Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983

131. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, January 18, 1982

SUBJECT

• Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I had lunch today at the Soviet Embassy with Ambassador Dobrynin. In the course of a wide ranging conversation, we covered the following subjects of interest.

Dobrynin began by discussing plans for the Secretary’s meeting with Gromyko in Geneva January 26–27. In this connection, I noted the possibility that the Secretary might have to restrict his meeting with Gromyko to one day, the 26th. Dobrynin was curious as to the reason for this and I pointed to the Secretary’s plans to travel to the Middle East following the session in Geneva. I stressed, however, that no final decision had been made.

Dobrynin was interested in reviewing probable subjects which would come up at the Haig-Gromyko meeting and whether or not agreement could be reached on any of the topics. He mentioned strategic arms talks as a leading topic. I said that the Secretary probably would be prepared to discuss this in general terms against the background of the President’s continuing interest in working for deep reductions in strategic arms. However, I did not feel that, in present circumstances, there was any prospect that we would be prepared to fix a specific date for the beginning of formal negotiations of START. This was a matter best pursued through diplomatic channels at present.

Dobrynin anticipated that the Secretary would wish to follow up the earlier talks with Gromyko in New York on Poland, Cuba, Afghanistan and Angola. He thought agreement on anything connected with these subjects was unlikely, and I agreed. On Angola, Dobrynin seemed to indicate somewhat more disposition to discuss the matter, as outlined below.

With regard to bilateral matters, Dobrynin thought there would be little to say at Geneva. He felt that there was nothing much to take up on exchanges, since we had placed most of them in suspense. Consulates also seemed dormant, although he understood that it was our intention to keep a hold on our buildings in Kiev.

I mentioned the situation of the Pentecostalists, saying that, as he knew, this was of interest at the highest level in our government. The whole situation was difficult and tragic—the best would be to permit family members in Chernogorsk to leave for the United States, with the Pentecostalists in the Embassy than being released to return to Chernogorsk and then to join their relatives in the United States. Dobrynin said he knew that Carter had talked to the Pentecostalists in Moscow (Carter had also called Dobrynin). Dobrynin said the only way to proceed was for the Pentecostalists to leave the Embassy and return to their homes. Thereafter, they could follow regular procedures and seek emigration.

Dobrynin had the following comments to make on the various subjects mentioned above as possible topics for the discussions in Geneva.

INF. Dobrynin said it was “curious” that the US side had not been better prepared for the INF negotiations. He claimed that the Soviets had presented a detailed statement of their position but that the US to date had failed to do so. The Soviets were waiting for the US to come forward with concrete positions but, he claimed, the latest US suggestion was for a two months’ recess, after which Nitze had said we would be prepared to go into detail. I countered Dobrynin on both of his allegations, saying that it should have been clear that the US side had presented a full statement of its position and that the main problem was that the Soviets did not find it acceptable. When Dobrynin said that Gromyko might wish to discuss the negotiations with the Secretary, I indicated that the Secretary would be prepared to talk about the negotiations in general terms but that it was preferable for the detailed negotiations to be conducted by our respective delegations.

On START, Dobrynin seemed to take in stride my indication that we would not be prepared to set a date for the beginning of formal talks. He felt, in any case, that the subject matter was so complicated that any agreement was a long time off—perhaps three or four years. Since both sides appeared willing to observe the conditions of existing agreements, he wondered if it might not be possible to come up with an interim agreement which would simply state this fact. This, at least, would be a positive step. I said that such a course could cause problems for the US side with the Senate, which would feel that its prerogatives were being undermined by this type of interim agreement.

We argued at some length about relative strengths in the strategic field, with Dobrynin recalling fears in previous administrations about a “bomber gap” and a “missile gap” and claiming that our present concerns about a trend toward Soviet superiority were misplaced. He said it was clear that the United States has more warheads than the Soviets, that the fact we have no heavy missiles is not of Soviet doing, etc. I made clear to him our basic concerns about the extent of Soviet activities in the missile field and the determination of the United States to correct the imbalance.

On Afghanistan, Dobrynin acknowledged that some additional Soviet troops had been introduced into that country. However, the Soviet Union was being cautious and would not follow the US example in Vietnam in introducing great numbers of troops. The main reason for this, he said, was to reduce casualties. Dobrynin said the fighting in Afghanistan was being prolonged because we were supplying the insurgents with weapons through Pakistan. This was causing great resentment in the Soviet Union and he said that “some circles” felt that the Soviet Union should “begin to get something out of the Afghan situation” by, for example, constructing airfields in Afghanistan which could take long-range military jet airplanes. This, he said, at least could “give us something to trade” in response to US pressures. I warned him that this would be a very dangerous game indeed.

I told Dobrynin that we would be interested in serious discussions with the Soviets on Afghanistan and would be glad to hear an elucidation of their ideas. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets were still waiting for the US to take up the subject in Moscow through our Embassy, as had been promised by the Secretary in New York.

On Angola, Dobrynin wondered if the Secretary would wish to pursue this subject further with Gromyko. I said I was sure the Secretary would wish to do so, following up on the talks in New York. I described briefly our Namibian negotiations and pointed to the necessity for Cuban troops to leave Angola simultaneously with the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. When Dobrynin questioned whether Cubans were really endangering South African forces, I said that the Cuban presence was part of the overall security picture in the area and that it would be essential for them to be withdrawn if independence for Namibia is to be achieved. Dobrynin did not appear to contest this concept vigorously.

In discussing Cuba, I mentioned my representations to Dobrynin about the latest delivery of MIG–23’s to the island, saying that this action was of great concern to the United States and that it appeared to be part of an overall Soviet thrust through Cuba to expand its power base in the hemisphere. I called attention to the restrained press treatment we have given to the MIG–23 story and said that the Secretary would be discussing this with Gromyko in Geneva. I repeated that the delivery of the MIGs raised questions regarding the 1962 understandings which required clarification.²

Dobrynin said the USSR had always observed the 1962 understandings scrupulously. The MIG–23’s did not violate the understandings and the Soviets could not understand our concerns on this score. He said he had received nothing from Moscow regarding my demarche on the planes; it was possible Gromyko would have something to say on the subject. I noted that the MIG’s could be said to constitute a “grey area” which should be clarified.

On another aspect of the Cuban situation, Dobrynin recited at some length his conversations with the Secretary about US charges earlier in 1981 that some 1,600 Cuban troops had been sent to Nicaragua. He stated that Brezhnev had taken these charges up directly with Castro and that Castro had totally and convincingly rejected them as false. Dobrynin felt that the United States had never proved its case on these charges and that this had left the Soviets feeling that the US concerns should not be taken seriously.

Dobrynin said he knew that the Secretary had met with the Cuban Vice President several months ago.³ He wondered what results had come from that meeting and what the prospects were for US-Cuban relations. I said that, whatever our contacts with Cuba might be, they had produced nothing positive to date. We continued to feel that the export of revolution by Cuba to Central America and other countries, the build up of arms in Cuba and Cuban activities in Africa raised tensions and should be terminated.

On Poland, Dobrynin seemed particularly negative. Referring to our “three demands”—lifting of martial law, freeing of prisoners and a resumption of dialogue between the government, Church and Solidarity—Dobrynin said that all three posed unacceptable demands on the Polish authorities. To lift martial law at this time and free the prisoners would only risk a return to the chaos preceding the December 13 action. He defended at length the right of the Polish government to act against those who wished to usurp power and contested the idea that what had occured December 13 was in any sense illegal or a “coup d’etat”. As to negotiations with Solidarity, this meant placing Solidarity on the same level with the government, which was clearly impossible. Dobrynin went on to say that “Solidarity” has become a “bad word” in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in general. While there could be a place for a vigorous trade union looking after the interests of the workers, he doubted if it would be called “Solidarity” in the future. As to whether it would have the right to strike, Dobrynin was uncertain, saying that “all sorts of things can happen in Poland”. He stated that, of course, any future trade union would be barred from reaching for political power.

Dobrynin referred to sanctions only in passing, saying that there did not seem to be anything left for us to do against the Soviet Union in this area. I assured him that there were, indeed, other measures which could be taken and that we might very well be compelled to take such steps in light of the lack of progress regarding Poland.

Dobrynin was curious regarding our plans for the Madrid CSCE meeting. He asked if the Secretary planned to attend and, if so, for how long. I confirmed that the Secretary intended to be present for the opening session. I did not know how long he would be staying, but I made clear that his focus, as well as that of other Western Ministers present, would be on Poland.

Dobrynin inquired about the possibility for a summit meeting between the President and Brezhnev. He said that he personally thought it was unlikely that a “traditional summit” could be held in ’82 with a full blown communique, etc. Perhaps a “get acquainted” meeting would be more practical. I said that, under present circumstances, I did not see the possibility of any kind of a meeting at the summit. The President has stated several times his interest in meeting with Brezhnev and I felt that this was something the President wanted to do but that Poland made that impossible for the foreseeable future.

Dobrynin said that he was extremely discouraged about the prospects for any kind of agreement between the US and the Soviet Union. In all of his experience, he had never seen such a bad time in US-Soviet relations. He believes the US Administration is on a deliberate confrontation course with the Soviet Union and that the future looked extremely discouraging. I agreed that prospects did not look bright, primarily because of Soviet actions. I contested Dobrynin’s assertion that the Administration wished a confrontation with the Soviet Union. What we hoped for was more moderation and restraint on the Soviet side which would enable us both to get on a more stable basis in our relationship. So long as such moderation and restraint were absent, then the relationship would only suffer.

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Walter Stoessel Files, Lot 82D307, Memoranda for the Record, 1982. Secret. Prepared by Stoessel. Copied to Bremer, Scanlan, and Montgomery.
2. Reference is to informal agreements reached between Robert Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.
3. Reference is to a meeting between Haig and Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Mexico City on November 23, 1981.
4. Stoessel initialed the memorandum above his typed signature.