Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

99. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 16, 1977, 9:30–9:40 a.m.

Summary of Telephone Conversation

PARTICIPANTS

• President Carter
• Chancellor Helmut Schmidt

PLACE

• The President’s Study

The following is a paraphrase of the conversation:

C: Helmut Schmidt.

P: This is Jimmy Carter. I called to express our concern and attention to the problem of the terrorists you now confront.² We are fully supportive of your efforts.

C: Thanks. I can use that support at this time.

P: Remember that you can count on us. I will also remember you in my prayers. We all hope this can be settled without further bloodshed. What are the prospects?

C: They are unclear. We are in indirect contact with the kidnappers through Switzerland. We are trying to bargain for time. I assume we are talking privately, without anyone listening in. I can tell you on that basis that we won’t surrender.

P: That seems to me a proper course of action.

C: It is our decision. We have, of course, left the situation intentionally unclear.

P: How are the rest of the things going? I understand you put before the Bundestag a program of tax reduction. And perhaps also an increase in public spending?

C: It also included an expansion of public expenditures for capital investment. It is hard to convince the states and communities to do projects. They have the major part of such expenditures, the federal government only the minor part.

P: I thought you just had to issue a directive and that was that.

C: I thought that was true for you! (Laughter)

P: How are your spirits?

C: Very good. I had always prepared to live up to challenges.

P: You have my complete support. Prime Minister Barre is here and he says to tell you the same is true of him.

C: Thank you. Please give him my regards and express to him my gratitude. May I ask, did you get my two letters?³

P: I did, and I will answer them within a few days.

C: The very secret one—did it help?

P: Yes. I’m not sure that it will work, but we will try.

C: One thing about the public discussion of the neutron bomb.⁴ I have the impression that it would be wise not to press the Europeans now. With time you will get a positive response. But if there is pressure now, latent negative attitudes may come to the fore.

P: I understand. What I don’t want to do is to proceed and then get shot down later as some sort of international ogre. We believe the weapon has its advantages. We don’t want to go ahead and then face public criticism later from European leaders.

C: The parliamentary discussion here went rather smoothly this week. But even here, there are latent feelings that could be inflamed.

P: What about other European countries?

C: I’m not well informed. But I just talked to my Defense Minister, and he said that not one, but several countries might raise problems.

P: It’s good to have that information.

C: My impression is that it would be easier here in Europe if the debate in your country, in the Senate, could be calmed.⁵

P: That would be nice. Now tell me how I can do it. (Laughter)

C: It’s always that way. One wishes, hopes against hope.

P: Thank you. You know I’m always here.

C: One more thing, Jimmy. How will you treat the fact of this call and its relation to the terrorist problem? Will you publish that there, or can I do it here, or shall we keep it secret as it is now?

P: You can use it in whatever way will be advantageous to you. We won’t make it public here, but if you discuss it there, I’ll of course confirm what you say.

C: Can I ask one more question?

P: Of course.

C: This problem with the man who is your budget director—is it a serious problem or is it exaggerated by the press and TV accounts?⁶

P: Both. It is a problem but has been exaggerated by the press. It has become something of a media event. Things that happened five, six, seven years ago have been brought up, exaggerated and, in some cases, distorted. It is a problem because it has been so exaggerated.

C: Thank you. I hope it can be resolved.

P: Thank you. Have a good day.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 9/1–18/77. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
2. Reference to the September 5 kidnapping of Hans-Martin Schleyer, President of the German National Association of Employers.
3. No letters from Schmidt to Carter have been found. Telegram 236187 to Bonn, October 1, transmitted Carter’s response to a September 14 letter from Schmidt, in which Carter praised Schmidt’s decision to expand the West German economy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770358–0484)
4. Reference is to the proposed deployment of the ERW, the enhanced radiation weapon or neutron bomb.
5. Reference is to the Senate’s ERW debate, which took place on July 1 and 13. (Bernard Weintraub, “Senate Votes Funds for Neutron Bombs, Heeding Carter Plea,” New York Times, July 14, 1977, p. 5)
6. Reference is to an ongoing controversy regarding the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Bert Lance. On September 15, Lance appeared before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee to respond to charges that he had used his position as President of the National Bank of Georgia for political and personal gain and that he had misled the committee during the process of his confirmation by the Senate. (Wendell Rawls, Jr., “Lance, Rebuking Critics, Defends Integrity and Banking Actions; Carter is ‘Keeping an Open Mind,’” New York Times, September 16, 1977, p. 52)