Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

161. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

POLICY PAPER ON BOLIVIA

I. THE ISSUE:

What policy should the USG pursue, in the current situation in Bolivia?

II. THE BOLIVIA SITUATION:

The military regime presently has effective control over the entire country. Passive disaffection continues, and several reports indicate that plotting to replace Garcia Meza and his collaborators with less tainted elements is on the rise, but there is no open resistance of any significance from any sector. Even if a palace coup does replace Garcia Meza, Bolivia will likely have a military government for some time. Attempts by Hernan Siles Suazo to establish a clandestine opposition government in Bolivia are unlikely to succeed.

An unprecedented level of brutality sets this coup apart from the numerous Bolivian coups of the past 30 years, as do the regime’s close ties to narcotics traffickers. Having violated the human rights of so many, the regime, and indeed most elements of the armed forces, will be reluctant to relax the repression.

III. U.S. RESPONSE TO DATE:

We have strongly condemned this further interruption of the democratic process. Ambassador Weissman was called home immediately for consultations and remains away from his post. The Embassy staff at La Paz has been reduced from 116 to 70 people and all military and much development assistance is being terminated. No new assistance is being provided, and we are limiting our contacts with the regime to administrative and consular matters. Reports showing the present government’s intimate connection with the international drug traffic have been released on the Hill and contributed to intense press, Congressional and international interest in this aspect of the junta.

In the OAS we helped pass a resolution deploring the military overthrow, and we have joined the Nicaraguans and others in exploring whether an OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers should be called to consider the Bolivian case. We will oppose loans to Bolivia in international financial institutions.

Through a series of demarches in various capitals, we have pressed other countries not to resume normal relations with the GOB under existing circumstances. The responses have been encouraging. Thus far, only 13 countries (including none of the industrialized democracies) have issued statements indicating a desire to resume full diplomatic contacts with Bolivia.

IV. OPTIONS:

A. Accept the coup—deal with the GOB on policy level.

B. Distance ourselves—continue our course of the past two months.

C. Destabilize the Garcia Meza regime—respond to overtures of dissident groups and provide them with material support.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

In the absence of any major change in the policies (and presumably personalities) of the present regime, we should maintain our suspension of security assistance and curtailment of development aid, further reduce the size of the Embassy at La Paz and avoid policy level contacts with the GOB at least until after the industrialized democracies and other Andean Pact members have resumed normal relations with the regime.

A. THE SHORT TERM GAME PLAN

Our basic short-to-medium term objective is to change the direction of the GOB towards fewer human rights abuses (including safe conduct out of Bolivia for former President Gueiler and asylees in various diplomatic missions), reduced venality and involvement with the drug trade, full implementation of programs to restore economic vitality and an eventual return to democracy.

We can seek to maintain diplomatic, public opinion and economic pressures on the GOB, attempt to persuade the Argentine and Brazilian Governments to use their influence for improvements in Bolivia and remain flexible to respond to positive changes in the situation. Specifically:

1. Keep the Regime Isolated

We are supporting the convocation of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers to address in the OAS the human rights abuses and the interruption of the democratic process, provided at least 18 votes for a meaningful resolution are assured. (There are now 17.) We will continue to contribute to publicity on the abuses being commited by the regime, as well as its close links to narcotics traffickers. We will continue our discussions with the industrialized democracies and the Andean Pact members in order to ensure there is no breaking of ranks.

2. Influence the Regime Towards Moderation

We are trying to persuade Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia’s most influential neighbors, to use their influence positively. Release of drug-related reports is a significant part of this endeavor.

3. Exert Economic Pressures

At this point only Argentina seems prepared to help a financially troubled Bolivia. Even its aid may be conditioned upon some improvements such as reduction of the drug connection and sounder economic policies. We will not support pending application for new loans to Bolivia in international development banks.

B. FUTURE OPTIONS

Even if Latin American and European democracies regularize their relations in the absence of major improvements in Bolivia, we should be among the last in changing our willingness to deal at a policy level with Bolivian officials.

Should there be major improvements in the Bolivian regime personalities and/or policies (as evidenced by a crackdown on the narcotics trade, a reduction of human rights abuses and more positive economic and political programs) we can then consider carefully whether these merit the resumption of more normal relations and a reinstatement of some aid programs. The widespread domestic and international support our present policy enjoys and the absence of major pressures to accomodate to the Garcia Meza regime permit us to move deliberately in this case.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 2, Bolivia, 1-10/80. Attachment to Document 160. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper.