Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983

254. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, December 21, 1982

SPOT COMMENTARY: Andropov Addresses Soviet 60th Anniversary Meeting

In his speech this morning,² Andropov made public Moscow’s offer in the INF talks to reduce Soviet “medium range” missiles in Europe to a number equivalent to the UK and French missile forces. He appeared to tie this offer, however, to an additional agreement on INF aircraft. He reiterated Moscow’s threat to deploy an ICBM analogous to the MX and stated that the USSR was already testing a long-range cruise missile which would be deployed if the US proceeded to deploy long-range cruise missiles of its own.

At the same time, he reaffirmed Moscow’s commitment to strategic arms limitations and reiterated the Soviet Union’s willingness to reduce the level of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by 25 percent below the SALT II aggregates.

—Andropov’s INF missile proposal has previously been made by Soviet negotiators in Geneva. It implies a Soviet willingness to reduce approximately one-third of its SS–20 force opposite Europe in addition to the dismantlement of approximately 250 older SS–4 and SS–5 missiles. The Soviet offer remains contingent, however, on nondeployment of new NATO missiles.

—His announcement of the Soviet cruise missile program is new. It is intended to heighten pressure on West Europeans to break with NATO’s INF plans and may be related to previous Soviet threats to place the US in an analogous strategic position if NATO proceeds with INF modernization.

—Andropov’s claim that Moscow is willing to reduce strategic delivery vehicles by 25 percent is consistent with Moscow’s START offer to reduce 1,800 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers from the agreed SALT II level of 2,400.

Domestic Aspects

The domestic portion of Andropov’s speech provided few clues about the direction of policy in coming months, and suggested he has yet to formulate a comprehensive plan for attacking economic problems. He refrained from praising Brezhnev, however, perhaps out of a desire to dissociate himself from the policy failures of recent years.

Andropov’s remarks on domestic policy focused on the nationality question, as had Brezhnev’s speech 10 years ago and as was appropriate for the anniversary of the Soviet Union’s formation. Overall, his remarks emphasized the themes of Russian nationalism and political and economic centralization. He emphasized, for example, the need for greater regional specialization. And his statement that the final aim of nationality policy was the “merger” of national cultures and peoples, for example, was a centralizing formulation that has not been used in recent years. However, he seemed to call for increased representation of indigenous nationalities in the party and state institutions of non-Russian republics. He attributed the persistence of parochial tendencies among Soviet nationalities partly to “mistakes we make in our work.”

Andropov also made a brief reference to the food program, suggesting that this part of Brezhnev’s domestic policy will continue. He stressed the need to improve transportation, reinforcing other indications that improving the performance of this distressed sector will be a top priority.

Chernenko made a brief introductory speech. The prominent role accorded him indicates that he remains a key figure in the leadership, and further indicates that he is exercising responsibility within the Secretariat for ideology.

(The above preliminary assessments are based on the partial text available from TASS and Moscow Radio at time of writing and are not exhaustive.)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (12/20/1982–12/21/1982). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence by [names not declassified] (SOV) and [name not declassified] (SDO). Reagan initialed the paper above the date.
2. Reference is to Andropov’s speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the creation of the Soviet Union. Under cover of a December 23 memorandum, Kraemer forwarded a one-page summary of the speech to McFarlane, who wrote on the covering memorandum: “Sven—Thanks. Please assure wide dissem.” (Reagan Library, McFarlane Files, 1982–1985, Chron—December 1982)