1. The Soviet Union would like to broaden the range of political relations
between our countries by greatly expanding diplomatic contacts and
maintaining continuous communications between Shultz and Gromyko
either directly or through the respective embassies; however, they are in no
hurry to arrange a summit.
2. In order for such a broadening of relations to occur the United States
must take several concrete steps:
What does this add up to? Moscow is willing to talk to us on a whole range of
topics provided we stop accusing it of violating international agreements
and criticizing its internal policies. We must also modify our negotiating
positions in Geneva to show that we really have a “desire to reach an
understanding”. With this demarche they are attempting to put us in a
position of supplicant who must pay for the right to negotiate. The question
is: What are they willing to pay for our consent?
Tab A
Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan2
SECTO 17002. Subject: U.S.-Soviet Dialogue: Dec 6 Dobrynin Demarche.
Memorandum for: The President
From: George P. Shultz
I met briefly with Soviet Amb Dobrynin this morning at his request to hear a demarche
on the state of our “dialogue” and how it might be improved. Reading
from a paper, Dobrynin made six
points:
First, he said that as Andropov
had told the Vice President in Moscow, the Soviets want to “rectify” the
U.S.-Soviet relationship through talks on concrete topics and are ready
to proceed if you are. But to move forward Dobrynin said we needed to “eliminate artificial
irritants” like our comments on Soviet chemical weapons use. The
Soviets, he added, do not want polemics per se, but as the “Pravda”
response to your Nov 22 message made clear, they will not let attacks
pass without answer.
Second, he said the Soviets think it is unproductive to measure the
importance of the issues on the U.S.-Soviet agenda by “subjective
notions,” especially when they pertain to internal jurisdiction.
(Dobrynin later specified to
one of my staff that this point “really” referred to emigration from the
Soviet Union.)
Third, the Soviets favor exchanges of views and the search for concrete
solutions, but he said they do not believe the results to date have been
satisfactory, especially in arms control. Dobrynin said Moscow hoped your statement of readiness
for better relations will be reflected in U.S. positions on the
substance of negotiations, and that Moscow did not sense a desire to
reach understanding in the unofficial exchanges we have had in Geneva
and on the eve of the Madrid CSCE
meeting. He added that the current recess in the Geneva talks offered an
opportunity to think about the future of the negotiations.
Fourth, he said the Soviets were prepared for broader and more active
contacts through the Embassies and between the Ministries of
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Foreign Affairs. He added that
he was always ready for discussion with me, and there would be “no
difficulties” for Ambassador Hartman to see Gromyko and First Deputy Korniyenko. He also proposed mutual visits and exchanges
between the Ministries at other levels: Assistant Secretary, Deputy
Assistant Secretary, chiefs of department or desk.
Fifth, he said that Gromyko was
prepared to discuss any subject with me through the Ambassadors in the
two capitals and personally, including the Geneva negotiations. Such
exchanges have proved “good way to go” in the past, he observed.
Dobrynin also said that
Gromyko was ready to take a
“positive” approach to the possibility of another meeting with me before
the next UNGA session.
Sixth, on the possibility of a summit: Dobrynin said Soviet views are known and are similar to
ours, i.e., that any such meeting must be carefully prepared. I replied
that I regarded the message as significant; that I would bring it to
your attention; and that I would respond in due course. The notion of
enriching our dialogue is a good one, I said, and with respect to arms
control, I concurred that the recess in the Geneva talks is perhaps a
good time to evaluate what we have learned and where we should go from
here. I said I was also glad to hear Gromyko’s statement of readiness to keep up contact with
me either through our Ambassadors or personally, and I noted that our
positions on a summit appear to be similar.
End of text.
