194. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1
SUBJECT
- Talking Points for Your Meeting with Dobrynin, Monday, July 12, 1982
Ambassador Dobrynin has requested a meeting with you in order to secure information. The information he most likely seeks has to do with the President’s thinking about political, economic, and military matters, especially as these bear on the Soviet Union. Some of the President’s recent actions—notably his London speech,2 which rattled them severely, and the extension of sanctions—have thrown confusion into the Politburo. The prevalent view there had been that Ronald Reagan would sooner or later succumb to Allied pressure and the force of U.S. public opinion and adopt a more conciliatory position vis-a-vis Moscow. His move in the opposite direction in June, combined with the concurrent departure of Haig, seems to indicate to Moscow some major shift in U.S. foreign policy the drift of which they would like to know. This is of particular importance at this time since some of them seem to have concluded (Tab I)3 that “the President is now in command of foreign policy”. (S)
I believe that it is good for us that they are uncertain and confused: this tends to make them hesitant and less aggressive. It would not serve much purpose for you to clarify in Dobrynin’s mind what our strategy is, for once they know it is easier for them to prepare effective countermeasures. It would be best therefore if, to the extent possible, you drew him out on such subjects as:
—Soviet position on Afghanistan: Do they really regard the situation there as “irreversible” (Gromyko’s words to Haig)? How long do they intend to wage this losing war?
—Soviet pressure on Poland: Do they believe that by preventing any kind of liberalization in Poland they will be able to solve Poland’s catastrophic economic situation?
[Page 641]—Concerning their own economic situation: How do they expect to overcome in the future a steadily falling rate of economic growth and perennial agrarian failures?
—Will they show flexibility in INF and START negotiations instead of reiterating fixed positions?
—Is authority in Moscow at present in secure hands? (You need not be embarrassed to ask—he will understand we must know if there is someone there we can deal with.) (S)
It will be hard to get him to talk but gentle persistence may do the trick. (S)
In response to his questions, I would stick to fixed, declared positions:
1. Sanctions: We intend to adhere to them (Gelb’s article4 was without substance) until and unless there is significant improvement in Poland.
2. INF and START: The President is determined to obtain equitable reductions and we are not likely to be worn out by Soviet intransigence to the point where we will start negotiating among ourselves. At the same time we do not strive for military superiority as is mistakenly asserted in Moscow.
3. Middle East: The current crisis is the result of Soviet support of Syria and the PLO which between them have destroyed Lebanon; Israel will not stay there once foreign troops are out. No return to previous situation of threatening Israel from Lebanon.
4. Summit: This can take place only if and when much progress has been made on outstanding differences between us: not in the cards yet. (S)
On all other questions I would be evasive and/or vague. (S)
You may want to make it clear that this meeting was exceptional, that you normally do not deal with Ambassadors and that in the future he should communicate with Shultz; otherwise he may feel he has opened a new “channel”. (S)
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (6/30/82–7/14/82). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “RCM has seen.” No record of Clark’s July 12 meeting with Dobrynin has been found.↩
- See Document 177.↩
- Not found attached.↩
- Reference is to Leslie H. Gelb, “Reagan is Seeking Ways to Moderate Poland Sanctions,” New York Times, July 9, 1982, p. A1.↩