145. Memorandum From Robert Blackwill of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- Your October 17 Meetings with von Staden
The context. The GDR action on currency exchange2 has humiliated Schmidt, frozen inter-German relations and called into question, at least for the moment, the governing coalition’s drive toward more and more detente in Europe.3 Moreover, the FDP showing should give Genscher a post-election boost toward his natural Atlantist inclination and strengthen his hand in foreign policy debates with the SPD. Thus, at least for the next several months, we have an opportunity to influence a Schmidt government less able to withstand totally our pressure. This will produce no miracles, and East–West trade will continue to be a difficult issue, but we should be able to make some progress with the Germans on matters of importance to us. After the East German moves, and with the Soviet shadow extending ever darker over Poland, Schmidt will not want to begin his new administration with a renewal of the fight with us. With this background in mind, and in addition to Iran–Iraq, the autonomy talks, the future of SALT II, etc., you may wish to pursue the following:
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- I think it would be useful if David gave von Staden a strong pitch on the NATO Phase II effort;
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- Both of you might want to emphasize the importance of finding a way out of the current US–FRG impasse on trade with the East. If the disagreement persists, it will envitably erode US public support for the defense of Europe;
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- You might also say that the President is looking forward to seeing Schmidt on November 20 during the Chancellor’s visit to the US.
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- In this context, we all need to think about ways to enhance US–German consultations at all levels, including the highest. (C)
I will be seeing von Staden at 11:30, ZB at 12:00 and David at 12:30.4 As you suggested, since von Staden is bringing someone from the Embassy, I will plan to sit in on both sessions. (U)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 26, German Federal Republic, 10–11/80. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamp near the top of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen” followed by the handwritten date“10/20/80.”↩
- On October 9, the East German Government increased the amount of currency that visitors were required to convert from $3.50 to $14.00 per day and imposed this requirement on retirees, who had previously been exempt. (“East Germans Raise Fee for Westerners,” New York Times, October 11, 1980, p. 2) Telegram 20050 from Bonn, October 17, reported on the October 15 Cabinet meeting on the FRG response to the GDR restrictions on currency exchanges, which the Embassy characterized as “neither appeasement nor reprisal.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800495–0854)↩
- Telegram 2256 from Berlin, October 20, reported that according to FRG Plenipotentiary for Berlin Spangenberg, at the October 15 Cabinet meeting (see footnote 2, above), Schmidt predicted that the superpowers would be drawn into the Iran-Iraq war, that oil from the Middle East might be cut off causing high unemployment and political polarization in Western Europe, that “the bad Soviet-American relationship” would stall “detente and its manifestations (CSCE, MBFR and arms control negotiations)” until at least 1982, and that the “inner-German relationship would not be able to develop further until this 1982 time frame.” With respect to TNF, the “smaller West European countries” would “try to stay out of trouble with both sides, but especially with the USSR if US leadership looked uncertain,” which might cause Schmidt serious difficulties with the SPD. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870117–2120)↩
- No further record of Blackwill’s meetings with Von Staden, Brzezinski, and Aaron has been found.↩