I believe your draft includes all of the regional and functional components
essential to a comprehensive study of East-West relations.2 My only reservation
concerns what I believe to be a need to establish the philosophical
contextual setting in which the study will take place. [Page 32] As you know, military studies always begin by
defining “the threat.” I believe we should use another term but that (the
threat) is what I’m trying to get at in calling for a contextual
setting.
Specifically, what is our assessment of the Soviet Union’s goals—its
geopolitical objectives and long-term game plan? In other words, what do we
believe are the dimensions of the problem we must deal with in the
near-midterm period? This section need not be terribly long but I believe
that in some study at the outset of this Administration we must say what we
believe about the enduring purposes and objectives of the Soviet Union. I
recall Sam Huntington’s piece in connection with PRM–103 which did (whether one agrees
with it or not) provide one man’s contextual setting.
From that broad overview, each of your component pieces flows logically; that
is, after we state our fundamental beliefs about their long-term intentions,
we can consider how their ability to carry out those intentions are affected
by the “Soviet internal scene” today, “US-Soviet bilateral relations” and
other dimensions of our relationship world-wide.
Again, with apologies for my military methodology, I would tend to follow
this threat section with an overview of our present resources for coping
with it in a very broad sense. For example, what is the state of our
alliances? Do we all hold a common perception of the threat? What is the
state of the military balance across the force spectrum? What is the state
of the economic balance? This amounts to a “net assessment.” Once you have
done that, you will have identified political, economic, and military
shortfalls (or surpluses). This leads to an identification of your
vulnerabilities. For example, I believe we would both focus on our
vulnerability to economic disruption arising from Soviet capabilities to
exercise prevailing influence over Persian Gulf resources. If that is true,
the study would need to treat—as you propose in paragraph 3—how we restore
effective deterrence in the Persian Gulf area. Related analysis would also
focus on how we restore free world political strength in that area.
All of the above need not alter your fundamental approach. I express it only
to confirm that we both view the scope of the study along the same lines,
generally.
Attachment
Draft Study Prepared by the Policy Planning
Staff
4
East-West Relations Terms of Reference
1—Soviet Internal Scene. Examine current Soviet
political dynamics, prospects for Brezhnev succession and impact on US/Soviet relations.
Assess state of Soviet economy, including dependencies that could be
exploited or could lead Moscow toward foreign adventures. Discuss Soviet
nationalities problem and dissident movement.
2—US/Soviet Bilateral Relations. How can we
exploit Soviet belief that they will be able “to do business” with
tougher but more consistent US Administration. How do questions of style
and rhetoric play into substance of our relations? Discuss the status of
established bilateral cooperative arrangements and describe those that
are advantageous to us and of real interest to Moscow. What policies can
we follow now that will lead to more moderate Soviet foreign/security
policy in the future.
3—Priority Problems.
(a)—Military Security/Arms Control. Identify US
conventional and theatre nuclear force posture weaknesses which undercut
our capacity to compete effectively with the USSR in Europe and in other parts of the world. Suggest
what in broad terms needs to be done to correct conventional and TNF deficiencies, and, taking account of
general Administration budgetary projections, assess regional
priorities. Identify potential new deployments (eg—ERW, CW)
which require allied assent. This section also should discuss how arms
control could, in tandem with force posture adjustments, serve the goals
described above. In this connection identify current broad US/allied
negotiating goals for MBFR, CDE and LRTNF talks, assess prospects for their achievement and
discuss possible alternative objectives. (Strategic forces and SALT will be considered in separate
studies.)
(b)—Poland. Summarize present internal political
situation in Poland, likely developments through June 1, potential
effects on Polish political structure and fall-out effect in other East
European states. Consider possible Soviet reactions, identify potential
“trigger points” and indicate interaction of Soviet Polish policy with
broader US/Soviet [Page 34] relationship.
Review possible US reprisals for Soviet invasion, likely allied
reactions and Soviet responses. Analyze Polish economic prospects and
broad US/Western options, including possible multilateral (or
multiple-bilateral) debt rescheduling.
(c)—Afghanistan/Southwest Asia. Discuss state of
Soviet control in Afghanistan, internal political equation and prospects
for negotiated solution. Assess effectiveness of current sanctions,
their viability and how they could be made more effective. Review
options for supporting Afghan rebels, in cooperation with other
countries, and steps needed to strengthen Pakistan and deter further
Soviet intervention in Southwest Asia.
4—Economic Issues. Summarize the state of
US/Soviet trade, joint ventures and technology transfers and the effects
of Afghanistan related sanctions. Assess merits of tightening up/easing
off on sanctions and what could be achieved in short and medium terms.
On the East-West economic front, review Soviet/European gas pipeline,
CSCE energy conference, COCOM rules and allied cooperation on
common export credit policies toward USSR. Assess in broad terms how we can use economic and
security assistance to support US competition with USSR.
5—US/Soviet Competition in Developing World.
Discuss how we can counter the political-military influence of Moscow
and Soviet client regimes (including Cuba, Libya, PDRY, Ethiopia, Angola and Syria) and how
we can exploit their vulnerabilities. Identify potential Soviet “targets
of opportunity” in next year and how to cope with such dangers. Consider
what can be done to undercut Vietnamese control of Kampuchea and support
Thailand and ASEAN states. Identify
possible US surrogates with which we can cooperate in Third Countries
(eg, Morocco in Africa). This analysis should take account of indigenous
forces of nationalism.
6—Core Alliance Partners. Discuss how we can
generate European and Japanese cooperation in containing Soviet
expansionism in developing world. Identify particular
problems/vulnerability of key allies (eg—FRG) and how to gain their support. In this connection,
analyze the “division of labor” concept and how it might be applied to
political, economic and security areas, taking account of distinctive
roles of Europeans and Japan. How can we ensure that allies blame USSR rather than US if East-West
relations turn colder.
7—China. Analyze US interests in the
Sino-Soviet-American triangular relationship and how to manage these
relationships to our advantage. Discuss how Sino-American cooperation
can limit Soviet expansion, including diplomatic and military
consultations, intelligence sharing and parallel approaches toward
Kampuchea and other international issues. How does arms supply issue fit
into this picture. Indicate how Chinese relationships with Japan and
Europeans might serve these goals.
[Page 35]
8—Eastern Europe. Review the degrees of internal
liberalization and external independence of the East European states and
discuss options for promoting the gradual development of those two
trends in cooperation with our key allies. Analyze how we can exploit
endemic East European economic problems to enhance our influence and
their freedom of action vis-a-vis Moscow, especially as the USSR is increasingly unable to bail them
out. Discuss how these goals can be furthered in the short-term and
longer-term without provoking internal political convulsions and Soviet
interventions.
9—Political Competition. Discuss strategy for
combating Soviet subversive activities, in Europe and Japan, as well as
in developing world. Describe options for public affairs diplomacy
(including ICA/VOA), ways to counter Soviet “peace offensive” in allied
countries and methods for highlighting Soviet interventions and the weak
Soviet foreign assistance record in LDCs. Discuss possibilities for
cooperation with allied and friendly countries.