Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

4. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction

We have prepared the response to PRM/NSC–17 in two parts. The first is this overview. It integrates major policy problems into two conceptual and eight specific issues. The second is a set of papers² that examines particular policy areas in more detail, presents pros and cons on individual options, and reflects work undertaken prior to preparation of this overview.

In the overview we have sought to be didactic by posing somewhat stark options that show the occasional conflicts among U.S. interests and between U.S. interests and those of other hemispheric nations. We have formulated these issues in ways to elicit guidance from the PRC on general policy directions.

Finally, the outcome of separate Presidential Review Memoranda on human rights, non-proliferation, and North-South questions³ will have a major impact on U.S. policy toward the hemisphere. Because of their global nature, these issues are touched upon in the overview, but are not drawn out as distinct issues.

II. The Setting

The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean are more diverse, prosperous, confident, independent and self-aware than any regional grouping in the Third World. They also have an alarming population growth, the dizziest rate of urbanization and the most highly developed systems of military government. As population and economic pressures have increased, the governments of this hemisphere have increasingly moved from the one-man caudillo to institutionalized, largely military regimes. Democracy, never strongly rooted, is weaker today than at any time since the Second World War. Its immediate future is not bright.

Trade and resource flows are the central concerns of the nations of this hemisphere in their dealings with us. Escalating import bills and heavy debt burdens seriously cramp development prospects—creating strong pressures for better terms of trade and credit from us. They also want us to respect their sovereignty, independent interests, and dignity.

What we want from them is less focused—and often intrinsically negative. We want them not to aggravate East-West tensions; not to deny us access to their energy reserves and other raw materials; not to develop nuclear capabilities. In sum, we want sufficiently stable and healthy economic and political growth not to weaken our security, create new global problems, or offend our values. We want moderation on North-South issues and support in world councils on matters of importance to us. At our most hopeful we want democratic systems to be revived in this hemisphere.

It is self-evident, however, that the U.S. is neither capable nor ready to undertake the resource transfers on a scale that could eliminate the disparities between us. It is just as self-evident that mounting frustrations over trade and financial issues are likely to undermine the international support we have traditionally received from Latin America, increase the flow of the unemployed over our borders, and damage our economic, political and security interests.

Latin America and the Caribbean bring home most dramatically the importance of North-South issues. From no other part of the world does foreign poverty impinge so intimately on our own society or create such an implicit obligation to help. The Alliance for Progress made important contributions—but its programs proved unsustainable both here and in Latin America. Moreover, because it was conceived largely in response to fears of Soviet penetration and assumed greater U.S. influence than in fact existed, the Alliance had strong overtones of intervention.

Our relations since the Alliance have led to a steady reduction of official contacts. For a decade, we have appeared increasingly out of step with the processes of change in either Latin America or the Caribbean, even on matters directly affecting our own interests. Our criticism of repressive governments has now placed us more clearly on the side of change, but we have little leverage on how that change comes about. Our pressures for human rights and non-proliferation have raised new fears about U.S. intervention and paternalism.

III. ISSUES FOR DECISION

A. Conceptual Issues:

The first two issues are conceptual—designed to elicit overall guidance for considering the directions under the specific issues presented subsequently.

1. The Special Relationship:

Discussion of the “special relationship” has focused in recent years on economic issues. But shared traditions, historical links, and common institutions are also involved. Four concepts are frequently combined under the heading “special relationship”:

—preferential economic treatment for Latin America (as a whole or to individual countries such as Mexico);

—an inter-American system of political, cultural and security links based on the OAS and the Rio Treaty.⁴

—our historical hegemony and its freight of paternalism; and

—the accompanying rhetoric about shared values.

We find it increasingly difficult to deliver on the first, useful to retain the second, and undesirable to prolong the third. And whether or not we “share values,” there is little doubt that we expect more from Latin America and they from us.

To reject the special relationship in toto because of its traditional paternalistic overtones and its irrelevance to most economic issues risks discharging a potential asset in the North-South dialogue and in maintaining hemispheric security.

Issue for Decision. How do we reconcile the “special relationship” with our global commitments and the desired independence of the nations of the Hemisphere?

Direction A: Seek to end the “special relationship” in its various manifestations. Make clear there will be no hemispheric preferences in the trade area, downplay the OAS and Rio Treaty, and play a passive role in other hemispheric institutions. Move toward eventual withdrawal. Stress bilateral relations and global institutions, pointing out that Latin America’s development gives it a relative advantage over other LDC’s. Deal with subregional disputes or conflicts through global institutions (UN) or bilaterally. Drop the the rhetoric of shared values and historic ties.

Direction B: Differentiate by using bilateral, regional, and global institutions as necessary. Concentrate on the global for the North-South issues. Strengthen bilateral ties with major hemispheric nations. But remain active in those hemispheric institutions that can further our mutual interests—particularly the OAS, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and those institutions that promote cultural and technical cooperation. Use the OAS and Rio Treaty for dealing with regional conflicts.

2. A North-South or East-West Approach?

Our reaction to political change in Latin America is critical. Our major interventions of the post-war period—Guatemala, Bay of Pigs, Dominican Republic, and Chile—have probably had more impact on our relations than all our resource-transfers and business activities combined. They were motivated by a strong East-West bias.

In recent years, we have been thinking more in North-South terms. We are more tolerant of Guyana’s Burnham declaring himself Marxist-Leninist, and of Peru’s military purchases from the Soviet Union.⁵ But should we consider significant help to Manley’s Jamaica⁶ to divert him from “communism” and Cuba or primarily to assist an important neighbor who is trying to bring about social change and development simultaneously?

The following directions are not mutually exclusive. The emergence of North-South issues does not eliminate East-West concerns. We can accept more ideological pluralism in 1977 than we could in 1962—but we could not be happy with a communist Brazil, Mexico or Panama. Can we abide additional Soviet military sales or increased Soviet influence in some countries? Do we have a choice?

Issue for Decision. How do we react to Soviet or Cuban involvement in political change or regional conflict in this hemisphere?

Direction A—East-West Focus: Devise programs and policies—short of military intervention—designed to head off significant Soviet influence or indigenous communist control over governments in the area. Should armed conflicts arise in this hemisphere involving Soviet or Cuban participation, support the other side. Place our economic resources where Soviet or Cuban efforts threaten. Bend our arms sales policies to head off new Soviet inroads in this area.

Direction B—North-South Focus: Our primary concern now is tension between the rich north and the poor south. Encourage independence—political, economic and psychological. Do not discourage diversification of contacts, even with communist countries. Place no ideological conditions on economic assistance. If another communist or radical socialist government emerges, or if a conflict situation arises, avoid actions that would polarize it into an East-West problem. Do not deviate from policy lines on arms transfers to head off Soviet sales in the area.

B. Specific Issues:

The new Administration has already set a new course for hemispheric relations. It has confirmed the need for a new treaty with Panama as the best means of protecting our interest in an open, efficient and secure canal. The State Visit of Mexico’s President⁷ set in motion a reexamination of relations with the Latin American country with the most pervasive impact on our own society. Separate consideration is being given to the reestablishment of contacts with Cuba—a process with important implications for our relations with Latin America, and with the entire Third World.

This overview now raises eight additional specific issues for decision. These issues do not pretend to be all-encompassing. They highlight major problem areas. They also address those problems where the Administration may have the greatest flexibility to give a fresh and more constructive tone to inter-American affairs.

1. Intervention:

Our concerns over human rights, the nature of our relations with military regimes, our past policies toward Cuba, the revelations of CIA activities, and some activities of multi-national corporations affect the way we view ourselves and have significant implications for how others view us.

The common thread linking these concerns is U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Covert intervention in Chile in 1970–73 led the United States to become identified with the military dictatorship that replaced Allende, and associated us to some extent with its subsequent abuses of human rights. U.S. actions designed to control Latin American behavior have ranged from economic sanctions to direct military intervention. They have cumulatively cast a pall over our motives and aroused suspicions that may take years to overcome.

Some of our programs and activities are still viewed as interventionist:

—Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain close liaison with local security forces in most countries, collaborating to combat crime and drug traffic, counter communist activities and develop national security information.

—Our efforts on behalf of imprisoned American citizens has led us to urge on governments new laws, changed prison regulations, and new judicial procedures.

—Our concern for human rights has led us to take actions that have been criticized as interventionist by some of the major nations in the hemisphere.

—Can one really exclude the possibility that we may have to intervene in Panama should negotiations break down and violence break out?

—And what of the activities of Cuban exiles and other rightists who operate out of and in the U.S. against foreign nationals and foreign governments? Exile terrorism is frequently believed to be controlled, or at least condoned, by the U.S. Government.

Issue for Decision: Given our past history and current interests and programs, how do we deal with the continuing charge that we are interventionist in Latin America?

Direction A—Limited Intervention—A Part of Interdependence: Reaffirm publicly and forcefully our commitment to non-intervention in the OAS Charter; announce a policy of broader contacts with all legal political forces, including visas to communists; explain that cooperation with others in combatting drugs, crime, and terrorism requires activities by U.S. agencies abroad; and explain that our promotion of human rights and protection of U.S. citizens is justified under international law. But stress our actions will not extend to interference into internal political processes.

Direction B—Dramatically Reduce Interventionist Activities: Announce a firm commitment to non-intervention combined with a decision to make a major cutback of U.S. activities in the hemisphere. Announce the end of all covert action and make an unequivocal commitment opposing the unilateral use of force in the hemisphere. State firmly that U.S. concerns for human rights will be stressed primarily through recognized multilateral institutions.

2. Relations with Military Regimes:

Fifteen governments in Latin America are now run directly or indirectly by military officers. We are uncomfortable with this level of military involvement in politics, all the more so since some of the regimes involved are consistent violators of human rights.

Our posture toward military regimes is complicated by the fact that:

—Military rule has deep roots in Latin America and is legitimized to some extent in most constitutions;

—The fragmentation of political parties and the relative weakness of civilian institutions sometimes provides no viable alternative to military rule;

—Military rule, traditionally directed largely at repressing popular disturbances, is now in some cases combined with efforts to expand the technocratic and even political roles of civilians in government.

The military regimes resulting from these patterns vary greatly, reflecting the different conditions in each country. Although these national distinctions and institutional differences are significant, strong generalized U.S. opposition to military rule could unite South American military regimes into a bloc directed against us. Our decreased military presence and our dramatically reduced role as arms supplier has already diminished our capacity to influence—or even relate to—the leading military elites.

Moreover, generalized U.S. opposition to military regimes combined with U.S. rhetorical and political support for civilian opposition elements could promote heightened internal tensions and political instability combined with charges of U.S. intervention in internal affairs.

Issue for Decision: Given our objectives on human rights and a clear preference for democracy, how should we relate to military governments in the Western Hemisphere?

Direction A: Work with all Military Regimes. Develop new programs for military relations as incentives to support democratizing trends and greater civilian participation. Use military training programs, sales and joint maneuvers as tools of influence.

Direction B: Diverse Treatment. Adopt a deliberate and evident strategy distinguishing among civilian regimes, non-repressive military regimes, and the most repressive military regimes. Maintain warm relations with the first, normal relations with the second, and cool but correct relations with the third. Do not attempt to polarize the hemisphere between democracies and military regimes, but stress non-military aspects of cooperation with countries where the military come to power. Cut back military programs and contacts with the most repressive military regimes.

3. Arms Transfers

Our policy on arms transfers to the region should be closely related to the previous issue of relations with military regimes. It should also relate to our global arms policies and our posture on non-proliferation. The introduction of costly modern weapons systems into the world’s least armed region is creating new dangers of local conflicts and posing new challenges to the global control of conventional arms.

Because military security is the ultimate expression of national sovereignty, an aggressive US posture could easily become counterproductive. We have traditionally maintained a more restrictive policy toward arms sales to this hemisphere than toward the rest of the world. By sharply reducing military programs over the past decade, we have reduced our capacity to influence local military postures or limit new acquisitions. (We are the fourth-ranking arms seller in the region now.) There is little left to cut. To move further in that direction while increasing our attention to human rights could result in a virtual break with the critical institutions in Latin America—the military.

The United States, however, has taken no major initiatives on arms transfers to Latin America for several years. We have made no high-level pronouncements of any consequence or detail on the growth of local tensions and war fears. The Declaration of Ayacucho in which eight South American nations pledged themselves in 1974 to limit acquisition of “offensive” weapons may offer a potential opening for a cooperative review of military security issues.

Issue for Decision: How should we approach arms transfers in the region in view of our declining role with the Latin military and the rising role of extra-hemispheric suppliers?

Direction A—Actively Promote Restraint: Continue our regional restrictive sales of advanced weapons; seek a suppliers agreement to limit sales; and actively promote regional or subregional arms control efforts. Refrain from competitive sales with the Soviets and other suppliers. Resist use of arms sales as means of relating to Latin military establishments.

Direction B—Flexible Approach: Use arms sales modestly to restore U.S. influence with some military regimes (e.g. a carrot for human rights improvement). Also selectively promote U.S. arms sales to limit intrusion of Soviet arms and retain some control over the pattern of regional weapons build-up. Promote voluntary restraint agreements among suppliers and buyers.

4. “Rights”

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a wide variety of social, economic and political “rights”. The United States and Latin America tend to view these rights from different perspectives. We emphasize political rights—from habeas corpus to freedom of assembly and speech. The Latins admire our political freedoms, but believe economic and social rights—jobs and income—are more important to most of their citizens, particularly the poor. The debate over “rights” thus frequently becomes a clash between the libertarians and the egalitarians.

Obviously, however, the Latin leaders and military are often egalitarian abroad and elitist at home. They do not readily share their wealth. Yet if there is one issue that unites the poor of this hemisphere with their rulers it is that the United States must share more of its wealth and consume less. We must not deceive ourselves—this growing rich/poor dichotomy is the bottom line in our relations in this hemisphere.

As the United States projects its values on human rights abroad, we can be more effective if we demonstrate in word and deed that we also give great weight to the egalitarian aspirations of the poor nations. We may be entering a period of fiscal restraint on foreign lending (reduced contributions to the IFI’s) in order to retain our way of life. We risk being seen as justifying our reductions on moral grounds so that we can continue to absorb a third of the globe’s resources. The Harkin Amendment symbolizes to many our overriding stress on political as opposed to economic rights.⁸ Moreover, any moves toward trade protectionism will hit Latin America first and most severely. Our concern for fundamental political rights is thus out of phase with the appeals and ideologies of most of the developing world. Most simply, the poor nations see life and survival as more important than liberty.

Issue for Decision: Can we square our renewed emphasis on human rights with the rest of the hemisphere’s obsession with economic and social rights?

Direction A—Stress Fundamental Human Rights: Stress that the real linkage between economic and political rights rests in democracy and mixed economies. Extend Harkin to all IFI’s. Voluntarily recognize our responsibility for increased resource transfers but link it to foreign governments’ willingness to distribute income.

Direction B—Recognize Link between all Rights: Move forcefully to expand IFI contributions and bilateral assistance. Take forthcoming posture in North-South dialogue. Move to repeal Harkin, reexamine our negative position on the UN Charter on Economic Rights and Duties⁹ and “collective economic security” in the OAS Charter Reform. Pressure governments politically to eliminate torture and assure habeas corpus and due process.

5. Resource Transfers: Private Investment

The outcome of the presidential reviews on North-South issues (PRMs 7 and 8)¹⁰ will be critical to our economic relations with Latin America. Trade—not aid—is the issue for Latin America. Any move toward or away from concessions to the Third World affects Latin America first.

This overview addresses two issues where we may have greater flexibility in regional terms: private investment and the MNC’s (considered in this section) and public development assistance (considered in the section that follows).

Multinational corporations are key agents of resource, managerial and technology transfers. They have also been one of the most consistent sources of tensions between the US and the other nations of this hemisphere.

Latin American governments are now more secure in their dealings with foreign investors. MNC’s are more mature in recognizing the need to respect—and adapt to—the laws and development priorities of the host countries. Now that a large portion of investments in extractive industries and utilities have already been nationalized, and that new modes of non-equity investment have become a more prevalent method of doing business in the area, the wave of expropriations that swept Latin America in recent years seems to be receding.

In this changed environment, we may have an opportunity to work out—with both foreign governments and US corporations—some new approaches to bring our policies on investment disputes and the promotion of US private investment more into line with the new working relationships that are evolving.

We could, for example, revise President Nixon’s 1972 policy statement on foreign investment and expropriation¹¹ to recognize more explicitly the rights of host governments to define the terms of receiving foreign capital, as well as their duties to provide fair treatment. We could even explore the far more legally complex and time-consuming possibility of negotiating bilateral investment treaties with Latin American governments.

Alternatively, we could seek to take advantage of the absence of expropriation disputes and the comparative quiescence of controversy over MNC’s to quietly disengage from active promotion of private investment.

As for other forms of private capital flows, there ordinarily is no major role for the US government to play with respect to borrowings from private money markets. Consideration might be given, however, to the establishment of some sort of balance of payments safety net or guarantee facility which would enhance the attractiveness of paper floated by Latin American countries.

Issue for Decision: Should the US government encourage US private investment in Latin America?

Direction A—Disengage: Make clear that MNC’s are on their own. Eliminate incentives designed to increase new investment. Say nothing new on expropriation. Stress that these are decisions for private corporations and foreign governments, not for the USG. Maintain a hands off posture toward commercial bank lending.

Direction B—Promote New Investment Relationships: Work on standards of conduct with the private sector and foreign governments and formulate a modified US global policy statement on expropriations. Seek repeal of Hickenlooper and Gonzalez Amendments.¹² Consider measures to facilitate Latin American access to U.S. private capital markets.

6. Resource Transfers: Development Assistance

US involvement in development in Latin America and elsewhere takes many forms: trade, debt rescheduling, investment, official development assistance (ODA), actions on international monetary matters, initiatives in the fields of science and technology, food, population, etc.

Official development assistance, which facilitates cooperation in many of these fields, now plays a decreasing role. Bilateral US AID financing for Latin America has been on the decline for a decade. International financial institutions (e.g., IBRD and IDB) now provide the region with most of its official external capital—but we are in arrears in our contributions. In addition, under present criteria, only Central America, the Caribbean, Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru will have bilateral aid programs after 1980.

These trends create a gap in the instruments available to us. The IFIs focus their attention on growth; in countries where our bilateral assistance has ended, only limited attention is paid by official capital suppliers to the many problems still associated with income maldistribution. In addition, the middle income countries are important to us politically in the context of the North-South dialogue, but we have virtually no bilateral aid instruments to promote institutional and human resource development in countries other than the poorest.

Issue for Decision: Should US official development assistance be increased, and if so, should the increase extend to both multilateral and bilateral assistance and include middle-income countries as well as poorer countries?

Direction A—Maintain the Status Quo: Meet current US commitments to the IDB and OAS. Do not seek to resume bilateral assistance in countries where we no longer have such programs. Continue bilateral aid phase-outs. Sustain the current bilateral aid focus on the poorest countries.

Direction B—Expand, Innovate and Strengthen Development Aid: Strengthen support of IFI’s. Develop new ways to cooperate with middle-income countries on institutional and human resource development, food production, technology transfer. Develop new criteria for such cooperation, including harder terms, greater matching contributions, jointly managed projects, and use of US guarantee mechanisms which do not necessarily call for flows of public funds. Expand both bilateral and multilateral assistance to the poorest countries and the poorest sub-regions (Central America and the Caribbean).

7. Educational and Cultural Exchanges

The level of professional and academic exchanges and cultural programs with Latin America, as well as support for research and study on Latin America in the U.S., has fallen drastically over the past 10 years. The Fulbright-Hays program in Latin America (and worldwide) is 30% less in constant dollars than it was in 1968; USIA book publishing and distribution have dropped by 50%; and the staffs of our Binational Cultural Centers have dropped from 114 to 14 in recent years.

Greatly expanding these programs would dramatize a new approach to Latin America and the Caribbean. The goals of such an initiative would be (a) improving intellectual and institutional relationships within the hemisphere; and (b) strengthening the capacities of Latins and North Americans to perceive each other accurately, and to cooperate on the solution of common problems. Such a program might include joint initiatives—including joint commitments of long-term funds—with at least a few of the major Latin American countries.

Such an undertaking would also:

—symbolize our commitment to human rights by providing new means of communication between intellectuals, professional associations (such as lawyers), universities, think tanks and other interested groups in the hemisphere.

—enhance the development of human resources through graduate education and professional exchanges.¹³

Issue for Decision: By how much should our educational and cultural programs for the hemisphere be increased?

Direction A—Double Funding for Current Educational and Cultural Program to Approximately $30 Million. Such an increase would enable us to devise and establish much broader linkages between universities and communities, including Hispanic-American groups.

Direction B—Recast and Expand Programs: Direct the Department of State, in cooperation with other agencies, to reexamine basic objectives and programs in consultation with U.S. institutions and with selected Latin American governments, preliminary to making a major specific proposal to the White House. Then approach Congress for new funding (up to $100 million a year). This level would imply major support for relevant U.S. and Latin institutions. It would subsume some of the activities now conducted by AID, USIA and HEW. Care would have to be exercised to avoid charges of cultural imperialism. New or amended legislation might be required.

8. Style and Attention

Many Latin Americans believe we alternately take them for granted, then expect too much of them. They suspect that US leaders have time for everything and everyone except for Latin America. They feel unheard, unappreciated, and discriminated against.

Much of this is inherent in the relationship. But much is not. We sometimes spring unnecessary surprises by not consulting or informing others in advance on matters of vital interest to them. And their cabinet ministers and even presidents sometimes have a hard time getting through to us.

During 1977, as a minimum program we should plan on one or two additional State Visits by democratically elected Latin American leaders (Perez of Venezuela and perhaps Williams of Trinidad) and a return State Visit by President Carter to Mexico. The Vice President might likewise consider visiting one or more Latin American countries. The Secretary of State should attend the OAS General Assembly in Grenada in June for 2–3 days¹⁴ and visit Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil, plus one or two Caribbean countries.

In addition, we should carry out continuing formal and informal consultations with Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica and Argentina on global issues, such as Law of the Sea and the North-South Dialogue, as well as on bilateral initiatives and our major foreign policy directions in other parts of the world.

Members of Congress should also be involved whenever possible in both travels and consultations.

A more ambitious program for the President and the Vice President would be to prepare for visits during the Administration’s second year to other democracies such as Colombia, Costa Rica and one of the Caribbean nations. Such early “attention” by a newly elected President and Vice President would be unprecedented and would help set a new tone.

Issue for Decision: How much attention should the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary give to Latin America and the Caribbean in the first year?

Direction A—Minimum: Plan two State Visits here, a return Presidential Visit to Mexico, and a possible visit by the Vice President to the region. The Secretary should attend the OASGA, make one or more trips to the region, and exchange occasional letters with key foreign ministers.

Direction B—Maximum: Plan the above plus Presidential trips to two or three democracies in the hemisphere during the President’s second year in office. The Vice President might make an additional visit or two as well. Both the President and the Secretary of State would seek to maintain a regular correspondence with their key counterparts.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1980, Box 60, PRC 008—Latin America—3/23/77. Secret. Borg forwarded to Brzezinski under a March 12 covering memorandum and noted that Vance requested that copies of the study be distributed to members of the PRC for use at the meeting scheduled for March 15 (postponed to March 24). See Document 7.
2. Tabs 1–10 are attached but not printed.
3. PRM–28 on human rights is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 46. PRM–12 on arms transfer policy and PRM–15 on nuclear proliferation are printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Documents 259 and 317, respectively. PRM–8 on North-South strategy is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 254.
4. See footnote 7, Document 1.
5. For Peru’s purchases from the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, part 2, Documents on South America, Document 293.
6. Additional information on U.S. assistance to Jamaica in 1977 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Documents 174, 176, and 180.
7. The memoranda of conversation between Carter and López Portillo during this visit are printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and theCaribbean, Documents 131 and 132.
8. For the Harkin amendments to foreign aid bills, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, footnotes 3 and 4, Document 1.
9. U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/29/3281, December 12, 1974, adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The United States voted against the resolution. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1974, p. 391)
10. PRM–7 on an International Summit is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 3. For information on PRM–8, see footnote 3 above.
11. Presumable reference is to Nixon’s January 19, 1972, statement announcing U.S. policy on economic assistance and investment security in developing nations. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 31–34) See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 172.
12. Reference presumably is to the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which required that the United States terminate foreign assistance programs in countries that had expropriated U.S. citizens’ property without conforming to standards of international law. It also required the United States to vote against loans from the IFIs to countries that had expropriated U.S. property. The Gonzalez Amendment to the Inter-America Development Bank Act, the International Development Association Act, and the Asian Development Bank Act required the President to instruct his representatives to vote against any foreign loans to countries that expropriated U.S. investment without compensation.
13. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs observes that a greatly increased program in Latin America could produce pressures for similar increases in exchanges with other areas of the world. [Footnote is in the original.]
14. Vance headed the U.S. delegation to the OAS General Assembly in Grenada in June. His intervention before the General Assembly, statement on U.S.-Panamanian relations, a transcript of his news conference, and his remarks upon returning to Washington are in the Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1977, pp. 69–76.