238. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1
SUBJECT
- Background Paper for Your Thursday Meeting with Shultz and Weinberger 2
It is much too early to tell which way Andropov will direct Soviet policies. He is by instinct and experience a policeman; there is nothing in his background to indicate any liberal tendencies. Indeed, compared to him, his defeated rival, Chernenko, is almost a moderate. However, Andropov faces immense problems and his decisions may be inspired [Page 796] less by what he wants to do than by what he must do. I believe that the following are his immediate goals:
—To restore in the USSR a sense of strong leadership which has been missing for a year: in this respect, Western conciliatory moves over the past week have been very helpful and are appreciated by him.
—To stem the psychological onslaught on the USSR and Communism launched by President Reagan, and, in particular, to put an end to the idea that the West has any leverage inside the USSR over the economic or political actions of the Soviet Government. (Note that in his talk with Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz the “most forceful” presentation concerned “interference in internal Soviet affairs”. They are hurting from our economic and “democratization” offensives.)
—To stop or at least reduce internal corruption and consumerism which makes it difficult to control the population.
—To derail the U.S. defense programs which face the Soviet leadership with formidable technical and budgetary problems.
—To repress and isolate the dissident movement in the USSR.
These priorities are fairly clear. What Andropov may do beyond that remains to be seen. In particular, his views on economic reform are unknown—it is quite uncertain whether he will turn toward greater self-reliance and harsh punitive measures to improve productivity, or, on the contrary, take the path of moderate reform and rely on incentives.
A good case can be made that we have gone as far as we should for the time being in our good-will gestures toward the man, and ought now to await further significant conciliatory gestures from Moscow.