Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

74. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1977, 9:40–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Richard D. Vine, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
• Thomas O. Enders, US Ambassador to Canada
• Gregory F. Treverton, NSC Staff Member
• Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada
• Ivan Head, Assistant Principal Secretary of Canada
• Donald D. Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs
• Allan E. Gotlieb, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs
• Peter Towe, Canadian Ambassador to the US
• Vernon G. Turner, Minister, Canadian Embassy

The President opened the talks by remarking that he was learning a lot of history from his series of bilateral discussions with Western Hemisphere visitors.² It was, he noted, the 100th Anniversary of the Pacific War.³ He then handed to the Prime Minister a volume of satellite photographs. He hoped it would prove of interest and if photographs from American satellites could be of any use to Canada—for instance for crop analysis—they would all be made available. The Prime Minister thanked the President, asking if the US had found any Canadian missile sites. After further lighthearted exchange about the guest list for the White House dinner the previous evening (soccer player Pele⁴ had been invited but could not come), the President mentioned the bilateral discussions taking place about the northern gas pipeline.⁵

Gas Pipeline

Alluding to the general state of relations, the Prime Minister applauded the progress registered since his meeting with the President last February; mutual cooperation had been a “tremendous success”. As for the northern pipeline question, it looked as if negotiators on both sides had worked out agreement down to the last details late on September 7.⁶ Much had been achieved since the meeting of the Prime Minister with the President last February and this showed what could be done by working together. One snag remained: what would follow brief general statement to be issued on September 8 immediately after the meeting. The Prime Minister understood that Dr. Schlesinger wanted to go public that afternoon. He had to inform the President, however, that he had spoken to MacEachen who was greatly distressed by this prospect and did not believe Canada could be ready to handle its end of the publicity today. For one thing, there was the need for a separate statement to get the Indians on board, and there were also problems with British Columbia. While these were internal questions and of no direct concern to the US, it had to be noted that from the very beginning Canada had acted consistently in order to meet the US timetable. MacEachen had a firm understanding with Dr. Schlesinger that announcement in both countries would be made at a time which was mutually suitable.

Dr. Schlesinger intervened to say he would call MacEachen. The Prime Minister replied that it would be too late to turn off the afternoon press conference if there were no agreement to go ahead with it. Dr. Schlesinger replied that the US was not going to be public without Canadian approval. The Prime Minister responded that a brief joint statement was okay but that giving out details would have to wait at least until tomorrow. Dr. Schlesinger explained that he was concerned that an “information vacuum” left in the wake of a brief joint statement would enable critics of the joint project to erode the agreement between the two countries. At this point, the President intervened to say that the US would not go public on details “until you say it is okay.” The Prime Minister appreciated that and alluded again to the great achievement since February. He observed that 12 hours might make the difference. In any event it was one thing for the President and himself to go out after the meeting and speak in brief general terms about the achievement involved.

The President then asked Dr. Schlesinger if the joint statement had been cleared on both sides. On learning that his separate personal statement to be read out during the ensuing press conference had not been cleared with Canada, he asked Schlesinger to read it over the phone to MacEachen. The Prime Minister demurred at the need for this, having ascertained that no details or figures were included. The Prime Minister then agreed that Dr. Schlesinger should talk to MacEachen, expressing his own concern that the information might leak out in the wrong way which could result in negative public reaction in Canada.

Dr. Schlesinger then left the room to call MacEachen, and he returned shortly before the meeting ended. He reported that it had now been agreed with MacEachen that details could be released the next day. Fact sheets would go up to Ottawa this afternoon on the Prime Minister’s plane. Finally, he said again that he would prefer to have a press briefing before the weekend slipped by.⁷

During this exchange the President expressed his appreciation for Canadian cooperation in reaching agreement and added that he admired Canadian negotiating abilities very much. He suggested that Canada might now want to take on SALT or Southern Africa.

[Omitted here are discussions related to Africa and nonproliferation.]

Canadian-Latin American Relations

In conclusion, the President said “nothing would please us more than to have you play a more active role in this Hemisphere.” The US, the President asserted, needed Canada’s help—on human rights, nuclear questions and in dealing with the nations of the Caribbean. Indicating that he would not wish to press the Prime Minister in any way, the President said that if Canada were itself inclined to be more active in Hemisphere matters, the US would certainly encourage that.

The Prime Minister replied that Canada tried to play a useful role where it could. It tried, in fact, to exercise “a kind of influence,” especially in the Caribbean. During the February meeting, he and the President had discussed Jamaica and Belize and Canada tried to extend its policy in Latin America. It already has deeply involved the Caribbean. So the desire for expanded relations was there. The only question was how to go about it. The Prime Minister wondered if the President was about to raise the question of Canadian membership in the OAS. If that was where his remarks were leading, the Prime Minister wanted to say at once that “the whole thing was being reviewed”. Was the OAS, in fact, a valid instrument for Canadian purposes, the Prime Minister asked rhetorically. Canada had received conflicting advice from different participants. The Prime Minister said that Canada would not wish to involve itself further with OAS until it was convinced that it was the right thing to do. But meanwhile Canada tried to show its interest in various ways. His attendance at Canal treaties signing ceremony, which associated Canada with the treaties, was part of that effort.

The President remarked that at the outset of his discussions with President Torrijos about the Canal treaties signing ceremony, the latter had urged the US to work on Canada to ensure that Prime Minister Trudeau attended. Canada was the first country Torrijos mentioned. The President sensed that the Latin American states in general would like Canada to be part of OAS and to share its responsibilities.

The Prime Minister speculated that the Latin Americans might be attracted to Canada because of its “third option” policy which had involved Canada distancing itself from the US—for instance, in economic and cultural matters. Fortunately, this had caused no real problems for US–Canadian relations. But the Prime Minister was not sure whether it was in the American interest to encourage the Latin Americans to coalesce with Canada against the United States. Summing up, the Prime Minister said that Canada had no objection to the OAS if Canada could play a positive role. Foreign Minister Jamieson added that the timing of any decisions would be affected by the end of review of the problem. There was no unanimity in Latin American on the question so far.⁸

Before concluding, the President and the Prime Minister talked of what they would say to the press afterward.⁹ The Prime Minister said he would like to talk of progress in all areas, including the seaway and tolls.¹⁰ The President suggested that he would make a brief statement and then the Prime Minister could say whatever he wished and answer questions. The Prime Minister asked if he could mention the convention tax issue,¹¹ and Secretary Vance replied that he was uncertain of the status of the issue. The Prime Minister said that many non-governmental organizations have members on both sides of the border. If those kinds of relationships are to continue, it would be helpful if the US changed its law. The President suggested that the Prime Minister express his own view. He could not promise what the US might be able to do, noting that there had been many abuses in the previous convention tax law. What was necessary was more general tax reform.¹²

The Prime Minister said he wanted to mention the issue of extraterritoriality of US antitrust law. Attorney General Bell had visited Canada, and that was helpful, but later in a speech he had used the “big stick.”¹³ The way to solve the problem is through diplomatic channels, not through US laws and US courts. Secretary Vance agreed that the issue needed a push. The President asked for a memorandum on the subject, saying he had not known of the Bell speech.¹⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Materials, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 9/1–18/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Trudeau was in Washington to attend the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty and meet with Carter and Vance.
2. Reference is to Carter’s meetings on September 6 and 7 with the leaders of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela, all of whom visited Washington to attend the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty on September 7. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary)
3. Reference is to the War of the Pacific between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru.
4. Reference is to the Brazilian soccer player, Edson Arantes do Nascimento.
5. During the spring and summer, U.S. and Canadian agencies issued reports on plans to construct a pipeline to transport natural gas from Alaska to the lower 48 states. On May 2, the Federal Power Commission’s report favored either the Mackenzie River Valley route or the Alaska Highway route. On May 9, Berger’s report criticized the Mackenzie River Valley route and offered qualified support for the Alaska Highway route. On July 4, the NEB backed the Alaska Highway route. (Steven Rattner, “Gas Pipeline From Alaska Across Canada Proposed,” New York Times, May 3, 1977, p. 59; Robert Trumbull, “Negative Report on Natural Gas Pipelines Arouses a Furor in Canada,” New York Times, May 11, 1977, p. 78; Robert Trumbull, “Canada Energy Unit Backs $8.6 Billion Gas Pipeline,” New York Times, July 5, 1977, p. 45)
6. Following the Canadian Government’s August 8 approval of the Alaska Highway route, Schlesinger and MacEachan led negotiations in Ottawa and Washington that resulted in agreement on a pipeline that would follow the Alaska Highway route. (Robert Trumbull, “U.S. and Canada Seek an Early Gas Accord,” New York Times, August 9, 1977, p. 55; Steven Rattner, “Carter Said to Back Pipeline via Canada to Move Alaska Gas,” New York Times, September 7, 1977, p. 83)
7. Schlesinger announced the agreement on Friday, September 9. Telegram 216428 to Ottawa, September 9, transmitted the fact sheet released during his press conference on that day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770327–1222)
8. In a December 2 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski wrote: “I asked State to follow-up your expression of interest in having Canada play a larger role in the Inter-American system, and they have provided a strategy paper which suggests that we move slowly to build Canadian interest in such areas as: the multilateral effort to develop the Caribbean, human rights, peace-keeping activities, more technical assistance and scholarships, particularly to benefit the poor in middle-income countries.” In response to Carter’s notation on that memorandum, in a December 5 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski asked him to add non-proliferation to the list. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Canada: 1–12/77)
9. See “United States-Canada Agreement on a Natural Gas Pipeline: Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Trudeau Announcing the Agreement,” September 8, Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 1547–1549.
10. On August 4, the Department of Transportation announced that the United States and Canada had reached a preliminary understanding on a toll increase that would become final after review by the St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation and a public hearing in the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770280–0029)
11. See footnote 27, Document 73.
12. See footnote 28, Document 73.
13. Reference is to Bell’s August 8 speech to the American Bar Association Assembly meeting in Chicago, in which he urged several foreign governments to cooperate with U.S. antitrust investigations of the oil and uranium industries and noted that lack of cooperation might result in less U.S. cooperation with foreign investigations and also influence “our prosecutorial judgment.” (Tom Goldstein, “Bell Asks Aid Abroad on Inquiries,” New York Times, August 9, 1977, p. 59)
14. No such memorandum has been found.