Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

223. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, August 31, 1978

SUBJECT

• Chile—Military Pipeline Shipments

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Should FMS pipeline shipments to Chile be released? A decision is needed soon.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

FMS pipeline shipments to Chile have been under a DOD administrative hold since June 28, when you instructed that the San Francisco bomb fin shipment be suspended and that we place the pipeline under review for case-by-case determination.² Only one FMS “case”, a minor training visit to Chile, has been approved since that time. Materiel with a value of approximately $1,549,500 out of the $24.8 million remaining has accumulated and is being held pending release by State. (DOD estimates that several million more will come up in the next month or so.) The materiel includes munitions, recoilless cannons, aircraft and ship spares, and miscellaneous equipment. An attachment to this memorandum summarizes what is being held.³

In order for the munitions (worth $949,500) to be loaded on this year’s ammunition supply ship, a release is needed by DOD in early September. Actual delivery in Chile will take place in December or January; and the shipment could still be recalled up to that time. Other, non-munitions equipment is being held at shipping points. Shipping dates by sea and air are not fixed other than for the ammunition ship (the “Mirfak”), but we are now at a point where our review has resulted in a de facto suspension of the FMS pipeline.

On August 2, the House rejected by a two to one vote the Stark amendment which would have cut off the pipeline on general human rights grounds. By the same margin, it reversed a voice vote and rejected a roll call [on] the Harkin amendment to suspend the pipeline until the Letelier/Moffitt extradition requests had been honored after Justice and State had indicated this amendment would interfere in the judicial process.⁴

HA believes that the principle of our human rights policy and existing law (particularly the directive of Section 502B (a) (3) to avoid identification with regimes which deny fundamental freedoms)⁵ argues for not having a US Government relationship supplying and equipping the Chilean armed forces. The situation in Chile remains one of some flux in terms of future political developments. Our current stance toward Chile—cool, aloof—as described by the Ambassador, would argue against a military supply relationship. It was in part because of a belief in the Congress that the Administration would act appropriately in the absence of additional statutory instruction that the Stark amendment was defeated.

Similarly, the view that we would ourselves take steps to use the pipeline as leverage if an impasse developed in the Letelier case encouraged the reversal of the initial vote on the Harkin amendment. If the pipeline is simply permitted to flow, the length of time before the decision-point is reached on the Letelier extradition case may mean it will have run out. We could have an impasse then but no pipeline to use for leverage.

HA understands the view that the Chilean government could interpret our “pipeline under review” stance to be a de facto suspension. They could then argue that there is no reason to cooperate with the extradition request. On balance, we do not believe that will be a persuasive case for the Pinochet regime to make to its own public.

ARA notes that it is generally conceded that the human rights situation in Chile has improved substantially in the last two years. Imposition of new sanctions at this point, as would be a suspension of the pipeline, without evidence of any retrogression in human rights behavior, would be illogical and clearly harms our dominant interest in pursuing the Letelier case. According to Defense, there will still be a quantity of items in the pipeline six months from now because a quantity of items will not be delivered until 1980.

THE OPTIONS

Option I:

Permit the currently completed pipeline (except the controversial bomb fins) to be loaded for delivery, retaining the option later of bypassing Chile with the munitions shipment. Unless an impasse is reached on the Letelier case or significant deterioration in the human rights situation occurs, permit the remainder of the pipeline, reviewed monthly, to flow.

PRO:

—Would be consistent with the position taken by State and Justice with the Congress.

—Would preserve the pipeline as leverage on Chilean cooperation in the Letelier/Moffitt case.

—Would avoid complex political, contractual, and financial consequences of further suspension or cutoff.

CON:

—Would draw criticism from influential elements in Congress and the public.

—Would work down the remaining pipeline accumulation to a point at which it eventually might not be a meaningful instrument for influencing the Chilean Government to cooperate in the Letelier case.

—Would mean that the U.S. government was continuing to supply weapons, ammunition and equipment to the armed forces in Chile in contrast to the logical consequence of our human rights policy.

Option II:

That you maintain the pipeline items in a state of review; storing them for future shipment to Chile if the human rights situation significantly improves and there is cooperation in the Letelier case.

PRO:

—Would be supported by vocal elements of both Congress and the public.

—Would represent (in contrast to mandatory legislative cutoff) a flexible Administration position, permitting items to be sent if situation improves.

—Given the denial of civil and political liberties in Chile and continued incidents, however reduced in number, of violation of rights of the person, the USG should not be supplying arms to the Chilean military.

CON:

—Would appear to impose a new and inexplicable sanction on a country with an improving human rights record.

—Would provide Pinochet an argument to the Chilean armed forces for non-cooperation with Letelier investigation.

—Would raise complex contractual questions with potential financial costs to USG.

—Would be opposed by Justice for negative potential in complicating extradition issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Option I to permit pipeline shipments (except the bomb fins) to resume (favored by ARA and Ambassador Landau).⁶

That you approve Option II to maintain pipeline in “state of review”, (favored by HA).

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 31, Human Rights—Chile II. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Steven and Schneider on August 29. A notation in an unknown hand on the first page of the memorandum indicates that Oxman saw the memorandum. Perry initialed the first page of the memorandum. Oxman wrote on the first page of the memorandum: “Conf w/ WC, 9/6. He meant it* should flow and we shd review each month, so we wd have something to turn off each month, shd we want to. *if over and above the $945,000 for the supply ship.”
2. Not found. In late May, the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) at the port of San Francisco refused to load bomb parts onto a ship that was bound for Chile. (John M. Goshko, “Plan to Ship Bomb Parts to Chile Arouses Dispute,” Washington Post, June 20, 1978, p. A2)
3. The undated attachment, entitled “Summary of Chile FMS Shipments Pending–o/a August 20, 1978–approximate dollar values,” is attached but not printed.
4. John M. Goshko, “Halt in Arms for Chile is Passed and Reversed,” Washington Post, August 3, 1978, p. A1.
5. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559), which Ford signed into law on December 30, 1974, amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) and added Section 502B, which expressed that a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy is the promotion and the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights. Section 301(a) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 94-329), which Ford signed into law on June 30, 1976, further amended the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act and added Section 502B(a)(3). See Foreign Relations, 1977-81, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, footnote 5, Document 1.
6. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations.