Office of the Historian

155. Excerpt From the National Intelligence Daily1

Washington, June 27, 1980

BOLIVIA: Election Outlook

Bolivians will participate on Sunday2 in the third general election in two years, but a military takeover in the immediate postelection period is possible. [Portion marking not declassified]

Former chief executives Hernan Siles Zuazo and Victor Paz Estenssoro probably will win the most votes, with former President Banzer running a strong third. If—as expected—none of the 13 candidates achieves a simple majority, the election will be decided by the new Congress when it convenes in July. [Portion marking not declassified]

Followers of both Siles and Paz have pledged to support the one who gets the most popular votes, although neither candidate has yet committed himself. The three leading contenders, however, have shown interest in negotiating a settlement to avoid any postelection stalemate.3 The major parties also are considering a coalition government to ensure broad political support for the next civilian administration. [Portion marking not declassified]

A repeat of last year’s electoral deadlock in Congress would tempt military hardliners to lead a coup on the pretext of restoring order and leadership.4 Inveterate armed forces plotters reportedly will accept either Paz or Banzer as president. They consider Siles an extreme leftist, [Page 472] however, and have threatened an immediate coup if he wins the election. [Portion marking not declassified]

In addition to having to contend with a turbulent political environment and the continual threat of a coup from military conservatives, the new president will have to deal with a depressed economy. [Portion marking not declassified] [less than 1 line not declassified]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00466R: Intelligence Publications Files (1980), Box 3, Folder 2. Top Secret; [code word and handling restriction not declassified].↩
  2. June 29.↩
  3. In telegram 4728 from La Paz, June 8, Weissman reported that Araoz was working “to have agreement from Mrs. Gueiler, Paz, and also Siles Salinas to seek to make a deal with Banzer and the military for the elections to proceed, for Paz to get the presidency, but with Banzer and the military sharing power. As for Siles Zuazo, he was completely unacceptable to the military, Araoz indicated, but since the military expects him to be the front-runner in the vote count, they will not let the election proceed unless they have assurances by the contemplated deal that Siles Zuazo cannot win the presidency in the Congress.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800280-0989) In telegram 151293 to La Paz, June 8, the Department advised the Embassy: “We could not give our agreement or support to any arrangement which, in advance of the elections, would exclude Siles Zuazo, one of the principal electoral contenders. Since the military is a major political force, it is logical they would play a significant part in whatever government results from the elections.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800281-0188)↩
  4. Weissman reported: “Araoz says that as of this afternoon, June 7, he is now absolutely certain that the Argentines are deeply involved in the planning of all aspects of the coup.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800280-0989)↩