—The emphasis is on the need for economic reform, with strong hints it should
follow the Hungarian model.
—The emphasis on Soviet relations with Asian countries (China and India,
above all) which suggests a possible drive to attain detente in Asia in order to be better able to face the American
“threat”.
Attachment
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Bremer)
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Clark)2
Washington, November 23, 1982
SUBJECT
-
Andropov’s Plenum
Speech—Foreign Policy Aspects
Andropov’s speech at the plenum
of the CPSU Central Committee November
22 is a shrewd effort to capitalize on the positive atmosphere and
rising international expectations surrounding the succession. The speech
also provided him an opportunity to put his own personal stamp on the
tone, if not yet the substance, of post-Brezhnev Soviet foreign policy.
The essence of this new tone is to convey a greater sense of Soviet
flexibility and reasonableness through verbal moderation, without making
any concessions on substantive issues. By so doing, Andropov intends to reassure his
domestic constituencies of the continuity of Soviet foreign policy;
provide further momentum to an improvement in Moscow’s relations with
the Third World, China and Western Europe; and place the U.S. on the
defensive, thus maneuvering Washington closer to an arms
control-centered relationship similar to detente.
Andropov begins his speech by
reassuring the CPSU, the Soviet
military, and the USSR’s allies and
friends that Soviet foreign policy will continue to pursue the line set
out by his predecessor; that the Soviet armed forces will continue to
receive “everything necessary;” and that Moscow will vigorously pursue
development of relations with like-minded Socialist nations. Following
up on the fence-mending begun during the Brezhnev funeral, Andropov then makes a direct appeal for improvement of
Soviet relations with “our great neighbor” China, the Third World (with
special mention of India), and Western Europe.
The most striking element of the speech, however, is an explicit call for
return to the detente relationship of the 1970s, centering on arms
control negotiations with the United States and Western Europe.
Declaring that “the future belongs to this policy,” Andropov calls for a relationship based
on “reciprocity and equality,” explicitly rejecting
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linkage between normal U.S.-Soviet
bilateral relations and “some sort of preliminary concessions in
different fields.” By avoiding direct criticism of the U.S. by name or
direct mention of regional issues such as Afghanistan, Poland and
Kampuchea, Andropov conveys
moderation to West European ears and relegates Soviet international
behavior to a category beyond serious mention.
In this way, he sets the stage to emphasize the issue which he wishes to
be the litmus test of East-West relations: arms control. On this issue,
he takes care to strike a measured and moderate tone, asserting that the
Soviets want neither “the dispute of ideas to grow into a confrontation
of states” nor “arms . . . to become a gauge of the potentials of social
systems.” He stresses a desire for both nuclear and conventional arms
negotiations and implicitly criticizes the U.S. position by condemning
“talks for the sake of talks” and mere restatements of existing
differences. He refrains, however, from the sort of explicit criticism
of U.S. motives and proposals that other Soviet spokesmen have advanced
in recent weeks. Several times he says that any agreement must reflect
“the interests of both sides,” but quickly qualifies this with the
warning that no one should expect unilateral disarmament from the USSR. He concludes by repeating Brezhnev’s call for a freeze on
strategic arsenals as a first step to a START agreement.
The speech does not reveal any shift in specific Soviet policies or in
Moscow’s overall approach to East-West relations. It does, however,
represent a tactical refinement in the way the new leadership intends to
pursue familiar objectives. Many of these tactical adjustments were
evident during the last year of the Brezhnev period—and may indeed have been inspired by the
Andropov ascendancy then
taking place—but we can expect them to be accelerated now that Andropov has taken over in his own
right. Thus, the playing up of potential U.S.-European differences on
East-West relations and the encouragement of the Western nuclear freeze
movement may now be reinforced by a more direct appeal to the nostalgia
for detente. This may be supported by an attempt to subordinate regional
issues, and thus linkage, by muting the rhetorical battle over these
issues. The Soviets also may hope to dissipate international resistance
to their goals in Afghanistan, Poland and Kampuchea by talking
compromise and openly courting the nations (China, Pakistan, the West
Europeans) whose support we need to maintain pressure for Soviet
concessions. The new leadership probably hopes, in turn, that all these
developments will increase pressures on Washington to reduce its demands
for an overall bilateral improvement and to acquiesce in Moscow’s desire
to place arms control at the center of U.S.-Soviet relations.
