243. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1

SUBJECT

  • Analysis of Andropov’s Speech of November 22, 1982

The Department of State has sent the attached analysis (Tab I) of Andropov’s address of November 22. The turgid document concludes that “the speech does not reveal any shift in specific Soviet policies or in Moscow’s overall approach to East-West relations”. This is true as far as it goes except that there are in the speech some interesting nuances which deserve notice:

—The emphasis is on the need for economic reform, with strong hints it should follow the Hungarian model.

—The emphasis on Soviet relations with Asian countries (China and India, above all) which suggests a possible drive to attain detente in Asia in order to be better able to face the American “threat”.

[Page 805]

Attachment

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)2

SUBJECT

  • Andropov’s Plenum Speech—Foreign Policy Aspects

Andropov’s speech at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee November 22 is a shrewd effort to capitalize on the positive atmosphere and rising international expectations surrounding the succession. The speech also provided him an opportunity to put his own personal stamp on the tone, if not yet the substance, of post-Brezhnev Soviet foreign policy.

The essence of this new tone is to convey a greater sense of Soviet flexibility and reasonableness through verbal moderation, without making any concessions on substantive issues. By so doing, Andropov intends to reassure his domestic constituencies of the continuity of Soviet foreign policy; provide further momentum to an improvement in Moscow’s relations with the Third World, China and Western Europe; and place the U.S. on the defensive, thus maneuvering Washington closer to an arms control-centered relationship similar to detente.

Andropov begins his speech by reassuring the CPSU, the Soviet military, and the USSR’s allies and friends that Soviet foreign policy will continue to pursue the line set out by his predecessor; that the Soviet armed forces will continue to receive “everything necessary;” and that Moscow will vigorously pursue development of relations with like-minded Socialist nations. Following up on the fence-mending begun during the Brezhnev funeral, Andropov then makes a direct appeal for improvement of Soviet relations with “our great neighbor” China, the Third World (with special mention of India), and Western Europe.

The most striking element of the speech, however, is an explicit call for return to the detente relationship of the 1970s, centering on arms control negotiations with the United States and Western Europe. Declaring that “the future belongs to this policy,” Andropov calls for a relationship based on “reciprocity and equality,” explicitly rejecting [Page 806] linkage between normal U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and “some sort of preliminary concessions in different fields.” By avoiding direct criticism of the U.S. by name or direct mention of regional issues such as Afghanistan, Poland and Kampuchea, Andropov conveys moderation to West European ears and relegates Soviet international behavior to a category beyond serious mention.

In this way, he sets the stage to emphasize the issue which he wishes to be the litmus test of East-West relations: arms control. On this issue, he takes care to strike a measured and moderate tone, asserting that the Soviets want neither “the dispute of ideas to grow into a confrontation of states” nor “arms . . . to become a gauge of the potentials of social systems.” He stresses a desire for both nuclear and conventional arms negotiations and implicitly criticizes the U.S. position by condemning “talks for the sake of talks” and mere restatements of existing differences. He refrains, however, from the sort of explicit criticism of U.S. motives and proposals that other Soviet spokesmen have advanced in recent weeks. Several times he says that any agreement must reflect “the interests of both sides,” but quickly qualifies this with the warning that no one should expect unilateral disarmament from the USSR. He concludes by repeating Brezhnev’s call for a freeze on strategic arsenals as a first step to a START agreement.

The speech does not reveal any shift in specific Soviet policies or in Moscow’s overall approach to East-West relations. It does, however, represent a tactical refinement in the way the new leadership intends to pursue familiar objectives. Many of these tactical adjustments were evident during the last year of the Brezhnev period—and may indeed have been inspired by the Andropov ascendancy then taking place—but we can expect them to be accelerated now that Andropov has taken over in his own right. Thus, the playing up of potential U.S.-European differences on East-West relations and the encouragement of the Western nuclear freeze movement may now be reinforced by a more direct appeal to the nostalgia for detente. This may be supported by an attempt to subordinate regional issues, and thus linkage, by muting the rhetorical battle over these issues. The Soviets also may hope to dissipate international resistance to their goals in Afghanistan, Poland and Kampuchea by talking compromise and openly courting the nations (China, Pakistan, the West Europeans) whose support we need to maintain pressure for Soviet concessions. The new leadership probably hopes, in turn, that all these developments will increase pressures on Washington to reduce its demands for an overall bilateral improvement and to acquiesce in Moscow’s desire to place arms control at the center of U.S.-Soviet relations.

L. Paul Bremer, III
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (11/19/1982–11/29/1982). Confidential. Sent for information. Reagan initialed the memorandum below the date.
  2. Confidential.