—The succession conflict got underway with the death several weeks ago of
M. Suslov, the most doctrinaire
of Soviet leaders: his death removed the guardian of orthodoxy and the only
individual who had enough prestige to keep his Politburo colleagues in
line.
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan
2
Washington,
March 9,
1982
SUBJECT
- Kremlin Succession Politics Heating Up
The ouster last week of trade union chief Shibayev was the latest sign of
intensified pre-succession maneuvering among members of the Politburo.
Brezhnev’s protege Konstantin Chernenko seems to be
moving to the fore. But the battle has only begun, and it is still far
from certain that he will inherit Brezhnev’s position as leader of the party.
Recent signs of Kremlin infighting have included:
—rumors implicating Brezhnev’s
son and daughter in corruption and smuggling;
—publication of a literary piece (subsequently and without
explanation withdrawn from public sale) about an aging man hanging
on to power—presumably an allusion to Brezhnev;
—TV clips that make no attempt to
disguise Brezhnev’s physical
deterioration; and
—a March 5 rumor of his death (which the Foreign Ministry’s denial
attributed to “unsavory sources”).
These jibes at Brezhnev were
probably aimed in part at his favorite Chernenko. Chernenko’s recent political ascent may already have
eased him into the party’s number two spot, which had belonged to the
recently deceased ideologue, Suslov. This is suggested by Chernenko’s:
—presence as the ranking Politburo member at the trade union session
which fired Shibayev (March 5);
—high profile during Jaruzelski’s visit to Moscow (March 1–2); and
—prominence in the media coverage of a February 25 award
ceremony.
In addition, Dobrynin told a State
Department officer on March 3 that Chernenko will probably take Suslov’s place in running Politburo
meetings when Brezhnev vacations
in the Crimea.3
[Page 502]
In contrast, Chernenko’s rival,
Andrey Kirilenko, apparently has been losing ground. He failed to attend
the February 25 award ceremony or participate in the talks with
Jaruzelski. Moreover, he did
not join Brezhnev and six of the
Moscow-based Politburo members (including Chernenko) at the March 3 performance of a controversial
new play about Lenin’s last days. The plot, which highlighted Lenin’s
misgivings about Stalin, was implicitly a dig at Kirilenko.
A key policy issue in the Chernenko-Kirilenko rivalry probably is the allocation of
resources. Chernenko’s rhetoric
suggests a readiness to do somewhat more for the consumer, while
Kirilenko’s indicates firm
support of the military and heavy industry.
In spite of his recent gains, Chernenko’s narrow power base (he is dependent largely
on Brezhnev’s patronage) casts a
shadow over his prospects. Kirilenko, having long been the more senior of the two
party secretaries, has the advantage of a well-entrenched constituency
in the establishment.
The outcome at this point remains unclear, but the abrupt increase in
open jockeying for position between the principal rivals suggests that
the question of who will inherit Brezhnev’s mantle of power may be more immediate than we
had previously estimated.
