Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

112. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, November 15, 1978

SUBJECT

• Germany and France²

Background

There are a number of key factors behind the current ferment in these two countries:

— The Germans are moving out of the time when they were content to be a “second-class” political power, and are not yet prepared to accept the responsibilities of real leadership in Europe. This is a transitional time for them—in which they have no real road-map, but have begun to experiment (e.g. EMS, IISS speech,³ new definition of “strategic” weapons). They are also concerned that they are increasingly being asked to pay the largest economic price for European unity, while that political process is largely stalled. This does not mean that they are questioning Adenauer’s decision to look westward instead of pursuing the Chimera of reunification: rather it is a desire to get more direct political benefits—in greater European unity—from that (inevitable) choice.

— There has been the general sense of uneasiness in Germany about the Carter administration. Some of this is short-term—in fact, some of the developments we have been seeing (such as part of the motivation for EMS, and the intensity of concerns about grey areas until recently) may reflect a lead-and-lag problem: the German bureaucracy is out of phase with renewed confidence in us. But some of it is long-term, relating to U.S. economic policies and power, unresolved questions about the implications of parity, and uncertainty about how we are going to define our longer-term interests in the world in the post-Vietnam era.

— To be sure, there continues to be a German interest in Ostpolitik, especially in the SPD. But its aims and options are limited, and are likely to remain so for the indefinite future. The Soviet Union may try to meddle but its opportunities are also limited, and the Germans are aware of the dangers of doing more than establishing themselves as second-level players. In time, there is potential for development of some European defense arrangements to try making up for deficiencies in the Atlantic connection which—while vital to Germany—no longer seems quite as firm as before. But that is a more likely approach than toying with a closer association with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Germans remain vitally concerned that we manage relations effectively with the Soviet Union. Our not doing so would not imply the existence of alternatives for the Germans, however: rather a rising testiness in the general tenor of relations, and more angst on issues like “coupling”.

— In France, meanwhile, Giscard has assumed a more activist position now that the elections are behind him. Some of this is opportunism: such as a partial revival of French efforts to play an interlocutory role with the Soviet Union. But Giscard is also facing some “new realities”: including a recognition that the situation no longer permits the tolerance that deGaulle had to deny the U.S. position on the Continent. Ironically—but also logically—as our relative power has gone down, so French concern to be on better terms with us has gone up. Most important for France is the classic problem of dealing with Germany. With Britain on the sidelines, uncertainties about us, and assertions of German power and angst at the same time, it is not surprising that Giscard is pushing hard on the relationship with Bonn. Nor is it even surprising that he is getting into an effort like EMS, with its implications for moving European unity forward and helping to deal with German power. Here, too, the reduced tolerance in the political situation no longer permits as much French negativism. Giscard is covering all bets: but the realistic ones are firmly set in the context of Western politics.

— These factors also highlight a further product of lessening U.S. dominance on the Continent (building on a similar movement with the onset of superpower detente): the increase in importance of the intra-European balance of power. That factor has always been there, but tends to be neglected when the U.S. position on the Continent is clear, and U.S.–Soviet relations are clearly defined. Britain, however, is not much of a player: so it is left to the French to try dealing with the growth of German power and position largely on its own, with various real and tactical devices (real: EMS; tactical: European Disarmament Conference).

— In economics, there is genuine concern, primarily in Germany, about the functioning of Western economic institutions, where a system based on U.S. predominance and stability is being questioned. This problem is exacerbated by our continuing high inflation (which is undermining certainty-of-expectations, especially for investment), and by the economic and political effects of the fall of the dollar (made worse economically by $600 billion in dollar “overhang”). In addition, the relative increase in German economic power is perforce thrusting the FRG forward, with political consequences on the Continent and a need for greater German economic leadership and responsibility. Again, the Germans are not yet comfortable with this new situation, and in any event recognize that the requirements of global economic management require an effective U.S. role and the continuation of cooperative efforts. If we play our part effectively, we will have to face growing German economic assertiveness; if we do not, we will also have to face very unsettling tendencies in both economic and political thinking in Germany. If anything, the dangers here are greater than in the military field, which has simpler requirements and a clear process for resolving difficulties.

— Finally, each European government is grappling with domestic social problems that are also emerging here: for example, the costs of expensive welfare systems, environmental considerations—as with nuclear power—that impinge more heavily in crowded societies even than they do here; and providing jobs and satisfaction for large numbers of young, well-educated people in slower-growing economies. We often judge governments that do not deal very well with these problems as essentially “weak”; but given the magnitude of the problems—and the social and cultural changes taking place—most European governments are doing at least as well as we are.

As always in Europe, the key of course is Germany and its evolution. And the most important point for us to remember as the Germans grope their way forward is that we must not give them any reason to doubt our confidence in them. It is not that they have any realistic option (such as accommodating to Moscow)—or that they would choose that option even if they had it. Rather, it is that we should avoid inhibiting the healthy development in Germany of constructive approaches to its problem of emerging from second-class status to real leadership in Western Europe. In that process, the focus needs to be on aspects of German interests that are compatible with ours, rather than on the more limited agenda of issues where we have differences.

Military

Military issues between us and the Germans are no doubt more difficult to resolve because of the earlier basic questioning about the political directions and reliability of the Administration, plus the economic factors cited above.

At present, the military relationship is in good shape: there are no more Mansfield Amendments,⁴ the U.S. defense budget is rising and increasingly focusses on Europe, and the LTDP has been agreed. Meanwhile, we have a reasonable process for dealing with grey areas; and there are thorough consultations (and protection of Allied interests) in SALT II.

However, the Germans can be forgiven for being uncertain about the evolution of the thicket of issues relating to defense. These include: the largely unknown effect of advanced technology on conventional arms and stability in Central Europe; the potential blurring of distinctions between conventional and nuclear war (as represented by cruise missiles—which also remain a largely unknown factor); and the relating of TNF to strategic arms in a time of potentially lower strategic forces, more visible Soviet TNF, and a blurring of distinctions between TNF and strategic weapons. Maybe there can be no new comprehensive approach to these issues—which involve doctrine as well as hardware; but in the absence of such a comprehensive approach, anxieties are quite natural.

Here, steadiness in our approach is most important:

— carrying on with the LTDP (including measures to deal with the tank threat that could obviate the need for ERW);

— continuing on the grey areas track we are on (while not over-reacting to Schmidt’s first ventures as a strategic thinker—another result of the German transition);

— starting discussions with the Allies soon on basic approaches to SALT III;

— and being very careful about yielding to siren songs like the French EDC⁵ (even if something like that were a good idea—and the problems are legion, despite some political merit in the idea from at least the German perspective). There may prove to be an analogy here with the early French effort at detente: that effort did spur thinking and action elsewhere in the West, but it was eclipsed when the Germans and we got into the game directly. But if we are to move—say, beyond MBFR—then the way the issue is introduced and pursued is critical.

Needless to say, we need to do a lot more basic thinking about this whole basket of issues and inter-relationships. The answers will not be easy to come by: but—as noted above—there is at least a process in the Alliance for dealing with the problem, and a common recognition that there are no real alternatives to Atlantic defense partnership.

To be sure, there are also a number of other military issues—many turning on money—that have not been resolved with the Germans: e.g. AWACS, the tank gun, and some parts of the LTDP. This is nothing to be alarmist about, and has a long tradition in NATO.

Apel on maneuvers raises more questions. In part, the incident reflects his inexperience and pique at the role some “political” generals have played—in particular Haig, though the fire has been directed to others, probably as a cover. Apel also failed to do any p.r. work in Germany on the maneuvers, and may have been trying to cover-up for his failure to prepare public opinion. While not wanting to ignore the question mark that still hangs over this incident, I also believe there is a difference between being prepared to fight a war and stand up to the Soviets, on the one hand, and—on the other—being cautious about chewing up farmland and crowding the roads with maneuver vehicles. Apel’s appeal to the Left-wing of the SPD on a limited issue like this does not necessarily imply any shift on fundamentals. To be Chancellor, however, he will have to steer a steady course on defense issues.

We should also be aware of two broader questions: first, the extent to which the Europeans, in general, see the military situation as an unresolved problem of central importance—e.g. how real is the threat of war, as compared with active efforts underway to deter it at all levels and to demonstrate “coupling” of U.S. strategic systems? Second, there is the question of the extent to which we fall into comfortable patterns of ordering our relations with Western Europe through NATO and the military connection, instead of putting more emphasis on other factors—especially, now, economic relations and policies, and political support for a faltering European unity. Judging German reactions to military issues as the touchstone of loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance may miss the point: in a time when war is not likely, the test of the relationship (and our role in it) increasingly shifts away from the military dimension. In fact, when we are dealing in a hard-to-quantify world of building forces in order to avoid being at a disadvantage in Europe in situations short of crisis or war (e.g. pressures to accommodate to Soviet political interests), it is remarkable that there has been such a positive European response on defense.

Economic

For the Europeans in general, Atlantic economic relations pose a special problem. In the military sphere, the relationship is one of common interest with relatively little difference of opinion (even with regard to France, when the basics are involved). In the economic sphere, by contrast, there is a potential tension between the economic and political advantages of cooperation, on the one hand, and commercial competition on the other. The question “Who gains?” has much greater currency in economic relations than it ever has in defense. Dollar and economic management issues have been posed above; in the longer term, there are also European concerns about expanding markets, keeping “up front” in high technology, and coping with the effects of long-term reduced growth. The French most often take the lead in questioning U.S. “global” policies that seem to confer commercial advantage (e.g. non-proliferation, conventional arms transfers, Concorde, two-way street in defense procurement). But the Germans and others are not far behind.

This concern must be met, in time. For now, the most important lesson is the need to keep firmly in mind the political impact of our economic policies, and the disciplines that our role and that of the dollar impose:

— controlling inflation;

— moving much farther on energy;

— showing we understand the dollar problem, and will respond adequately;⁶

— working through the Economic Summits, beefing-up the OECD, starting to plan North-South relations more effectively in the West;

— redoubling efforts to deal with the problem of economic nationalism (as on MTN);

— making sure the Europeans understand that Treasury does not make U.S. foreign policy (as on the EMS); and

— getting firm direction for economic policy-making (i.e. showing we know what we are doing in this area).

We must also get on with basic thinking about the future of economic relations with West Germany and others—and accommodating German economic assertiveness.

Political

In political terms, there are several possible steps, in addition to the basic point about showing confidence in Germany during its period of transition, noted above:

— There is a real “successor generation” problem, reflecting the passing on of a generation of Germans and Americans who knew one another well. This is not true of governmental relations or of high finance. But it is true in business, labor, health, education and other areas. Each country takes the other for granted in understanding one another; yet the trend is otherwise. Needless to say, we have not got very far with ICA on this yet.

— It is also critical for Britain (if at all possible) to get back into the game. This is why we should find ways (now under consideration) of encouraging Britain not to “miss the bus” on the EMS, and of helping London to understand the penalties we all pay for continuing British ambivalence about the Continent. Pumping up the British is a long-term effort; in the meantime, the emergence of a “Bonn-Paris axis” is the next best thing, provided that we are constantly involved in shaping its directions and establishing its limits—largely through our own forthcoming positions and actions in economics and defense. Trying to substitute a Washington-Bonn axis for a viable intra-European balance of power is not the answer, for obvious reasons, and we should continue to mute the inevitable dominance of that connection, by as much as possible continuing to draw in Britain, France, and—as much as possible—the other Allies.

— Finally, we need to get the psychology right—again, largely the point about confidence in Germany. This means accentuating the positive in relations with Germany (and France); increasing contacts at the higher governmental levels; leaning heavily on traditional military and economic cooperation themes; using all the multinational forums open to us; and not blowing problems out of proportion. This means keeping grey areas and decoupling in perspective; and, in particular, understanding the economic issues and how far we have to go in meeting them.

Getting the psychology right also means, of course, learning to live with the new frustrations of actually having to listen to the Allies during “consultations” on issues like grey areas and ERW—and having to respond to them on economic questions—whereas before we had the relative power and position simply to get our way. A new experience for us: but one that will become more demanding on our patience and ability to adapt, not less.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Deputy Files, Box 1, Europe 2/2–9/79 Trip: 1–2/79 [III] Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information. In a February 17 memorandum to Brzezinski, Hunter presented an analysis of “difficulties in relations with West Germany” that concluded: “In the longer term, of course, the problems we see now will not really be resolvable unless there is a progressive effort (in West Germany and elsewhere) to come to terms with what continues to be the central European issue: the nature, form, development, and accommodations of West German power.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 24, German Federal Republic, 4/77–3/78)
2. In November 1978, several NSC staff members prepared memoranda on Germany for Aaron. Contributions included an undated paper entitled “France, West Germany, and the United States: The Case for an ‘Inner Correctorate;’ a November 14 memorandum from Thomson to Aaron entitled “US–FRG Security Relations;” and a November 15 memorandum from Putnam to Aaron entitled “German-American Relations: A Political-Economic Perspective.” (Ibid.)
3. Reference is to Schmidt’s October 28, 1977, speech at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. (Helmut Schmidt, “The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture,” Survival, Volume 20, no. 1, January–February 1978, pp. 2–8)
4. Reference is to Senator Mike Mansfield’s May 1971 proposal to reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe by half. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 185, footnote 4.
5. Reference is to the European Defense Community, proposed in 1950 by French Prime Minister René Pleven, which would have merged the military forces and pooled the armament industries of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. See Foreign Relations, 1950, Volume III, Western Europe, Telegram 2248 from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, October 27, 1950, pp. 410–412.
6. In an August 14 memorandum to Brzezinski that reported on a trip to Europe, Hunter wrote: “In all my conversations in Europe, it seems clear that the leadership of the Administration is being judged—not so much in terms like the neutron bomb or U.S.-Soviet relations—but much more on the management of the U.S. economy, the enactment of energy legislation, and the role of the dollar. Psychologically, the fall of the dollar is having a profound impact in Western Europe (with continual front-page news) and is having an impact on perceptions of our reliability.” Next to this passage, Brzezinski wrote: “right.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 22, Europe: 1/77–12/78)