Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

147. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State¹

24107.

Bonn, December 19, 1980, 1758Z

Department please pass White House and USMission NATO. Subject: Conversation with Chancellor Schmidt December 19 on FRG Position on Economic Measures in Event of Soviet Intervention in Poland. Ref: State 334468.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary: I saw the Chancellor December 19 and went over with him the talking points contained reftel. He listened carefully but, while praising the NATO consultation process in developing measures in the event of a Soviet intervention in Poland, he was essentially noncommittal as to the stance which the FRG NATO PermRep would take in the future in drawing up the list of economic measures. Schmidt expressed concern about the “worst case” approach, saying he felt it would be desirable to develop differentiated approaches geared to various contingencies. He also displayed great sensitivity about possibility of leaks concerning NATO consultations. He noted the relatively calm situation now prevailing in Poland and feared that a leak to the public of a NATO document containing a list of economic countermeasures based on a “worst case” contingency would be unsettling and could be seen as provocative by the Soviets. He nevertheless claimed to be surprised that FRG PermRep was “reticent” in NATO consultations and he asked Von Staden to follow up with the Foreign Office with a view to clarifying the situation.³ Schmidt was pleased that I would be seeing Genscher (we are requesting an appointment with Genscher December 22 following his return from Prague).⁴ Schmidt also made comments concerning criticism by US officials of the FRG defense budget which will be reported Septel.⁵ End summary.

3. The Chancellor received me December 19 at my urgent request, delaying his departure to Hamburg to do so. He was accompanied by von Staden; I was alone.

4. After listening carefully—although with several interruptions—to my presentation of the talking points contained reftel, the Chancellor first expressed appreciation for my remarks with regard to the FRG’s concern for its relationship with the GDR, and my assurance that we had not proposed action in connection with inner-German trade. He added that he was grateful for the Secretary’s comments in clearing up this matter.

5. During my initial presentation and at several points in our subsequent conversation, the Chancellor questioned me closely as to our definition of “Soviet intervention” in Poland as it related to NATO consultations on countermeasures. When I explained that consultations were based on a “worst case” intervention scenario, the Chancellor expressed concern, noting that there were many variations which Soviet intervention could take, and that, in fact, the “worst case” scenario probably was the least likely. He felt it would be desirable to consider a differentiated list of countermeasures which could be fitted to various contingencies short of an outright, brutal Soviet intervention. I explained the rationale for operating on a “worst case” basis and observed an attempt to work out a series of measures applicable to a number of different contingencies would be overly time consuming; rather, the idea was to develop as broad a list as possible from which governments could make decisions based on the actual circumstances of intervention. The Chancellor, however, made clear that he continued to be skeptical about this approach.

6. The Chancellor also repeatedly expressed his concern about the possibility of leaks arising from the NATO consultations. He thought that NATO’s record in maintaining the confidentiality of PermRep discussions was not good and he commented that leaks—which sometimes almost seemed deliberate—would have international political as well as financial consequences. He reiterated his preference for very restricted consultations and the need for every effort to be made to preserve confidentiality.

7. The Chancellor remarked that, at a time when the situation in Poland seems to have calmed down somewhat (he referred in particular to the “amazing discipline” shown at the Gdansk ceremonies), it would be most unfortunate if a list of economic countermeasures against the Soviet Union based on a “worst case” scenario were to be leaked. This would not only be unsettling but could be taken as a provocation by the Soviet Union.

8. In connection with leaks, I observed that there was also a possibility that a leak could occur regarding the failure of Alliance members to agree on measures to be taken in the event of Soviet intervention and that this also could be most damaging. The Chancellor did not comment, although Von Staden took note of this observation.

9. Speaking in general terms of the NATO consultations about Poland, the Chancellor said he had welcomed the broad consensus which he understood had been achieved at the last Brussels Ministerial by the Defense and Foreign Ministers.⁶ In this regard, he remarked that he felt Foreign Minister Genscher had been especially helpful. Having this broad consensus in mind, the Chancellor said he was quite surprised by what I had said concerning the “reticence” of the FRG PermRep with regard to consultations on economic measures.

10. Continuing, the Chancellor said that he was pleased that, in contrast to the situation regarding Afghanistan, NATO was consulting in advance about contingencies which could develop in Poland. He stressed again that these consultations, in his view, should embrace various eventualities and should not be based on a single scenario. He was pleased in general that the consultations embraced both political and economic measures and he stressed that consultations on such measures should be approached in a flexible spirit and should not develop into a kind of dogma.

11. The Chancellor said that he saw no differences in principle between the US and the FRG in connection with attitude toward East-West trade, although it is true that the FRG has had different results from the US in this area and trade with the East plays a greater role for the FRG than it does for the US. He added that questions concerning economic countermeasures are obviously complicated, particularly the legal aspects, and needed to be considered carefully. In general, however, he wanted to be clear that he had no difficulty with using economic measures for political ends, but this should be done only when necessary and only in a manner appropriate to the circumstances.

12. Von Staden remarked that he thought there had been a concensus at the Quadripartite meeting in London on the contingencies which might arise and the reactions to them.⁷ He added that we should not be trying to develop a list of countermeasures, all of which could be triggered at once without time for reflection as to the actual circumstances of Soviet moves. I said that my information on the Quadripartite meeting was that, in fact, the FRG representative had been most reserved about any discussion of specific economic measures; as to a “triggering list,” I said this was definitely not the aim of the NATO consultations. Our goal, rather, was to develop a broad list which subsequently would be reviewed in capitals and from which Ministers could draw in determining what actions would be appropriate.

13. In his concluding comments, the Chancellor said he wished to note that it was not his style to make loud pronouncements about actions to be taken in the future which subsequently are not fulfilled. He recalled in strong terms the question of the Olympic boycott and the fact that in the end the FRG had stood with the US on this question. He said that he wished to be known as a person who does not give his word easily, but when he does he fulfills his commitment.

14. I thanked the Chancellor for his comments and his time and repeated our hope that the FRG PermRep could be given more latitude to discuss specific economic countermeasures in the event of Soviet intervention in Poland in accordance with the mandate from the Foreign Ministers. The Chancellor requested Von Staden to follow up on this matter with the Foreign Office to clarify the situation and said he was pleased that I would be talking with the Foreign Minister.

15. In a subsequent conversation with Von Staden after we had left the Chancellor’s office, he referred to the paragraph in my talking points indicating that the problem “goes beyond the situation in Poland and relates directly to the overall international behavior of the Soviet Union.” Since he understood that the mandate of the Foreign Ministers to the PermReps had in fact been directly related to Poland, he said he was puzzled by this passage. I said I felt it should be taken to mean that a Soviet intervention in Poland should not be viewed by the West as an isolated event but should be seen in the context of a pattern of behavior, including the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet arms buildup, etc.

16. Comment: Although personally cordial, the Chancellor was obviously rushed and a bit testy. During our conversation, he spoke mostly in German, which is unusual in our talks. While he made no definite commitment as to instructions to the FRG PermRep, I believe it was useful to see him and I feel that the report of my demarche should have an impact on the Foreign Office.

Stoessel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870101–0816. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Telegram 334468 to Bonn, December 19, instructed Stoessel to meet with Schmidt and Genscher to express U.S. concerns about the FRG’s reticence regarding possible economic measures in the event of a Soviet intervention in Poland. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870101–0828)
3. Reference is to the December 16 NAC meeting, during which the NATO Permanent Representatives agreed to a first draft of possible political measures to be used if the Soviets intervened militarily in Poland, but the West Germans refused to agree to specific economic measures. (Telegram 8603 from USNATO Brussels, December 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D880026–1036)
4. In telegram 24187 from Bonn, December 22, Stoessel reported on his December 19 meeting with Genscher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N810001–0009)
5. In telegram 24106 from Bonn, December 19, Stoessel reported that during their December 19 meeting Schmidt referred to press reports of criticism by Brown and Brzezinski that West Germany’s draft 1981 defense budget would not increase by 3 percent. Schmidt stated that he found such comments “hard to understand,” given his promise to Carter that the FRG would meet the target, if needed with supplemental appropriations as in previous years. Schmidt indicated that he felt that such comments would have an “adverse psychological effect on Bundestag members” and “wondered what such comments implied about solidarity of ties between the two allies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870101–0823)
6. See Document 68.
7. Reference is to the December 15 Quadripartite meeting on Poland; see Document 69.