Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

125. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House¹

Brussels, December 13, 1979, 1434Z

Secto 12024. White House Eyes Only for the President and Dr. Brzezinski. State Eyes Only for Acting Secretary Christopher. Subject: Report of Conversations in Bonn, December 11, 1979.

1. (Secret—Entire text).

2. Following is a memorandum of my conversations in Bonn with Genscher and Schmidt.

3. Summary. Secretary’s talks with Genscher and Schmidt were wide-ranging and positive. Both agreed that move toward imposition of UN Chapter VII sanctions against Iran would be logical and would have FRG support. Chancellor said that FRG—on condition that other European countries did likewise—would participate in financial actions along general lines suggested by Presidential emissaries, although he did not think they would be effective.² It was agreed that four Allied Foreign Ministers at meeting in Brussels December 12 would discuss these matters and that experts of Four Powers would meet thereafter with view to elaborating statement of Allied views to be completed December 13.³ Both Genscher and Schmidt suggested possible political utility of bringing Saudi Arabia, Emirates, and Iraq into closer association with European Community, although no details were spelled out. Chancellor discussed his plans for trip to United States early next year (Septel).⁴ End summary.

4. Secretary had wide-ranging, positive talks with Foreign Minister Genscher for one hour and with Chancellor Schmidt for one hour and fifteen minutes in Bonn December 11. He reviewed in detail our views of the Iranian situation, including discussion of channels we have been using in attempt to communicate with Iranian authorities, UN actions and options for moves in the future. He stressed that we have been patient and firm in dealing with the situation but that we are determined not to allow matters to [garble] frozen where they are. With the UN Security Council decision calling for release of the hostages and the expectation of a World Court decision in this sense in the near future, the groundwork has been laid for further action in the UN framework.⁵ The Presidential emissaries in their visits to capitals last week outlined various short-term measures which could be taken in the financial field affecting Iran. In addition, if we find ourselves next week in a situation where the Iranians have totally ignored the views of the world community as expressed by the Security Council and the World Court, then we will have to think of Chapter VII sanctions.⁶ This would be a logical step in increasing the pressures against Iran.

5. Both Genscher and Schmidt stressed FRG solidarity with the U.S. and Genscher noted in particular his statement earlier in the day to this effect in the Bundestag which had received the unanimous support of all factions. Schmidt underlined his admiration for the President’s stance in difficult circumstances and said it was absolutely out of the question that the U.S. should give in to blackmail.

6. Schmidt indicated that, in a meeting he had held the previous night with interested Cabinet members, the conclusion had also been reached that UN Chapter VII sanctions would be a logical next step. Both he and Genscher said they would support such a move. They inquired about possible Soviet reactions to a call for sanctions and the Secretary said that he had discussed this with Dobrynin before the latter’s departure for consultations in Moscow.⁷ Dobrynin had said only that he would have to seek instructions on the question. The Secretary had made clear that a Soviet veto would have very serious adverse effects on U.S.–Soviet relations and on the position of the Soviet Union in the world community. In view of the support given by the USSR in the UN Security Council debates to the principle of the inviolability of diplomatic premises, he expected that the Soviet Union would not veto a call for sanctions; perhaps an abstention would be possible, but this would not be a veto. The Secretary said that China would support a call for sanctions. The Chancellor thought that the Soviet Union would wish to influence the exact wording of the call for sanctions and wondered if we had prepared language as yet for an appropriate resolution. The Secretary said we have not reached that stage but would be considering the matter urgently.

7. On the range of economic measures against Iran which had been discussed last week by the Presidential emissaries in the several capitals, the Chancellor said the FRG would be prepared to cooperate on the condition that other countries did so as well. However, he said in all frankness he did not believe these measures would be very effective in exerting pressure on Khomeini. They were rather technical in nature and difficult for most people to understand; moreover, any impact they would have would take some time to be felt. The Chancellor noted that the powers of the FRG Government to compel banking institutions to take such measures are limited but he made clear that the government could exercise influence on the major German banks to induce them to take actions which are deemed necessary and appropriate, but always on the understanding that banks in other European countries would be taking similar action.

8. The Chancellor suggested that the four Allied Foreign Ministers, in their discussions in Brussels the evening of December 12, should also cover the Iranian situation and, in particular, financial/economic measures under consideration. They could then mandate their experts (for example, Cooper for the U.S. and Lautenschlager for the FRG, together with their British and French colleagues) to meet urgently to review options and produce an agreed paper on the range of suggested actions. The Chancellor thought we should ask that such a paper be ready by midday on December 13. The Secretary agreed with this suggested course of action.⁸

9. Genscher and Schmidt both mentioned that they have been giving consideration to what further measures, if any, the European Community might take to promote stability in the Middle East and reassure those countries in the area who are concerned by the events in Iran. They spoke of possibly including Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Emirates, and Iraq in some kind of association with the European Community, although the terms of such an association were not spelled out in any detail. Schmidt thought that a move of this kind could help to give these countries the feeling that they are supported by the West and that this could be helpful in current circumstances. Genscher referred to the association of many of the Mediterranean states with the EC and thought that this possibly could be extended to include some of the key states in the Middle East. Genscher underlined that the FRG had made no decision in this regard and had not talked with other EC member countries; it would not do so until it had received U.S. reactions. Cooper noted that, in the past, we had had some problems with the associated measures worked out by the EC in the Mediterranean area, but he thought these had been resolved. The Secretary said the idea was an interesting one which we would wish to consider in the U.S.; personally, he thought it might well help to promote stability in the Middle East and, on this basis, he would tend to favor the idea.

10. In the context of a discussion of possible military action by the U.S. against Iran, the Chancellor gave it as his view that a sharp reduction or elimination of oil deliveries from Iran would result in a world economic crisis. Third World countries would be affected, as well as industrialized countries, including some in Eastern Europe. Unemployment rates would go up drastically. He thought that oil would simply be unavailable in sufficient quantities to meet demand, regardless of how high the price went. He said that all of this would have to be faced up to and accepted if necessary, but we should do so with our eyes open and the U.S. should ensure that thorough and timely consultation is carried out with other countries before steps are taken which could result in shutting down the flow of Iranian oil.

11. In the conversation with the Chancellor, there was a general discussion of various other possibilities for action against Iran, including military. The political situation in Iran was also reviewed, and other subjects which came up briefly included the situation in Egypt, the state of the Shah’s health, and prospects for his resettlement.

12. The Chancellor and the Secretary discussed the forthcoming NATO meeting briefly, in particular the decisions concerning theater nuclear force modernization and the proposals for arms control negotiations. They reviewed political problems of the Dutch, Danes and Belgians, but expressed confidence that the Alliance would, in the end, find a way to make the necessary decisions. The Chancellor stressed the need to take a serious attitude—and to make this clear publicly—regarding arms control negotiations with the East. Referring to his recent talks with Gromyko, he mentioned that, in his experience of some ten years of dealing with Gromyko, he had never found him more friendly and forthcoming in private discussion than on the occasion of his last visit to Bonn. The Chancellor said he was convinced that the Soviet Union would wish to pick up the thread before long of the arms control negotiations despite the TNF decisions.

13. The Chancellor inquired about SALT II ratification and said he would be prepared to make another statement early in the new year supporting the treaty, but he did not wish to do so if it would in any way be counter-productive. The Secretary encouraged him to make such a statement.

14. The Chancellor said he was thinking of making a trip to the United States to see the President in the first part of 1980 if this would be acceptable to the President and if the timing could be worked out in the light of the President’s heavy schedule in the election year. He noted that he would be seeing Brezhnev during the first half of 1980 and that he felt it would be desirable if he could see President Carter before such a meeting. The Secretary said the Chancellor would be most welcome in Washington and it was left that Embassy Bonn would undertake to work out details of a possible visit (Septel).

15. The Chancellor, although tired, seemed in good shape and buoyed by his success in the SPD Congress. He asked the Secretary to convey his warmest good wishes to the President and his support and sympathy for him in dealing with the Iranian crisis.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790010–0053 and P840156–1784, N790010–0053. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Vance visited Bonn on December 11 and 12 during a trip that also took him to London (December 10), Paris (December 10–11), Rome (December 11), and Brussels (December 12 and 13).
2. For the financial measures suggested by Carter’s emissaries, see Document 34.
3. No memorandum of conversation for the discussion of Iran on December 12 by the U.S., FRG, UK, and French Foreign Ministers has been found; for a German account, see AAPBD 1979, Document 377.
4. In telegram 22093 from Bonn, December 12, Stoessel reported that Schmidt thought that it would be useful for him to visit Washington early in 1980 and noted that it would be convenient for Schmidt to visit during the third week in February. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790573–0011) For records of Schmidt’s March 5 talks in Washington, see Documents 199 and 200.
5. On December 4, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 457 calling on Iran to free the American hostages immediately. (Bernard D. Nossiter, “Diplomats Dubious: They Express Skepticism Teheran Will Obey—Waldheim to Act,” New York Times, December 5, 1979, pp. A1, A21)
6. Reference is to sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. See footnote 2, Document 193.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume VI, Soviet Union, Document 236.
8. In telegrams 21945 and 21947 from Brussels, both December 13, Cooper reported that he had met with Bridges, Paye, and Lautenschlager to discuss measures to be taken by major industrial states and economic sanctions that might be applied in Chapter VII action against Iran. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790575–0096 and D790575–0102) On December 19, Vance sent Schmidt a message to thank him for his hospitality at Schloss Gymnich and for “thinking through with me the choices open to us and to our friends and allies.” Vance noted that Schmidt’s suggestion that economic and financial experts meet after the quadripartite dinner in Brussels was “a particularly constructive one which has produced results.” (Telegram 326771 to Bonn, December 19; Central Foreign Policy File, D790584–0273)