Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

110. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, October 4, 1978, 8:15–11:05 p.m.

FROM

• Zbigniew Brzezinski

SUBJECT

• (Present for the second half of the meeting, from approximately 9:00 PM, were Ambassador Stoessel, State Secretary Gunther von Well, and Juergen Ruhfus of the Federal Chancellery) Meeting with Chancellor Schmidt²

1. During my private meeting with Schmidt, we discussed his possible succession (he mentioned Defense Minister Apel and State Minister Wischnewski); the need for a separate Carter–Brezhnev channel; and MTN.³

With regard to the Carter–Brezhnev channel, which Schmidt urged strongly as a way of by-passing Soviet bureaucracy, I indicated that the President might explore this directly with Brezhnev during their possibly forthcoming meeting. In addition, Schmidt agreed to use his Soviet connections to explore the desirability of a direct channel between me and Aleksandrov (Brezhnev’s equivalent to me). Schmidt felt such a link would be useful.

With regard to the MTN, Schmidt agreed to be helpful in seeking French and British cooperation but stated he needs more detail and that Strauss⁴ tends to “cry wolf” too often.

2. I briefed Schmidt in detail regarding Camp David and our further plans. He stated explicitly that he will use Hussein’s November visit to Bonn to press him hard to collaborate. He might also visit Jerusalem (I urged him to do so) and exert his influence on Begin. With regard to Lebanon he showed polite interest in the recent reference by President Carter to a possible conference.

3. Following my briefing on SALT, Schmidt asked whether there were limitations implicit in SALT on theater nuclear forces. He was particularly interested in the status of the cruise missile issue.

4. The bulk of the time was spent in reviewing the “gray area” nuclear matters. Schmidt voiced the now familiar German concern about possible decoupling. He agreed that a top-level political dialogue on the matter was necessary, lest lower level bureaucratic-military consultations create a dynamic all their own.

5. He agreed further that the proper steps in such top-level discussions would involve, first of all, a top-level review of the nature of the problem (to establish if there is a consensus regarding the issue); to be followed, secondly, by a review of what the required military response might be; to be followed, thirdly, by a review of a possible linkage of the foregoing to East–West arms control negotiations.

It was evident that Schmidt’s thinking on this issue was not advanced, that he was groping for solutions to a problem which he had not yet clearly formulated, and that he was reflecting a more general anxiety regarding the implications for Europe of apparent strategic deterioration on the part of the West.

He reiterated, however, that Germany could not agree alone to the deployment of any new theater nuclear system; that at least one more European country would have to participate (given Germany’s political vulnerability in regard to the other European countries).

Toward the conclusion of our discussion Schmidt expressed the view that it would be most desirable for President Carter, himself, as well as Giscard and Callaghan to find some informal occasion prior to next year’s economic summit to meet and discuss this issue in an informal setting.⁵

6. Schmidt raised the question whether it would not be timely to seek the replacement of NATO Secretary General Luns. I indicated to him that the thought had occurred to us as well, but that the initiative should really come from the Europeans, preferably from a small European country. In regard to successors, Schmidt felt that Thorn, Tidemand (of Norway), or Macdonald (of Canada) would be quite acceptable.⁶

7. Schmidt insisted strongly that the new European Monetary System (EMS) was not anti-U.S. and specifically wanted to know whether the President fully understood that. He welcomed the President’s statement to the IMF but inquired whether the President really meant it, for he understands that influential U.S. officials were skeptical.⁷

In this connection, he urged the dispatch to Europe of a prominent American financial figure who would discuss the matter fully with Schmidt and report to the President.

8. Schmidt reiterated in the course of the conversation his view that the Soviet role in Africa continues to be negative and that the Soviets have not in any significant fashion desisted from their growing military-political support for extremist solutions. He felt that this still calls for a Western response (though he did not indicate how).

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 51, Chron: 10/1–7/78. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the page. Sent to Carter under cover of Document 177. A more detailed account of Brzezinski’s meeting with Schmidt is in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9/78–2/79. During his visit to Bonn, Brzezinski also met with Wischnewski and Apel. (Telegram 18370 from Bonn, October 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850104–2505; Memorandum of Conversation with Wischnewski, October 3; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9/78–2/79; Memorandum of Record [on talk with Apel]; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 24, German Federal Republic: 7/78–1/79)
2. Brzezinski visited Bonn as part of an October 2–4 trip that also took him to Paris and London for consultation with NATO Allies. (Telegram 262501 to USNATO, October 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2574) In an August 18 telephone conversation with Schmidt, Carter proposed sending Brzezinski to Bonn to brief Schmidt on the Camp David summit on the Middle East and SALT. (Memorandum of Conversation, August 18; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 8–9/78) In a July 21 memorandum to Carter, Owen had suggested that Brzezinski visit Bonn from time to time to “confirm and symbolize” the good relations established by Carter’s July visit to Germany. (Ibid.)
3. In this sentence, Carter underlined the words “separate Carter-Brezhnev channel;” in the margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “a fixation!”
4. Reference is to Robert Strauss, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.
5. Carter, Giscard, Callaghan, and Schmidt met at Guadeloupe, January 5 and 6, 1979; see Documents 27, 28, 29.
6. Next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “ok [illegible].”
7. Reference is to Carter’s September 25 speech to the International Monetary Fund; see “Remarks at the Opening Session of the Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors,” Public Papers: Carter, 1978, pp. 1627–1629.