263. Editorial Note
By late April, 1980, almost 2 months into the Bogota hostage crisis, the Government of Colombia and the M–19 guerrillas had almost reached agreement on the M–19’s two main demands: a ransom payment and the release of about 30 M–19 leaders from Colombian prisons. The Government of Colombia would not unilaterally release any prisoners, although it worked to speed up military trials and invited the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) to observe the trials. On April 22, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sent a memorandum to President Jimmy Carter, noting that “the arrival of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission on Sunday” had caused “a marked improvement in the prospects for an early resolution of the Bogota crisis.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports [State], 4/80) (S) Although the United States and several other governments whose diplomats were hostages had opposed the payment of any ransom and the Government of Colombia did not discuss ransom in its negotiations with the [Page 757] M–19, private negotiators simultaneously discussed a ransom payment with the M–19 captors.
The United States, like other governments whose diplomats were held hostage, was not directly involved in the negotiations. Consequently, the information it received regarding the resolution of the crisis changed quickly. On April 25, Vance wrote to Carter that “final agreement has not been reached on the question of prisoner release and there is still a possibility of an impasse developing on this issue. A detailed discussion of departure arrangements has been going on in the negotiating sessions. The current plan appears to be for most of the hostages to be released in Havana.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports [State], 4/80) (S) In telegram 4748 from Bogota, April 26, the Embassy reported, “Reliable information has virtually dried up as GOC systematically excludes outsiders from wrap-up negotiations. Most persistent report now is that terrorists are not only holding firm on release of at least a few key prisoners but are also raising the ante on ransom. Nevertheless, there are clear signs that departure preparations are proceeding.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800207-0216) (C) Barely 45 minutes later, the Embassy cabled to the Department of State: “President Turbay just informed DCM by telephone ‘in strongest confidence’ that release of hostages would occur tomorrow morning, April 27.” (Telegram 4750 from Bogota, April 26, Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 12, Colombia, 1/80-1/81) (S) Eighteen hostages remained captive. (Asencio, p. 227)
On the evening of April 26, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher informed Carter that U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Diego C. Asencio would be flown to Havana with the captors and other hostages, where the remaining hostages would be released. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports [State], 4/80) (S) On the morning of April 27, the Embassy cabled: “As best we can reckon, Ambassador Asencio and most other hostages departed Bogota airport as planned aboard Cuban aircraft, in company of M-19 terrorists, at 0820 hours, bound for Havana, over-flying Panama.” (Telegram 4757 from Bogota, April 27, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800210-0349) (LOU) After the hostages’ release, Asencio was flown to Homestead Air Force Base in Miami.
In his memoir, Asencio wrote that a private Colombian citizen paid a ransom of $1.2 million for the hostages. (Our Man Is Inside, pp. 212, 229, 241)