245. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Clark) to President
Reagan1
Washington, November 27, 1982
SUBJECT
-
George Shultz’s Luncheon Meeting
with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
on November 23, 1982
In his first meeting with George
Shultz since Andropov
had been named General Secretary, Dobrynin cautiously explored the ground without making any
fresh promises or commitments. His instructions seem to have been to learn
at first hand how far the United States was prepared to translate its
friendly gestures toward the post-Brezhnev leadership into specific concessions. His main
points were:
—That it might be desirable for you to meet with Andropov. George’s
response to this suggestion was cool.
—That no progress was being made in the Geneva arms talks and that the
negotiations might better be moved to “higher levels” (summit?). George replied that we had excellent
negotiators in Geneva.
—That we were violating SALT II with your
MX decision and “planning something ‛deceptive’ regarding the ABM Treaty”, which George firmly refuted.
As had been their practice in the past, the Soviet side insists on excluding
from discussion all regional areas of conflict between us (Poland,
Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, etc.), in order to confine
negotiations with us exclusively to bilateral issues, essentially arms
control and summit conferences. In this respect, Andropov’s accession to power has made no perceptive
difference as yet.
[Page 810]
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan2
Washington, November 24, 1982
SUBJECT
- My Luncheon with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin November 23
As we agreed Tuesday morning,3 I told Ambassador Dobrynin that you are totally committed to maintaining
US strength, but are no less serious in your willingness to work for a
more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Ambassador
Dobrynin replied that the
Soviets also wanted a more constructive relationship and the question
was how to bring this about.
This led to a discussion of the issues, places and people involved. The
issues, I said, were on the agenda which Foreign Minister Gromyko and I identified in New
York—arms control, regional issues (Afghanistan, Kampuchea, etc.) and
what I called “Madrid” issues (CSCE
and human rights). We reviewed the various settings for US-Soviet
discussions: INF and START in Geneva,
MBFR in Vienna, CSCE in Madrid and the experts’ talks on
non-proliferation and Southern Africa currently being arranged. I noted
that if we are serious about the effort to improve relations, he and I
should meet more often. Equally, as it is important for the Soviet
Government that Dobrynin get a
“feel” for us in high level meetings, it is also important for the
United States that Ambassador Hartman have the opportunity to get a “feel” for the
Soviet leadership through regular access and exchanges. Dobrynin acknowledged this point. We
discussed the possibility of my meeting with Gromyko this spring, but agreed that such a meeting
would depend on the progress in our relations over the next several
months.
Dobrynin raised the question of
whether or not “our bosses” should meet. He explained that in his last
years Brezhnev could give
speeches and sign documents, but not negotiate. This, however, was not
the case with Andropov. He asked
if there were any point to a get-acquainted meeting with you. I replied
that there is no point to a meeting for the sake of a meeting. What is
needed is the prospect of forward movement on problems between us. I
agreed to explore the issue but basically, adhered to our previous
position on the summit question.
[Page 811]
I raised with Dobrynin the
misrepresentation of what the Vice President told Andropov in Andropov’s account to the West Germans. Dobrynin said he was puzzled and could
not understand what had happened, but I am sure he got the point.
There was a good deal of discussion about how to negotiate. In that
context, Ambassador Dobrynin
noted that the Soviets felt there had been no progress in Geneva. He
said frankly that the Soviet negotiators there were totally bound by
their instructions and without flexibility. He suggested that any
progress on arms control would require a political impulse from higher
levels. He seemed to imply that we might need another forum for the
“real” negotiations. I replied that we have competent personnel in
Geneva who are prepared to negotiate. It was agreed, however, that as
the current round of negotiations was coming to an end, each side should
review the bidding with its negotiators when they returned to their
respective capitals.
Dobrynin complained that your M–X
basing decision was a violation of the SALT II Treaty and also suggested that we were planning
something “deceptive” regarding the ABM
Treaty. I refuted Dobrynin’s
allegations about SALT II and have
instructed that we clarify and correct any misperceptions on the ABM issue. Dobrynin also asked where we planned to discuss the
CBMs which you proposed. I noted
that we considered Geneva the appropriate forum. He agreed that Geneva
was appropriate for some of the measures but not for all, for example
the hot line. We agreed to discuss the issue further at a later
date.
We concluded that each of us would discuss the broader subject of
improved relations within our governments in preparation for our next
meeting. Ambassador Dobrynin
conveyed the feeling that if there is some prospective movement, he was
willing to do his best in support of it. On balance, I think the
discussion reinforced the central message I gave on your behalf at the
outset: we will remain strong, but are willing to work for more
constructive relations.
