105. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Summary of the President’s Telephone Call from Chancellor Schmidt
The following is a paraphrase of the conversation:
Chancellor Schmidt: Helmut Schmidt speaking.
The President: This is Jimmy Carter. Did you have a good visit with Brezhnev?2
Chancellor Schmidt: That is exactly why I called.
The President: It is gracious of you to call. Are you pleased with the visit?
Chancellor Schmidt: Yes. They were kind and helpful. They tried to play down the conflicts that of course continue to exist. One point, Jimmy, I wanted to report to you immediately. In our personal conversation, without aides present, Brezhnev inquired a lot about you. I said I am totally convinced of your peaceful intentions. Not only did I have the impression that he wanted to meet you, but I said that I thought you wanted to meet with him. I said there was no doubt about your desire to conclude the SALT II negotiations. He asked a lot about that. He sometimes tried to project the impression that he was not convinced of your seriousness, but seemed mostly acting.
The President: I see.
Chancellor Schmidt: I said that you faced some opposition in the Senate to a SALT Agreement, and that, as far as I could see from Europe, that opposition would increase because of Soviet activities in Angola, Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa.
The President: I think that is an accurate assessment. I want to conclude an agreement, and I am prepared for a fight after we get an agreement. I believe the American people will support an agreement, and the prospects for ratification are very good. I don’t fear a fight. What you told him is accurate; as I’ve told him in correspondence, when the Soviets interfere in Africa, either through their own actions or those of the Cubans, there is a sense here that the Soviet Union is not sincere about detente or SALT. We’ve been sinful in the past ourselves, in Vietnam, so the Soviet activities in Africa are very disturbing to the American people. What you said is accurate.
Chancellor Schmidt: I said that very strongly.
The President: How vigorous was Brezhnev? How was his health?
Chancellor Schmidt: I’ve known him now for five years. Without any doubt he is not in the same shape as he was in 1973 or 1974. He reads his papers, and he wants to have Gromyko or a personal aide with him all the time. Still, he seems to have an overall grasp of the problems. His personal and moral authority with his ministers and with the Politboro seemed quite strong. It was obvious that he is getting old; he needs an aide de camp and a doctor, that sort of thing.
His attitude was benign, friendly. I think his belief in the necessity of overall peace throughout the globe has to be taken seriously. I take his comments to that effect at face value, though clearly there are others back in Moscow, who we don’t see.
The President: As a measure of his commitment to detente, did you make any progress in MBFR?
Chancellor Schmidt: We did talk about it. I showed him charts about the Soviet tank superiority in Central Europe. He didn’t want to talk about the subject, but he listened, and he took the charts with him. We also discussed those weapons that are covered in neither the MBFR nor the SALT talks. He said the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate about those systems. That was new for me, a new willingness of the Soviets to include those weapons not covered in either existing negotiation.
The President: I have two more questions. Did you have the impression that he is genuinely interested in concluding a SALT II Agreement and, second, in accepting our long-standing invitation to visit the United States?
Chancellor Schmidt: I think he is deeply interested in SALT II. As a personal matter, I think he also deeply wants to meet with you. I have the impression that his aides say now is not the time for a visit but that he should wait and see if SALT II progresses near a conclusion.
The President: We’re eager for progress. Gromyko will be here in two weeks. The last time I met with him we made more progress in three hours than the negotiators make in months. I found Gromyko insightful and apparently with authority to make some moves forward. He was not familiar with all the details—those are hard for me or for anyone else. I look forward to his visit, and I think we can make progress.
Chancellor Schmidt: Gromyko is coming to the U.S. at the end of the month, is he not? He was very friendly on this visit. He even laughed about twice a day! (laughter) Brezhnev does want to meet you, Jimmy.
The President: We have the same impression. I offered to meet with him at Camp David or in Alaska or somewhere else. We share your assessment: those around him don’t want him to come until they are sure about SALT.
Chancellor Schmidt: Yes, from his political position, that makes sense.
The President: We have done nothing to delay. The Panama Canal treaties had to be brought to a vote first, but nothing else holds up SALT. We have never held back in the negotiations. We can see what the negotiators can accomplish before Gromyko comes. I hope that after I meet with Gromyko and we make more progress, Brezhnev will see that with one face-to-face meeting we can finish an agreement. I would then plan on not presenting the agreement to the Congress until 1979. Congress got far behind during the debate on the Panama Canal treaties and couldn’t handle both SALT and the rest of the business it must do this year. But that need not delay signing an agreement.
Chancellor Schmidt: That is what I told Brezhnev. I said the negotiations could conclude but then you might not present the agreement to Congress until next year.
The President: There is the Limited Test Ban, which has been in effect for years even though Congress has never even considered it. So an agreement I sign with another leader can be binding even without formal Congressional approval.
Let me raise another subject. Do you have any reticence about making a strong public commitment to NATO when you come to Washington, or do you have any reticence about the long-term defense measures that have been developed?
Chancellor Schmidt: Not at all. I received your telegram yesterday.3
The President: We have been somewhat concerned. Pierre Trudeau seems to want to hold back on the long-term defense program; I’m not sure why. He doesn’t want to move forward in one step. But I feel the world needs a display of confidence by the NATO Allies. Congress will give very strong support—it has been reluctant sometimes in the past.
Chancellor Schmidt: I read the draft statement that you sent me. I would suggest that one point be elaborated, the point about our desire to secure arms control agreements that enhance security. I’d like that to be given more plausibility. We have the Special Session in New York in the same week as the NATO meeting, and we need some common denominator for the two. Perhaps that could be “balance of military capabilities,” which could be achieved either by reducing arms or, if necessary, by improving our defenses.
But I have no reluctance about the statement. I think it is good for us to issue as NATO members. I also agree with the idea of holding a private informal luncheon outside the NATO context. We can talk freely, and it should be interesting for us and for the other heads of government. I buy both ideas, but I suggest we try to give more substance to the arms control part of the statement.
The President: I’m very encouraged. Anything you want to do to strengthen the statement is amenable to my desires. Perhaps you could also send your comments to the other heads of state.
Chancellor Schmidt: I will do that. Did you send the statement to Pierre Trudeau, Valery Giscard and Jim Callaghan, or to others as well.
The President: Just to the four of you.
Chancellor Schmidt: I also look forward to our private breakfast.4
The President: So do I. I enjoyed our last meeting.5 I think it was fruitful for our countries. On economic problems, I’m glad that our situation is better, although we continue to have some inflation. Our growth is running at better than four and one-half percent, and the dollar is doing better. I had a very good meeting with Fukuda.6 We are consulting with the Japanese almost daily on the yen–dollar exchange rate, although we are not intervening in that market as we are with the Mark.
Chancellor Schmidt: Very good, Jimmy. I think that’s about all I had.
The President: It was gracious of you to call, very thoughtful. I’m sure your conversation will expedite a SALT II Agreement. We can share thoughts on MBFR when you come.
Chancellor Schmidt: Thank you, sir.
The President: Have a good day.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 5/78. Secret; Sensitive. Carter spoke to Schmidt from the West Room (Residence). At the top of the page, Carter wrote: “Good. J.”↩
- Reference is to Brezhnev’s May 4–7 visit to the Federal Republic of Germany↩
- On May 5, Carter sent messages to Callaghan, Giscard, Schmidt, and Trudeau that invited them to a May 30 lunch for those heads of state and government who would attend the NATO summit and proposed a draft of a statement to be issued on May 30 by the heads of delegation. (Telegram 116402 to Paris, London, Bonn, and USNATO, May 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780194–1031)↩
- See footnote 10, Document 101.↩
- See Document 165.↩
- On May 3, Carter met with Fukuda in the Cabinet Room from 11:35 a.m. to 12:22 p.m. after which they had a working lunch that lasted until 1:49 p.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary)↩