Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

2. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 5, 1977

SUBJECT

• Your Request for an Assessment of Peru’s Military Threat and Appropriate U.S. Response²

Attached at Tab A is the study you requested on the Peruvian armament level and potential threat.³ State prepared it in consultation with Defense, CIA, and NSC Staff. At Tab B is the quantitative summary of the military capabilities of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and also some options for U.S. policy suggested [less than 1 line not declassified]⁴ At Tab C is a short paper prepared by the CIA assessing the Peruvian threat.⁵ At Tab D, the State Department has prepared a comprehensive list of options for U.S. policy with regard to the arms build-up in the Andes and the possibility of a war.⁶

The principal points made in the studies include:

1. Since 1973, Peru has bought or made commitments to purchase weapons from the Soviet Union valued at approximately $500 million. This has permitted Peru to gain a considerable advantage in materiel over its neighbors. One reason the Peruvians have done this is to compensate for clear inferiority in human materiel (education and competence of its Indian soldiers).

2. While Peru’s neighbors fear its possible expansionist and revanchist (lost territory to Chile in 1879) designs, State, Defense, and CIA belive that, if anything, Peru has grown more cautious as a result of its near-war with Ecuador in December, 1976. The political instability in Peru, however, could conceivably create a situation or a (Peruvian) government that would attack its neighbors. The combined assessment of State and the CIA is that the chances for an outbreak of hostilities this year are slight.

3. With its military materiel advantage, Peru will undoubtedly call for regional arms limitations agreement, but its neighbors are not likely to want one. The U.S. can try to play the role of honest broker to bring the countries together, but it is possible that our motives would be questioned. Bolivia, however, has invited the United States Government to make a clear public declaration of its strong opposition to conflict in the region.⁷

4. While Peru’s neighbors have sent missions abroad to purchase arms, an arms race is hardly inevitable. The Bolivian Foreign Minister, for example, has informed our Ambassador that he believes Bolivia will not shift funds out of economic development into the purchasing of new weapons.⁸ Nor are we likely to see a significant shift in preferences from U.S. and western sources of supplies to Soviet sources. In spite of our veto of the Israeli sale of Kfirs to Ecuador,⁹ the President of Ecuador has informed our Ambassador that he intends to send a high-level mission, including the Foreign and Defense Ministers, to Washington—not to Moscow—to reaffirm Ecuador’s interest in close ties with the U.S. as well as to discuss their concern for Ecuador’s military security.¹⁰

5. By cutting FMS credits for Peru this year and vetoing the Kfir sale, we have already taken a few steps to show our resistance to an arms race in the region. Besides privately urging the nations of the region, especially Peru, to limit their arms purchases and publicly stating the need for peace in the region, other options for the U.S. (Tab D) include stimulating a multilateral effort among arms suppliers to limit sales and monitoring purchases closely with the idea of trying to lend balance when possible. It is not expected that any U.S. initiative to the Soviet Union, except in a multilateral framework, will succeed in limiting their sales to the region. The Policy Review on Conventional Arms Sales (PRM–12)¹¹ and on Latin American (PRM–17)¹² will look into these questions more deeply.¹³

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 39, Peru, 1977. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. In a February 18 note to Brzezinski, Carter wrote: “I’m concerned about Peru & armament level. Advise how best to express our concern to P. & USSR, & give me more detailed assessment of the potential threat to neighboring countries. J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 43, Peru, 2–12/77)
3. Tab A is attached but not printed.
4. Tab B, the undated quantitative summary entitled “Comparative Order of Battle for the Andean Region,” is not printed. The policy options portion of Tab B is presumably the paper marked “Annex B” in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 43, Peru, 2–12/77.
5. Tab C, the February 23 paper entitled “Peru: An Assessment of the Threat,” is attached but not printed.
6. Tab D, an undated paper entitled “Options for Action to Reduce Tension in the Andes,” is attached but not printed.
7. In telegram 1386 from La Paz, February 22, the Embassy reported that Adriazola “emphasized that US has a major responsibility to preserve peace in the Southern Cone, especially to prevent weak country such as Bolivia from being hurt by armed conflict. Said he thought US should make clear public declaration of its strong opposition to conflict in Southern Cone.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 64, Peru, 1/77–12/79 #1)
8. In telegram 1386 from La Paz, February 22, the Embassy reported that Adriazola believed that Bolivia would not “spend significant amounts on new weapons.” (Ibid.)
9. See footnote 2, Document 266.
10. See Documents 265 and 266. In telegram 1408 from Quito, March 3, the Embassy reported that the Government of Ecuador had “decided that before sending the high-level mission which it had previously requested, it wishes to send a mission at the Under Secretary level to test the water in Washington.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770072–0592)
11. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 259.
12. See Document 1.
13. Carter wrote and underlined “ok” at the bottom of the memorandum.