Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

119. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Grenada, June 15, 1977

SUBJECT

• Peace in the Andean Region; Americans in jail in Bolivia

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Mark Dion, USOAS (Notetaker)
  • Mrs. van Reigersberg (interpreter)

• BOLIVIA

  • Foreign Minister Adriazola

The Foreign Minister said he was delighted to have a chance to meet the Secretary, to discuss the realities of Latin America and to follow up Mr. Todman’s recent visit to La Paz. Secretary Vance said he had had a long report from Ambassador Todman who was enthusiastic in his description of Bolivia.² They agreed it would be useful to have these visits on a more regular basis. The Secretary then asked the Foreign Minister for his views on the Andean region at the moment, particularly with regard to the fragility of peace there.

Adriazola gave the Secretary a lengthy description. Peru has acquired highly sophisticated weapons of great firepower from the Soviet Union. This has created a disequilibrium and produced a geo-political imbalance that has neighboring countries deeply worried. After its defeat in the war with Chile in 1879, Peru created a mystique about recovering its territories. The current imbalance is the result of a history of hostility between Chile and Peru. Bolivia is involved because it is a neighbor. It hoped that its formula of peace, development and integration would allow it to return to the Pacific ocean in peace. Great powers are indirectly involved in this problem as well. Peru’s acquisition of weapons has made it quite dependent on the USSR. War could come. A conflagration in South America would mean chaos for the hemisphere.

Last week, Minister Adriazola spoke separately with the presidents of Peru and Chile. He asked the President of Peru whether it was planning to declare war on Chile. The answer was no, that none of its weapons were for offensive purposes, that they would only be used for self-defense. The Peruvian President explained that the result of a temporary victory now over Chile would be to create much more serious problems for the future because once Chile acquired means of revenge, it would attack again and such a war would be extremely costly to Peru. Adriazola asked the President of Chile whether he expected Peru’s armaments to be used in war. The President of Chile said he thought Peru was considering hostile action. Why else had it bought so many arms?

Adriazola noted at this point in his account that Peru had tried to buy weapons from the U.S. When the US refused, the USSR offered large quantities on easy terms. These purchasing arrangements allowed Peru to acquire modern weapons cheaply. Bolivia is a peaceful country. What wealth it has is used for development, not preparations for war. The Government of Bolivia is sensitive to social problems and is working to build a better life for its people. Adriazola asked how Secretary Vance viewed the situation in the Andean region.

The Secretary said that it is our opinion that Bolivia has indeed shown great restraint in weapons purchases and is working hard for development and social justice. We are concerned with the Peruvian buildup; what role could the US play to improve the situation? We refused to sell arms to Peru because we wanted to prevent an arms race. The Peruvians then went to the Soviet Union and bought on favorable terms with low interest. The Secretary reiterated that this situation is of great concern to us.

Adriazola said there were two ways the US could help build a work for detente in the area. One is to help build a balance among the parties; the other is to warn them that the U.S. will not countenance a war in Latin America.

Secretary Vance asked if the latter were not in fact an act of intervention. Adriazola said the Charter of the OAS and the UN Charter both ruled out intervention in internal affairs. They also called for self-determination and respect for sovereignty of state. Not just two countries are involved. The whole continent and indeed the Western hemisphere will be affected by such a war. The U.S. must therefore make every effort to avert war. Given Peru’s clear dependence on the USSR, it could find itself forced into war by Soviet pressure.

The Minister said he was delighted Ambassador Stedman would be coming to Washington to work with Ambassador Todman. Ambassador Stedman knows the situation intimately. Adriazola promised to provide Ambassador Stedman with briefings and documentation that would allow him to discuss the course of action the US might take on his return to Washington. He said Ambassador Stedman was very well liked in La Paz and that Bolivians were sorry to see him go but pleased he would be in Washington.³

Secretary Vance said he was looking forward to a discussion with Ambassador Stedman. He promised to analyze any documents the Minister supplied.

At the conclusion of their talks, the Secretary then raised the question of Americans in jail in Bolivia and asked if the Minister would be kind enough to look into their situation. He hoped that the arraignment, trial and sentencing could be accelerated. Some 40 Americans are in jail in Bolivia, according to the Department’s information. Minister Adriazola said he was aware that 25 drug traffickers are now being subjected to legal procedures but he doubted that the process could be hurried up. Instead, he suggested that an interchange of prisoners could be considered along the lines of the Mexican-US exchange. Secretary Vance said he would look into the idea to see what could be done.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, OAS meeting June 14–17, 1977, Grenada. Confidential. Drafted by Dion, approved in ARA and S. Vance and Adriazola were in Grenada for the OAS General Assembly meeting. In telegram 152728 to La Paz, June 30, the Department transmitted this memorandum to the Embassy.
2. See Document 118.
3. Stedman left post in La Paz on June 23.
4. See footnote 4, Document 118.