188. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Clark) to President
Reagan1
SUBJECT
-
Al Haig’s Meetings with Foreign
Minister Gromyko June 18–19,
1982
Al held two drawn-out meetings with Gromyko: the one on June 18 (Tab A) was to concentrate on
arms control, the one on June 19 (Tab B) was to deal with regional problems
but because there was so little
[Page 621]
new to say on this subject, the second meeting, too, switched to arms
control. (S)
In the first session, Gromyko restated
old Soviet claims, insisting that when due allowance was made for their
different enemies and allies, the two great powers had nuclear parity. As
concerns concrete proposals he could think of nothing fresh to say and
reiterated the need to revive the Vladivostok Accords and SALT II. He appeared particularly upset by
your bold proposals for arms reductions which have helped defuse the global
unilateral disarmament movement on which Moscow counts heavily to soften our
determination to build up U.S. defenses. (S)
The second day’s discussions indicated little flexibility on Moscow’s part.
Gromyko remained unyielding on
Afghanistan though he agreed to uncommitting Embassy-level talks on this
subject. He had nothing new to say on Central America and the Caribbean, or
on the Middle East. Only in discussing Southern Africa did he hint at
possible concessions in the sense that the Soviet Union might consider a
Namibian settlement if there were ways of guaranteeing a Marxist-Leninist
regime in Angola following the departure of Cuban troops. He was bitter over
your “economic warfare” policies, including the expansion of the gas and oil
sanctions. (S)
Gromyko pressed for a commitment on a
summit which is important to certain factions in the Soviet
leadership—those, like himself, grouped around Brezhnev—inasmuch as by meeting formally with the Soviet
leader you help legitimize his status at home. (S)
In all, the meeting indicated no change in Soviet policy and no move toward
serious negotiations and compromises. Gromyko’s evident anxiety and inflexibility reflect the
disarray which the opening of the succession struggle and its recent
military and psychological defeats have engendered in Moscow. The Kremlin is
still on “hold”.(S)
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Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan2
Washington, June 19, 1982
SUBJECT
- MY JUNE 18 SESSION WITH GROMYKO
This session lasted five hours, and we concentrated (by his choice as
guest and thus first speaker in our UN
Mission) on principles and on arms control. We will deal with critical
regional security issues when we resume tomorrow; he told me he would
start with the Middle East, and I told him I would start with Poland. It
was a tough session, and I expect tomorrow’s exchange to be similarly
rough.
Gromyko was clearly on the
defensive, following your successful European trip, the unveiling of
your program for arms control and your U.N. speech. He complained
forcefully and at length that in fashioning our arms control proposals,
we have ignored the long-standing Soviet insistence upon “equal
security”. His presentation was one long protestation of Soviet
innocence while blaming the U.S. for the deterioration of our
relationship and international relations generally.
His detailed comments on arms control made clear again that when the
Soviets talk about equal security they mean we must admit that an
overall nuclear and conventional balance currently exists because they
deserve special compensation for their geography and for our Allies’
military strength and systems. He pressed hard for the resuscitation of
inadequate arms control agreements of the past, especially the Soviet
1974 Vladivostok accord and SALT II.
He reiterated the Soviet nuclear non-first-use pledge he made at the
U.N. on Tuesday.3
In response, I told him in no uncertain terms that strict equality is the
only basis for agreements between us; that previous agreements were
inadequate because they failed to limit the most destabilizing systems
in both sides’ arsenals; and that reductions in these systems are the
only good answer. I told him that the nuclear non-first-use pledge is
entirely self-serving given the tremendous Soviet conventional
advantage, and restated that in NATO
Europe, the West would never be the first to initiate conflict at any
level. It is the Soviet Union,
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I pointed out, that bears full responsibility for deterioration in
relations because it has used and continues to use or help others to use
force.
Overall, I came away from the session impressed with how worried and
disturbed Gromyko was at the
degree to which we have seized the high ground and the initiative in
East-West relations. What worries the Soviets the most is your
comprehensive program for arms control.
American newsmen tell us he is planning a major press conference for
Monday4 (the day he was
originally scheduled to depart for Moscow), and I expect him to make
some of the same points he made yesterday, and in general, to try to
regain some of the high ground for the Soviets through accusations that
we have gone over to the offensive and are refusing to negotiate
seriously and sincerely etc., in contrast to them. I therefore plan to
meet with the press today, partly to draw some of his poison
preemptively, mainly to maintain the offensive on arms control and
East-West relations overall that you have seized.
Tab B
Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan5
Washington, June 20, 1982
SUBJECT
- My Session with Gromyko,
June 19
Today’s session lasted four and a third hours, and was devoted largely to
regional issues as I had planned. And, as I expected, it was as rough as
yesterday’s meeting.
We went over the whole gamut of U.S. regional concerns, from Poland to
Kampuchea, and also discussed the Middle East at his initiative.
On Poland, Gromyko listened
impassively while I stated our position on the problems and the
prospects, and offered no indication of give. But he reacted bitterly to
your decision to extend sanctions, as announced in the newspapers. He
complained that it coincided with our meeting, claimed it represented
economic warfare, and predicted it would spill over into political
relations, since they cannot be separated. Agreeing with the last point,
I explained that business-as-usual is
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impossible and that economic relations cannot
improve so long as Soviet behavior in Poland, Afghanistan, etc., remains
unchanged.
On Afghanistan, Gromyko gave no
hint of a change in the Soviet position. As you and I agreed, however, I
did suggest that Ambassador Hartman conduct intensified bilateral discussions in
Moscow in July, and Gromyko
agreed.
The exchange on Central America and the Caribbean was standard: I
reiterated the dangers we see and the importance of the issue in our
relationship, with particular reference to Soviet military shipments,
while Gromyko insisted once again
that we must settle with the locals, but that the Soviets will not stand
in the way.
Southern Africa presented the one slight ray of hope in an otherwise
somber meeting. Gromyko continued
to hint that the Soviets would be willing to stand aside from a Namibia
settlement which included a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. His major
concern seemed to be the stability of the Angola Government and the
threat from Savimbi. I told him
that reconciliation among the factions in Angola is something the
parties must work out themselves. The Soviets understand that we are
working hard for a genuine settlement, and that they will bear the onus
for failure if it fails.
On the Middle East, Gromyko
repeated all the familiar Soviet claims and proposals about the area.
They are obviously smarting from the beating their clients have taken. I
made clear that we are working hard on the problem, and remain the only
major power capable of moving the disputes of the area toward
settlement. Gromyko did raise the
possibility that the Soviets will call again for an international
conference, and this is something we should be watching carefully in the
days ahead.
Toward the end of the meeting Gromyko raised the possibility of a summit. I expressed
regret that Brezhnev had not been
able to attend the SSOD and meet with
you, and explained that much would depend on future developments and the
possibility of carefully prepared results. He did not seem entirely
satisfied, concluding that we should let them know when we have chosen a
date and place. For obvious political reasons, I think, the Soviets are
anxious to have a summit as soon as possible.
Gromyko also returned to the
question of respecting SALT II
commitments, asking for more precise details about what you meant when
you said we would not undercut existing agreements as long as they do
not. I was deliberately vague in response, saying we are comfortable
with existing policy, and any questions should be discussed by our
negotiators in Geneva.
Finally, I made a pitch on humanitarian issues with special reference to
Jewish emigration, citing your interest and pointing out that
[Page 625]
small gestures in this field
can have a disproportionately large payoff in overall relations.
It was a wearing meeting, but useful, and not only in the sense that it
registered the fact of superpower dialogue in tense times. It built on
the momentum you have created in our favor in recent days and weeks by
presenting a sensible, full-scale program for arms control negotiations
and getting Allied support for it by making absolutely clear to the
Soviets that our full agenda is intact, and that we will not be able to
move forward on a broad front unless they are willing to take all our concerns into account—regional security,
military security, human rights and other bilateral issues—and act on
them.
