Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

127. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 22, 1980, 9:45–10:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The President’s Meeting with the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany² (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Robert D. Blackwill, NSC Staff Member
• Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany
• FRG Ambassador to the U.S. Dr. Peter Hermes
• Heinz Weber, Interpreter

After an initial exchange of pleasantries the President asked Genscher to extend to the Chancellor his personal appreciation and admiration for the Chancellor’s speech in the Bundestag and for the letter that he had just received.³ The President said that the U.S. partnership with the Federal Republic was very valuable to our country and to him. We look forward to the Chancellor’s visit. (S)

Continuing, the President indicated that we look on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a major departure and a threat to world peace.⁴ It must be met on a long-term basis in the strongest possible way. Therefore, the economic measures we took against Moscow and our position on the Olympics were not transient for the United States. Our public was aroused. The President said that he was sure that if we did not react this time, the Soviets would be tempted to move again—against other countries in Southwest Asia and eventually to interrupt oil supplies from the Middle East on which the West was dependent.⁵ The President asked Genscher to do everything possible to influence the French and others who have not been so forthcoming in response to the crisis in Afghanistan. (S)

Stressing that we continued to desire a cooperative relationship with the Soviets, the President noted that we would pursue SALT, MBFR and attempt to work with Moscow to control the threat to peace. Our communication with the Soviets will be strained in the near term but we will let them know that we want a cooperative relationship, if and when Soviet actions make that possible. (S)

In response, Genscher said that in his judgment the Soviets invaded Afghanistan because they wished to prevent that country from leaving their sphere of influence. The FRG believed that Moscow had miscalculated both the reaction of the West to the invasion and the reaction of the Third World. The Soviets had made a similar mistake concerning TNF modernization. They had felt that the TNF decision would not be supported by the European Allies and that they could separate Europe from the United States on the issue. Genscher said that after Afghanistan, he was sure that the Soviets would try to drive a wedge between Europe and the U.S. For this reason it was imperative that the Allies reach a common understanding and strategy concerning Afghanistan under which each individual Ally could undertake individual tasks. Germany was ready to take the lead in providing economic assistance to Turkey and also could give some help in arms supply since Turkey was a member of NATO. (S)

Genscher continued that the FRG considered it imperative to focus attention on Pakistan. Germany could not provide military assistance but could participate in financial assistance. Bonn had suggested to the EC that it offer political and economic help to the Gulf and to Iraq as had been done with the ASEAN countries. This would be a direct and effective response to Soviet policy in the area. Genscher noted that we should try to consolidate and stabilize the countries around Afghanistan. He hoped that the leaders in Iran would become aware of where the real danger to that country came from. The FRG would also consider increasing development assistance in Africa to try to help stabilize the situation there. Germany was ready to discuss increased military expenditures if this became necessary and all parties in the Bundestag agreed on this issue. (S)

Genscher said that it was important to see further progress in the Middle East in order to reconcile Sadat with the Rejectionist Front. In sum Genscher stressed, the West should show the Soviet Union not only protests but a counter strategy that made it clear that the next Soviet adventure would bear an even higher risk than Afghanistan. Genscher thought that we had an opportunity to use Afghanistan to revitalize the West. For instance, after a one-year dispute within the Community over an EC economic relationship with Yugoslavia, last Tuesday⁶ the Nine had settled the problem in one hour. (S)

The President responded that he thought our reading of the strategic consequences of the Soviet invasion were completely compatible with that of the FRG and that Genscher had made a good analysis of the situation. Noting that the letter from Chancellor Schmidt this morning had indicated the need for improved Allied consultation, the President asked if Genscher had discussed with Cy Vance the possibility of an early meeting of the Quadripartite Foreign Ministers. Genscher replied that they had been thinking of a meeting after the Islamic Conference January 26–29, and Secretary Vance added that they were trying to think of the proper camouflage for such a get together. In answer to the President’s question, Secretary Vance said that the Italians would not be included and Genscher noted that Prime Minister Cossiga had been particularly helpful recently and the Germans would not mind if the Italians were invited. The President noted wryly that he thought the Foreign Ministers were devious enough to find an excuse to meet, and asked if the French would be willing to come. Genscher replied that the French had always been willing to discuss every issue in this group—Yugoslavia, Portugal, Afghanistan, the Middle East—but not in NATO. (S)

The President wondered whether an umbrella for the Ministerial meeting might be a pre-planning session for the Economic Summit and Genscher said that would provide a good camouflage. Dr. Brzezinski added that would also bring in the Japanese who would have an important role to play in meeting the Soviet challenge. (S)

Genscher then offered the President his warmest congratulations for his victory in Iowa.⁷ The President responded that the victory had been unexpected and was due to the good work of Fritz Mondale and Mrs. Carter. He had stayed in the White House. The Vice President said he had had the glory of explaining to farmers why lower farm prices were good for them. That had been fun the Vice President noted ironically, but the farmers had gotten the message. The President added that he had carried the farm vote three-to-one and had won every county in Iowa except one. (C)

Genscher then said that it was his conviction that if we explained the Soviet challenge to our citizens, they would understand and be prepared to respond. The West could not allow the Soviets to move ahead step by step without reaction. It was also important that the nonaligned countries realized this and had confidence in Western resolve. They needed to believe that the West would help them in their hour of need since the Soviets were always ready to respond to an invitation. The Soviets had miscalculated twice recently, concerning TNF and in Afghanistan, and it was important that the West give them no reason to miscalculate again. (S)

The President said that his own assessment, and that of our Ambassador in Moscow, was that moving the Olympics would be a strong lesson to the Soviets.⁸ We were firm in our determination not to go unless the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. We hope for support in this from the Third World, the Moslem countries and Europe. Australian Prime Minister Fraser had indicated last night his support for our position and Joe Clark had done the same. (S)

The President said the Soviets would have to realize that in invading Afghanistan they had crossed a very important line. They had to be made to understand that they must pattern their future behavior on acceptable rules of international conduct. Indicating that he thought the Soviets had been surprised by the international reaction to Afghanistan, the President said he did not know how the Soviets could withdraw and save face. In response to the President’s tough message on Afghanistan, Brezhnev had said that Soviet troops were there temporarily and would be removed when the cause of their presence was removed. Thus, Brezhnev seemed to be drawing a distinction between Afghanistan on the one hand and Poland and East Germany on the other. However, even if the Soviets did remove their forces by March or April or May, if they left behind a puppet regime, the Western punishment level should be retained. (S)

The President continued that our intelligence indicated that the Soviets were having trouble stamping out the tribesmen and deserters from the Afghan Army. They were not finding it easy to conquer Afghanistan. (S)

In closing, the President said that Genscher and Schmidt should not hesitate to call. He thought it would be very useful to proceed rapidly to set up a Four-Power Foreign Ministers meeting. The President asked Genscher to pass to Schmidt his highest admiration for the Chancellor’s strength and courage. The President said he understood his freedom to act without adverse consequences was quite different from that of Schmidt because of the vulnerability of West Germany. Therefore, Schmidt’s reaction to the crisis only increased the President’s admiration. Genscher responded that Germany had always given priority to the security aspects of the Alliance. The FRG would discuss the Olympic issue with its EC partners. But it was necessary to avoid creating the impression in Western publics that the Olympic question was the central Western response to the invasion of Afghanistan. Other longer-term measures were also very important. The President agreed. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President, 1/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Genscher visited the United States from January 18 to 22 for talks with U.S. leaders, including Vance, Brzezinski, and Carter. A memorandum of conversation for Vance’s January 21 talk with Genscher is in National Archives, RG 59, Vance Papers, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Jan/Feb/Mar 1980 Memcons. Telegram 20233 to Bonn, January 24, conveyed a summary of the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800041–0145) No memorandum of conversation for Brzezinski’s January 22 talk with Genscher has been found.
2. In a January 21 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski wrote: “Although brief, your meeting with Genscher is unusually important. During Genscher’s visit to Washington, we need to turn German verbal expressions of support for Western solidarity in the face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan into tangible punitive steps the FRG will take in its relationship with Moscow. We will be aided in this effort by domestic pressures on Schmidt from the opposition and Schmidt’s desire to avoid a public dispute over Afghanistan with the United States during an election year in the Federal Republic.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 25, German Federal Republic: 1/80)
3. Reference is to Schmidt’s January 17 statement to the Bundestag and his January 18 letter to Carter, which discussed the need for direct U.S.-Soviet dialog, the danger that economic sanctions or military action against Iran would undermine the West’s standing in the Islamic world, and the desirability of four-power consultations. (AAPBD 1980, Document 17)
4. In his January 21 memorandum to Carter (see footnote 2, above), Brzezinski wrote: “There is considerable doubt in Germany from Schmidt on down that we have thought through the relationship between the captivity of our hostages in Teheran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Schmidt worries that the application of sanctions against Iran by the Europeans would lead to a suspension of Iranian oil to Europe and cause unprecedented economic problems in the industrialized world. He also fears if we use military force against Iran, it would destroy our efforts to secure the support and trust of the Soviets as exemplified in Afghanistan. Finally, Schmidt wonders if, as after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the U.S. reaction to Afghanistan will be initially sharp but will fade away after a few months.”
5. In his January 21 memorandum to Carter (see footnote 2, above), Brzezinski encouraged Carter to tell Genscher that “we understand that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has altered the strategic equation in Southwest Asia, that this has been fully taken into account in our efforts to free the hostages, and that we are prepared to meet the Soviet challenge over the long haul.”
6. January 15.
7. Reference is to the January 22 Democratic primary election in Iowa, in which Carter won 59% of the vote and Edward Kennedy won 31%. (Adam Clymer, “Carter Wins Strong Victory in Iowa as Bush Takes Lead Over Reagan,” New York Times, January 22, 1980, pp. A1, A16)
8. On January 20, Carter announced that he had asked the President of the U.S. National Olympic Committee not to send the U.S. team to the Summer Olympic Games scheduled to take place in Moscow from July 19 to August 3 if the Soviet Union did not withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within the coming month. See “Letter to the President of the U.S. Olympic Committee on the Games to be Held in Moscow,” Public Papers: Carter, 1980, pp. 106–107.