223. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- East-West Economic Policy
It is worthwhile to step back from the tactical details of our current discussions with the Allies on the Poland-related sanctions to review our overall progress on East-West relations. (C)
From 1976 to 1980, you succeeded in transforming American public opinion concerning East-West relations. You exposed the fatal weaknesses in detente policies, and built support for a more realistic approach. From 1980 to 1982, you changed U.S. government policy towards the Soviet Union. You increased military expenditures, placed arms control policies on a sound basis, and changed the tone of our public statements about the Soviet Union. Your challenge for the next [Page 758] two years is to change the public opinions and government policies of our allies in the area of East-West economic relations. This process will not be easy—the allies, for many reasons, consider the detente era an unqualified success. Many in this Administration will say that the difficulties of changing our Allies’ minds are insurmountable. Because the effort will be ultimately unsuccessful, they argue, and because it will generate friction in the Alliance, we should not try. I believe that as a matter of principle we must continue to make every attempt to change the course of East-West economic policy and its fueling of Soviet military might, and I am confident that we can succeed. (C)
In the two earlier phases of your efforts, objectives were fairly clear. Your victory in the 1980 election capped the campaign to change U.S. opinion on East-West relations; in the past two years your two defense budgets and your arms reduction proposals have been identifiable milestones in changing U.S. government policy towards the Soviet Union. For the next phase—changing the opinions and policies of our allies—equally clear milestones are needed. In priority order, I suggest that they are: (C)
1) Firm commitments from the Allies to buy no more natural gas from the USSR than presently contracted amounts;
2) A strengthened agreement on procedures to halt the flow of high Western technology to the Soviet Union.
3) A firm pledge by our allies to end subsidized credits to the USSR and tighten remaining credit terms. (C)
We should measure our success against these objectives—not some lowest-common-denominator agreement with the allies. (C)
We should use the current round of repression in Poland to publicly make the transition from a sanctions policy tied to events in Poland to a two-part policy. The first part is to put in place an enduring East-West economic policy based on the three objectives listed above. The second part is a modified package of sanctions tied directly to events in Poland. Our rationale is that Poland is not only a tragic event in itself, but also a manifestation of underlying repressive character of the Soviet Union which must be met by enduring unified Western policies in the area of East-West economic relations. (C)
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00044 15 Oct 1982. Confidential. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Reagan initialed below the date. On October 15, Reagan held a meeting of the National Security Council from 2:10 to 3:20 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes of this meeting were found. In a diary entry for that day, Reagan wrote: “An N.S.C. meeting. George S. has made some progress on negotiations with our European cousins. If we can get enough agreement on credit restrictions etc. to the Soviet U. we could lift the sanctions on the pipeline.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Vol. I, p. 163)↩