willingness to use this issue
both politically and for larger ends. With his KGB background, he would know against whom to strike. There
might even be a return of an occasional show trial specifically for
corruption, although Andropov
would choose the targets with care to insulate his strongest
supporters.
—It seems logical and likely that Andropov would press for additional resources for both
the military and the KGB. These are
important constituencies for him and for his principal supporters in the
leadership. While there might be some reallocation of priorities within
the military, overall greater resources to respond to the perceived
increased threat from the US are in the cards, in my view.
—On the economy, while specific policies are difficult to forecast at
this point, we should expect “reform” and perhaps some limited
experimentation. The focus on internal discipline, anti-corruption and
vigilance—in essence, the maintenance of strict internal controls—must
go hand in hand with any effort to undertake economic reform or
experiments, witness the Polish experience. While a more detailed
analysis of economic options available to the new leadership will take
more time, the essential message is that we should anticipate change in
this area and it seems likely to involve (1) greater trade with the
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West, (2) more problems for us
in the area of technology transfer, and (3) more difficulty with our
Western and Japanese allies over the issue of trade with the East. The
idea of Andropov’s willingness to
consider reform in the Soviet economy is suggested by stories that he
has been the protector of Hungarian economic reform and is willing to
consider such new approaches—although Hungary is obviously a much
smaller country and the costs of failure are not as high (always a
disincentive to agricultural reform in Russia).
—In the Party itself, I expect to see Andropov move to improve the competence of senior
officials generally while ensuring that the new men are sympathetic to
his objectives and politically supportive. He already is placing his own
people in openings on the Politburo, Secretariat, and elsewhere in the
hierarchy.
—More generally, Andropov’s
advocacy at the Supreme Soviet of greater realism in planning and
recognition of problems, and the call of an important Soviet newspaper
editorial last week for a major revamping of the Soviet bureaucracy,
both suggest that significant changes are in store internally.
Foreign Policy
—US:
Andropov seems likely to pursue a
policy directed at achieving simultaneously some visible reduction in
tensions with the United States, curbing new US arms programs,
preventing the deployment of INF, and dividing the US from its European
allies. A conciliatory approach to the United States and effective use
of peace-oriented propaganda and “active measures” are to be expected.
The Soviets will try to reinforce notions already current in the West of
the need for forthcoming gestures to the new Soviet leader and the need
to take advantage of this “new beginning.” While the European decision
on INF remains uncertain it would seem most unlikely for the Soviets to
abandon the Geneva talks. Rather, we should be prepared for imaginative
Soviet initiatives both in negotiations and in public in the next few
months to throw the US on the defensive and increase divisions between
the Europeans and ourselves. Should INF deployment actually begin, the
Soviets could then walk out in Geneva and blame failure on the US. They
would subsequently strive to prevent full deployment by playing on
European fears and purported US intransigence.
The Soviets have seen a steady deterioration in US-Soviet relations for
seven years under three US administrations. I believe they have
concluded that the moment for establishing a more benign relationship on
their terms has passed. Arms control negotiations and other forms of
cooperation with the US government are likely considered to hold out
little prospect of success for years to come. Thus, Andropov probably will focus Soviet
policy on isolating the US and trying, through
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all instruments available to him, to build
opposition to US military modernization and to US policies toward the
USSR generally, both in the US and
abroad.
—East-West Trade:
Andropov likely will continue
efforts to tie East and West Europe to the USSR through economic “cooperation” and trade. The Soviets
already are aware of the leverage they hold because of the value of
East-West trade to the West and the jobs said to depend upon it. Trade
thus has both economic and political benefits for
them. Andropov presumably will
strive to maximize these benefits and seek a corollary benefit in the
strains such increased dealings will bring between the US and its
allies. After removal by the US of sanctions imposed after Afghanistan
and after Poland, this instrument of US policy will have little
credibility in the future in Soviet eyes. Indeed, Andropov will see the US as little more
than an annoyance in the area of trade and technology transfer, unable
to impose discipline inside the US, much less in Europe and Japan.
—Eastern Europe:
Andropov reportedly has evinced
considerable hostility to the Yugoslavs, Romanians and Czechs in the
past—implying little tolerance for deviation from loyalty to Moscow and
political orthodoxy. Almost as proof, his meeting with the Yugoslavs
after the Brezhnev funeral was
“harsh” and he pointedly snubbed Ceausescu. On the other hand, he is
said to be close to Kadar of Hungary and a protector of Hungarian
economic reforms. This and other information suggests some flexibility
toward East European efforts to cope with economic problems but only
within the context of close ties to the USSR and firm party control. As in the USSR, Andropov could well urge his East European colleagues to
impose stricter discipline at home—accompanied by a campaign to root out
obvious and damaging corruption in high places, perhaps by making
examples of some officials.
—Afghanistan: Afghanistan seems to be a candidate
for a new Soviet initiative to try to diminish in some measure both the
insurgency there and their military role. It continues to be an
embarrassment for them in Islamic countries as well as in the West, it
does impose a certain military cost in both materiel and casualties, and
it is an obstacle to any significant reconciliation with the Chinese.
Some new initiative combining a new government with some greater
legitimacy in Afghanistan (although still under Soviet control) coupled
with strong pressure on Pakistan to abandon its supporting role for the
insurgents could conceivably meet with some success if orchestrated well
by the Soviets. It could involve a government in Kabul with a figleaf
image of neutrality and a diminution of support for the insurgents that
would allow the Soviets to withdraw at least some of their forces.
—Middle East: The short term options are not
bright, but the Soviets are prepared to be patient. Egypt and Iran are
the big prizes and
[Page 848]
Andropov will pursue overt and
covert policies designed to take advantage of any instability in either
country.
—Kampuchea: Kampuchea is another area where the
Soviets could make some concessions to the Chinese for larger ends.
Never before have the Soviets shown any particular sensitivity to
Hanoi’s concerns. While Vietnam might not abandon its campaign in
Kampuchea under Soviet pressure, the Soviets still could claim to the
Chinese that they were no longer supporting Vietnam’s effort and were
amenable to new political arrangements that could be worked out. This
might involve some sort of face saving settlements that would not
represent a defeat for Vietnam but would get most of their troops out of
the country.
—Third World: In the Third World, I believe we can
expect not only a continuation of the direct and indirect
destabilization activities the Soviets have had underway in recent years
but perhaps an increase in that activity. In many ways Soviet policy in
the Third World is likely to be indicative of a more assertive Soviet
role abroad generally, although as our papers on Andropov have made clear, he prefers to
win by strategem and maneuver rather than resort to force—although he
will use force if maneuvering fails and the risks are deemed
acceptable.
—China: As I have suggested in several places
above, I believe Andropov is
playing a key role in the new initiative to try and patch things up with
China. At some point, this will involve tough decisions for the Soviets
because any real reconciliation with China will require acceding to
Chinese preconditions relating to Afghanistan, Kampuchea or Soviet
deployments along the Chinese border. The latter is probably the easiest
area for the Soviets to be responsive. Andropov’s pointed conversation with Foreign Minister
Huang Hua after Brezhnev’s
funeral, the meeting between Huang Hua and Gromyko the next day and Chinese willingness to send
Huang Hua is indicative of both powers intent to pursue an improved
relationship at minimum and to improve their mutual positions with
respect to the US.
8. In sum, the US faces a new and, in many ways, far more intelligent and
skillful adversary than we confronted in Khrushchev or Brezhnev—and a man who is a “doer”. He
is familiar with the world and a realist. My money says we will face a
much greater challenge from the USSR
under his leadership. While the specifics of his program are difficult
to construct, we should be prepared for significant new Soviet
initiatives in both internal and foreign policy. A leadership has come
to power during the last two weeks in the Soviet Union with greater
power and more unity at the highest level than after either the
succession in 1953 or 1964. It has come to power with considerable work
to do and Andropov is not a man
who will delay in setting in motion initiatives to address a number of
issues and problems. The effort to
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repair relations with China—long thought out of
the question by most analysts in the West—is indicative of the kind of
flexibility, pragmatism and boldness we can expect from this new leader.
His talks with the Yugoslavs and Finns are indicative of his willingness
to play hard ball.
