211. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Shultz1

SUBJECT

  • START and INF

Nuclear negotiations with the Soviets will return to center stage over the next several months, what with the resumption of the talks themselves, your meeting with Gromyko, UN and NATO diplomatic activity, and “freeze” politics at home. I want to share with you and Ken my thoughts on the issues we will face in this period and beyond.

START

The Soviet proposal is not, in my opinion, warmed-over SALT II, as our chief negotiator suggests. Rather, it is roughly what might have been expected from them in SALT III, had SALT II been ratified—an offer of significant, but not deep, reductions linked to restrictions on US forces of chief concern to Moscow, cruise and theater (INF) missiles. The Administration’s approach has thus produced dividends:

—By convincing the Soviets that we’re committed to US nuclear force modernization, we’ve induced them to offer more than they’ve offered before in order to restrain our programs.

—By adopting a politically appealing deep reductions proposal, we’ve caused them to follow suit, albeit in lesser measure, in order to deny us sole possession of the high ground.

—By saying, in effect, we’ll respect SALT II limits, we’ve convinced them to move on to more ambitious arms control instead of concentrating on bringing SALT II formally into force.

The main differences between us and the Soviets concern: (1) the level of reductions; and (2) the fact that the Soviets do not share our interest in concentrating reductions in ballistic weapons. They haven’t accepted our view that fast (i.e., ballistic) weapons are more destabilizing than slow (i.e., bomber and cruise) weapons. Moreover, concentrating on ballistic weapons would require major changes in their ballistic-[Page 692]oriented force posture while leaving us free to produce in great numbers the weapons about which they are most concerned: cruise missiles.

To be sure, there are other obstacles: whether or not the Soviet Backfire bomber should be counted as a strategic delivery vehicle; whether and how to limit non-deployed missiles; and whether the Soviets will accept intrusive verification measures. But these should prove manageable if a deal could be struck on the central issues of how far and what to reduce. (I address below the Soviet demand that a START agreement be accompanied by abandonment of our INF deployment program.) All in all, it is not unrealistic to contemplate a START agreement within the next two years, provided both sides make a determined effort.

I happen to believe that a START agreement somewhere between the current US and Soviet positions would be very much in our strategic interest, not to mention a major success for the President and proof that our approach to nuclear arms control and dealing with Moscow has been correct. I’m convinced that there will be no agreement if we do not go a reasonable distance to meet Soviet concerns about cruise missiles, especially the air- and sea-launched versions, where our growth potential is greatest, and that the pay-off of cutting the Soviet ballistic force would more than justify placing our cruise programs under limits.

Others will argue that an agreement is in our interest only if it is based on our opening position. They claim that the survivability of our land-based missiles would not be enhanced by a START agreement permitting the Soviets significantly more land-based missiles than our proposal would allow. They point out that our air- and sea-launched cruise missiles are strictly retaliatory forces and that constraining them would therefore weaken deterrence. Finally, some will argue that a START agreement is almost certain to undercut popular support for sustained growth in defense spending, so we’d better insist on an agreement that cuts Soviet forces drastically. While I’m not persuaded by these arguments, they are serious and deserve your consideration.

The question of whether to make a serious effort to get an agreement should also be viewed in the context of what relationship we want with Moscow. The Soviet move suggests to me that Moscow still wants to do business with this Administration. The Soviets will draw conclusions from how we handle START about whether we want to do business with them in areas of potential common interest.

If, in this succession period, the Soviets conclude that the Administration is not interested in progress in what has always been treated as an area of strong common interest, they will have to wonder whether there is any point in showing moderation in other areas. Again, there are other ways to look at it. We have said that progress in arms control [Page 693] should be accompanied by progress toward settling international problems caused by Soviet misdeeds. Some would argue—and I’m not altogether unsympathetic—that a US effort to yield progress in START would lead the Soviets to conclude that all the talk about linkage was just that: talk. My own view is that, even with tight linkage, we won’t find it easy to use Soviet interest in restraining our nuclear programs as a lever to alter Soviet international conduct—but what leverage we have will be removed if the Soviets think we want arms control progress no matter how they and their proxies behave.

Assuming we want to go for an agreement—unless the Soviets embark on new foreign adventures—timing can be crucial. On the one hand, if, say, a year passes from the time the negotiations began (this past spring) and the US has not budged, the Soviets are likely to dismiss the idea of an agreement with this Administration. On the other hand, if we leap too quickly, the Soviets may conclude that they can get an agreement closer to their current position than to ours if they just stand pat. We might therefore think in terms of a substantive move early next year, perhaps signalled in a January meeting between you and Gromyko. This would leave a full year for give-and-take before getting so close to the American election as to create an appearance of using START for electoral purposes.

INF

Differences between us and the Soviets in this negotiation are more profound. The prospects for convergence are poor: we lack negotiating leverage (our missile deployments don’t even start until late next year); our demand that the Soviets dismantle their entire long-range missile force is not remotely realistic; and we and the Soviets disagree sharply over whether to include aircraft (we say no, they say yes), French and British forces (we say no, they say yes), and Soviet forces opposite China (we say yes, they say no).

Through two negotiating rounds, we haven’t budged. The Soviets have made cosmetic changes and are likely to make substantive concessions in order to pin blame for the lack of progress on us, induce the Allies to pressure us to soften our position, and, most importantly, erode support for our missile deployment plan. The Allies will want us to show that we are making every effort to get an agreement before deployments begin, even if they realize that an agreement may be unobtainable.

In considering the possibility of changing our INF position, the most important question is what impact it would have on Allied support for modernization. If European publics perceive the sides to be far apart because of US intransigence, they will be susceptible to the claim that we are using the negotiations as a cover to permit the [Page 694] deployments—then we’ll be in trouble. If they see the sides far apart because of Soviet intransigence, we can make the argument that the deployments must begin before the Soviets will have sufficient incentive to negotiate in earnest. At the same time, if we make a move, we could create a sense of progress and put the Soviets in the position of moving further themselves while warning that hopes for an agreement would evaporate if deployments commence. It’s important to bear in mind that much of the European support for deployments is based on the argument that the Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate unless they were convinced that we will proceed with deployments absent an agreement. Faced with new hope that success in negotiations might make deployments unnecessary, combined with a fear that commencing deployments might damage the negotiations, large segments of European opinion might be drawn to the idea of delaying deployments “to give arms control more time.” It’s hard to forecast how “Europe” will react to INF negotiating developments. But it’s clear that managing these political dynamics will require great skill and close consultations with key Allied leaders, especially the German Chancellor.

My own feeling is that we should be prepared to alter our INF position if and when it becomes clear that failure to do so will jeopardize support for modernization. That said, we should not stray from our insistence or equal limits and significant reductions. Nor should we get drawn into a deal that would allow both us and the Soviets to maintain INF missiles outside of Europe while banning them in Europe; this would suggest a “decoupling” of the US from Europe without eliminating the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

Rather, we should consider such possibilities as offering limits on aircraft (which the Joint Chiefs would oppose) and proposing equal missile limits greater than zero (but well below current Soviet and planned US force levels). We might also think about the possibility of offering limits on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) as part of an INF agreement. The Soviets will insist that these weapons be treated either in START or INF; if we put them in START the Allies will see us using the negotiating leverage of our SLCM program to limit the threat to us instead of the threat to them. There are those who argue that we shouldn’t put SLCM’s on the negotiating block at all—and, indeed, I would recommend considering a numerical ceiling, not a ban.

The START–INF Link

The Soviets have said they will not go along with strategic reductions if we are left free to build up forces that can strike the USSR from Europe. While they may soften this stance, they will at least want to have an INF agreement more or less in hand before accepting a START [Page 695] agreement. For vastly different reasons, the Allies will insist on the same link. We’d face a violent political storm—especially in Germany—if it appeared that we were making a more serious effort to reduce the nuclear threat to the US than to reduce the nuclear threat to Western Europe.

The link works in reverse as well. An INF agreement would be largely irrelevant without a START agreement, since the Soviets would be free to add “strategic” forces and target them on Europe instead of on us. In practice, however, we’re unlikely to find it easier to reach an INF agreement than a START agreement.

There are a range of possibilities for linking START and INF: separate negotiations leading to separate agreements at separate times; separate negotiations leading to separate agreements at roughly the same time; separate negotiations leading to a single agreement with separate limits on strategic and INF systems; merged negotiations leading to a single agreement with integrated limits on strategic and INF systems. It’s too early to say which approach is best. One option we don’t have is going for a START agreement without at least being prepared to try for movement in INF. Ultimately, we may face the dilemma of what to do if we and the Soviets are ready to settle on strategic limits but are still far apart on INF limits. For now, we’d be wise to accompany any move in START with an equally significant move in INF, lest we trigger a German anxiety attack.

“Freeze” Politics

The Administration stayed ahead of the freeze movement this past spring by beginning START and making the argument that a freeze would remove the Soviets’ incentive to agree to strategic reductions. Of course, posing the issue as a choice between a freeze and reductions only works if reductions are believed to be achievable. It won’t be long before the critics start asking (rhetorically) where the progress is. If the Administration responds that we are making progress, it will be admitting that the Soviets have made an important proposal, in which case pressures will increase to alter our own START position. If the Administration wants to avoid giving the Soviets credit for their move, it will have to claim there has been little progress, in which case interest in a freeze will grow. One advantage of a US move in START is that it permits us to cite progress without crediting the Soviets and adding to the pressure on ourselves. That said, I for one would not favor a move until early next year.

The Interagency Problem

I haven’t tried to convince you to follow a particular course; you’ll want to get others’ views and do some thinking of your own. But I hope I have convinced you that success—however defined—will [Page 696] require agility. Unfortunately, the existing interagency process relies on bottom-up thinking and is plagued by philosophical differences so severe that those who have good ideas that might produce progress are afraid to float them. Unless the process is made more responsive, those opposed to movement will prevail by default. At a minimum, the initiative in these negotiations will shift to the Soviets, and we’ll find it hard to manage the politics of INF in Europe and the politics of the “freeze” at home.

Altering interagency procedures—e.g., setting up a new group chaired by NSC staff—won’t solve the basic problem. What is needed is for everyone to have a clearer sense of where the President wants to see these negotiations go. If he wants progress, he will need to make known that he wants to consider options that would produce progress. If he wants to sit tight, we shouldn’t worry that the system is unresponsive. My hunch is that he would at least want to consider what might be done to get movement. The way to find out is not by asking him to react piece-meal to specific negotiating issues that cannot be settled in the bureaucratic trenches, but rather by offering him your broad ideas directly and getting a reaction.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger2
  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Lawrence Eagleburger Files, Lot 84D204, Chron—September 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Dam. In an undated handwritten note to Shultz, Eagleburger wrote: “GS—I don’t claim to be a disarmament expert (with good reason). But the ramifications politically—particularly in Europe and here at home—are substantial. Thus, I’ve done the attached to try to give some sense of the complexity of the issues.”
  2. Eagleburger initialed the memorandum “LSE” over his typed signature.