151. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1
[Omitted here are portions of the memorandum unrelated to Bolivia]
6. Bolivia—I had a useful discussion with Bolivian President Walter Guevara, who described the precarious political situation in his country, urged us not to go forward with the disposal of tin, and asked us to support Bolivia’s request for access to the sea. I told him that we would support Bolivia’s desire to access to the sea. On tin, I gave Guevara your letter and requested his advice on ways we could dispose of the tin so it didn’t have a negative impact on the Bolivian economy.2 On Tuesday,3 Ambassador Boeker hosted a lunch for me and virtually all of Bolivia’s political and military leaders. I made clear that the US strongly supported the democratization process, and the move to civilian government which had taken place. I also made it very clear that any efforts to mount a coup would be viewed by the US and the international community with extreme disfavor.4 I urged them to put their joint support behind the democratic process. I encouraged the civilian leaders of the different political factions to help the Guevara administration to deal with the country’s serious economic and political problems, rather than try to topple the government as several appear to be trying. The luncheon conversation succeeded in getting the various leaders to communicate with each other for the first time in a while. My hope is that the luncheon conversation will reduce the chances of a coup and provide the government with necessary support to continue its progress toward democratization.5
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State): 10/79. Secret. In the top right-hand corner, Carter wrote “Cy. J.”↩
- See Document 150.↩
- October 23.↩
- Carter wrote “good” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.↩
- In telegram 9314 from La Paz, October 31, the Embassy reported that on the morning of October 23 Boeker, Vaky and Vance had discussed “what we might hope for if your luncheon intervention later that day had the desired impact on Bolivian politics.” The Embassy reported that three changes had since occurred: “A. Victor Paz’ disowning the civilian-military plotting his backers had started; B. Paz’ ordering his parliamentary group to cease their kamikaze attacks on Guevara—censure motions, resignation demands, etc.; C. Guevara then being able to conclude a multi-party accord or coalition that would give his government a political base that could just survive until the next elections.” The Embassy reported that the fourth of their agreed-upon hopes was “a melting away of military support for several incipient coup leaders,” and that this might still “run its course.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175-1802)↩