Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

67. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, September 4, 1979, 2:00–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Brigade in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

• OSD

  • Secretary of Defense Harold Brown

• JCS

  • General David Jones, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence
  • Arnold Horelick, National Intelligence Officer, USSR and East Europe

• NSA

  • Admiral Bobby Inman, Director, National Security Agency

• NSC

  • Marshall Brement (Notetaker)

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Lloyd Cutler

MINUTES

Secretary Vance opened the meeting by asking Admiral Turner to bring the group up to date on the subject. (U)

Admiral Turner. [less than 1 line not declassified] August 9 revealed to us that Soviet troops were contemplating a training exercise. [less than 1 line not declassified] August 16 confirmed that the exercise was to take place the following day. This allowed us to target the event and to acquire [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence of the exercises from August 17 to August 20 as they were taking place. This [less than 1 line not declassified] evidence, combined with [1 line not declassified], allowed us to verify for the first time beyond any question that we were dealing with a Soviet ground combat activity. The day after the exercise ended, we [less than 1 line not declassified] observed that a good bit of equipment that had been located there had been transferred to the Lourdes Communications base and to Santiago de las Vegas. From all this new evidence we were able to flesh out our concept of what the Soviet brigade looked like. (TS)

As a result of the pinpointing of this exercise, we have gone back and looked at all the evidence we have on the subject since 1962. We cannot be sure that the Soviets withdrew all their ground combat forces from Cuba after 1962, and it is possible that this brigade could have been positioned on the island since that time. We have evidence of a Soviet training exercise directed against amphibious forces which took place in 1971. From 1971–1975 there was a dearth of information. Since 1976, we have had [less than 1 line not declassified] 15 tactical training exercises by the Soviets. (TS)

We have picked up [1 line not declassified] of the unit and know it is commanded by a colonel. I emphasize that the [less than 1 line not declassified] were not highly conclusive or clear-cut evidence. But by last spring there was enough indication of Soviet training activities having taken place that we found it advisable to do a national estimate. After an intensive review of past [less than 1 line not declassified] on July 12 [less than 1 line not declassified] an evaluation that there was indeed a Soviet brigade in Cuba. (TS)

While not a typical Soviet combat formation, the brigade is not unique to Cuba. Other brigades exist in East Germany, Mongolia and elsewhere. The facility in Santiago de las Vegas is manned by Soviet personnel. (TS)

We are concerned that we have not been able to [1 line not declassified] An exercise was scheduled for September 3, but this did not occur, and we are not sure why. It may be a result of our concern or it may have something to do with the current hurricane or the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. (TS)

What we know is that we are dealing with a unit of approximately 2,000–3,000 men and that it is commanded by a colonel. We assume that it is at full strength because it is so far from home, and we have positively identified enough equipment, e.g., 33 tanks, for a full-strength tank battalion. (TS)

Vance. Would it be possible that this unit had some connections with the [less than 1 line not declassified] (TS)

Turner. There is no evidence this group has any connection with the [less than 1 line not declassified] (TS)

Admiral Inman. [5 lines not declassified] (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski. How many took part in the exercise? (TS)

Horelick. About 750–800 people actually took part. (TS)

Vice President. What do we estimate is the function of the brigade? (TS)

Turner. We now know that it is not to train Cubans, or for jungle warfare training, which some people had previously assumed, and that they are not there to protect the Lourdes facility. Our best hypothesis is that the brigade is there as a gesture of support for Castro. We cannot exclude that it has been there since 1962. (TS)

Vance. The number of Soviet troops in Cuba in 1962 reached 20,000. Kennedy insisted that the Soviets take out the personnel who serviced the offensive weapons and also the technicians and the guards of the installations where they were installed, but did not ask for a withdrawal of all combat troops. The Soviets did withdraw most of their military personnel, but did not withdraw all their troops from Cuba. (TS)

Turner. In 1971, some Soviet combat elements were in Cuba. In 1975, we witnessed an enlargement of the facility at Santiago de las Vegas. And from 1975 to 1977, this facility was modernized. This was consistent with the major modernization of the Cuban armed forces which the Soviets were undertaking at that time. We assume that the brigade was fleshed out and gotten up to strength during this period. From 1977 to 1979 we saw no evidence of further construction, no inflow of people, or anything else to indicate that the size of the unit was being increased. We therefore assume that it reached its present size by 1976. (TS)

Inman. We have a human source who stated that the brigade was there in 1968, but this cannot be confirmed. (TS)

Brzezinski. Had we done this kind of intelligence scrutiny before, would we have been able to identify a Soviet unit in 1968, assuming one was there at the time? (TS)

Horelick. [less than 1 line not declassified] Cubans and Soviets use the same equipment. [2 lines not declassified] Knowing what we now know, we reviewed an exercise which occurred a year ago and we discovered that it had the same signature as the exercise which recently took place. We are now prepared to say that the 1978 exercise was also carried out by this Soviet brigade. (TS)

Turner. If this subject had had a higher priority we might have discovered it earlier. But the [less than 1 line not declassified] information is spotty. [less than 1 line not declassified] is not the kind of [less than 1 line not declassified] which fills one with confidence. We still cannot prove beyond all shadow of doubt that Soviets were in those tanks. (TS)

Vance. Both Harold and I a month ago, with the full clearance of the intelligence community, made statements that there was no evidence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba.² (TS)

Secretary Brown. What I said was that there was a [less than 1 line not declassified] set-up, but no convincing evidence of a brigade. (TS)

Brzezinski. I briefed the President at that time and I remember that the expression I used was that we had no “conclusive evidence” of the existence of the brigade. (TS)

Aaron. During the days when we were engaged in paramilitary operations in Cuba did our agents ever run into any Russians? (TS)

Inman. I have gone over the evidence and we have no information about any organized Russian unit in Cuba. (TS)

Vance. I think we should now turn to the issues which we are facing. This is a very serious and complex situation with domestic and international overtones. In dealing with it we must be seen as effective and coordinated and must follow the situation on a daily basis. To do this I want to set up an interagency group to meet daily on this problem under the chairmanship of Under Secretary Newsom. We need to examine the strategic implications of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. The questions we must ask ourselves are what are the implications in the region as a whole and in the world in general, as well as on the domestic side and for the SALT ratification process. (TS)

Vice President. Does this action violate the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement? (TS)

Vance. No it does not. The correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev was supplemented by other communications between McCloy and Kuznetsov and Mikoyan and by various other exchanges. Essentially, it dealt with offensive weapons in Cuba and not with ground troops. (TS)

Vice President. And the brigade does not threaten us at all? (TS)

Brown . The brigade is not a threat to the continental United States, but if it had a lift capability it could be considered an effective force in the rest of the Western Hemisphere. (TS)

Vance. Kennedy referred to 6,000 troops but did not identify the troops as a threat, only their association with offensive weapons was mentioned. (Under Secretary Newsom then read to the group the pertinent parts from the Kennedy speech dealing with Soviet combat troops in Cuba.)³ (TS)

Brzezinski. We must be careful not to give the Soviets a clean bill of health on this. People will read this Soviet brigade as being there in conjunction with a new situation in which the Soviets are using the Cubans in a far more assertive fashion than was the case before 1975. It is here that the US-Soviet connection becomes difficult. (TS)

Vice President. If we seem too soft on this issue it could be damaging to us domestically. How to flag our concern without feeding the lions in the Senate is a tricky question. (TS)

Vance. We have to express our concern. At the same time, we have to look at our main ultimate objective, i.e., to get the brigade out. The more you build up the issue publicly, the more difficult it will be to get the brigade out. (TS)

Brzezinski. We have to sound convincing to the Soviets, but do not want to pump the issue up publicly. We ought to say to Moscow that we are seriously concerned and that this issue has struck a sensitive nerve for us, which affects our vital interests and the SALT ratification process as well. The Cubans for the first time have been given the capability to project their power, and this creates a difficult situation for us. We would hope that the Soviets would understand our sensitivities and withdraw. If not, we will have to make it clear to them that we will not be sensitive to their concerns. We ask for reciprocity. If we do not get it, we should make clear to the Soviets that the character of Harold’s upcoming visit to China will depend to some extent on their reactions to our concerns about this issue. You should all know that Senator Byrd just told the President that resolutions will probably be offered in the Senate delaying final SALT ratification until this issue is resolved satisfactorily. Byrd said that he was not yet decided on how he would vote on such a resolution. We tried to jack him up and he wants to be helpful on SALT, but this is a real issue. (TS)

Vice President. We have to develop an approach that has some bite to it so that Senator Stone and others who feel the same way he does will be satisfied. (TS)

Brown . Our ultimate aim is to get the Soviets to pull their forces out. But maybe getting them to cap the number of their troops in Cuba is a possible first course. After we get an agreement on no more troops then they could get out later and more quietly. (TS)

Vance. I don’t think that capping is enough. We must have withdrawal. (TS)

Brzezinski. We might give them the option of saying to us that this was some sort of a training unit. They would be given to understand that we would accept such an explanation provided that they phase the unit out of existence. This might be a way out of the dilemma which we face. (TS)

Brown . The Soviets will not worry about any posture we adopt until we do something concrete to drive our concerns home to them. (TS)

Aaron. Maybe the best approach to the Soviets would be to ask for no more exercises. This might be the best we can get from them. We should not establish criteria which we cannot monitor. How would we know whether the Soviets actually withdrew? (TS)

Newsom. We could try to convince the Soviets that we are entering a new phase and that this is a burden on our overall relations. (TS)

Brown . We should not tie this to SALT. We should rather say that this is unacceptable to us in terms of our overall relationship. (TS)

Brzezinski. There has to be sensitivity to the special interests of both sides. This is a new situation. We are now more neuralgic than we have been to Cuba’s ability to project its power as well as to its actions in Africa. Unless the Soviets desist from certain forms of activity, this cannot help but influence the overall relationship. (TS)

Cutler. Does this Soviet facility qualify as a base? (TS)

Brown . It is hard to see how it does not. (TS)

Aaron. It is difficult to maintain that it is not a base. (TS)

Vance. If we say it is a base, this makes the task of coming to some solution of the problem much more difficult. (TS)

Newsom. We do not in fact know that the Soviets are not on a Cuban base. (TS)

Brown . We have not talked about the effect of this action on Latin America, and how we are to portray to others this new Soviet ability to project their power. (TS)

Brzezinski. This will be perceived as a test of this Administration. In responding to it, we must differentiate between our public posture and what we will be saying privately to the Soviets. In public we must explain our concern about this brigade in the context of growing Cuban adventurism over the past several years. Privately, we must convince the Soviets that unless we get some satisfaction on this we are in a very difficult situation. We will almost certainly confront strong public demands that we delay SALT ratification until this problem can be settled. As I said, Senator Byrd told the President that a resolution will be offered in the Senate linking final ratification of the treaty with a settlement of this problem, and that he himself is wavering and may have no choice but to support it. Byrd insisted that we need quick action. This makes it all the more urgent that we talk to the Soviets about it. (TS)

Vance. We received word today that Dobrynin is due back on Friday. I have sent him a message that he return as soon as possible. (TS)

Cutler. Our position with the Senate must be that if it is a base, we will ask the Soviets to take it out. (TS)

Vance. A demand such as that will lessen the chances of bringing it about. (TS)

Brown . Should we not say that if it is a permanent base, this will have grave consequences for our relations. (TS)

Brzezinski. It is clear that the Soviets will not tolerate a public humiliation in Cuba or a reliving of the 1962 missile crisis. (TS)

Cutler. Nevertheless, the issue of the Carter letter to Stone has to be addressed.⁴ (TS)

Newsom. We should keep in mind that the Soviets have had a Sigint base in Cuba for a long time. (TS)

Cutler. This is a separate question. Intelligence collection facilities in third countries have not been a contentious issue. (TS)

Aaron. In dealing with the Soviets, we could note that we have only seen this unit in operation on an intermittent basis. It is extremely important to emphasize this because it is much harder for the Soviets to withdraw a combat brigade completely than it would be to close out a facility. (TS)

Brzezinski. Perhaps we should first discuss what outcome we really want. Can we go on living with 2,800 Soviet troops in Cuba? (TS)

Vance. I say we cannot live with the maintenance of a Soviet combat brigade there. (TS)

Brown . From what Inman has said, those 2,800 people are not advisors. (TS)

Brzezinski. Can we live with them operating on a lesser level, for example a platoon? (TS)

Turner. We have never seen them operate as a full brigade. (TS)

Brown . The recent exercise was at a level of only two battalions. (TS)

Brzezinski. Can we, as an Administration, accept a continuation there of Soviet combat forces at whatever level? (TS)

Cutler. We need convincing evidence to assuage Congressional critics. (TS)

Brzezinski. What is our minimum objective? Is it that the Soviets should no longer ever hold exercises? (TS)

Newsom. Is it conceivable that the Soviets would say they would disband that command and we could announce the removal of the brigade structure? (TS)

Jones. Our big problem is that we don’t know why the brigade is there. Removing their headquarters would not really solve the problem. (TS)

Aaron. If we take the position that we want the brigade out of there, the first question we will be asked is how do we know that the Soviets are complying with such an agreement? How can we possibly verify it? My fear is that we would be getting into some kind of arms control agreement on this question. (TS)

Brown . Withdrawal is a very tough objective, and it is more difficult to achieve this objective once you state it. (TS)

Cutler. It is very hard for the President to climb off the base question which he articulated in the letter to Stone. If there is no convincing evidence that this is not a base, then we are committed to oppose it, and if we fail to get some positive action out of the Soviets this would definitely impact on SALT. (TS)

Aaron. What we are trying for is an explanation. This is the important thing. We need to know that this is not a combat operation. Right now we are not looking for a deal or a withdrawal, just for a satisfactory clarification. (TS)

Brzezinski. It is not inconceivable that the Soviets may act in a positive manner on this. Their naval task force that was heading for Cuba turned around on August 14 and went off to West Africa and this may have had something to do with the demarche that George Vest made on this subject. If we say to them that if they refuse to cooperate we will view this as insensitivity to our interests and will therefore be less sensitive to their concerns in the future and tie this to Harold’s visit, it may have some effect. (TS)

Newsom. Might we not ask for a commitment that no Soviet troops be directed against any place else in the Western hemisphere? (TS)

Secretary Vance. A Senate Resolution on this would be extremely difficult to handle. Is there a Senator who would not vote for a Resolution calling for withdrawal of Soviet ground combat forces from their base in Cuba? (TS)

Brzezinski. Perhaps we might ask the Senate to give us six weeks to resolve the issue. (TS)

Cutler. Something has to be done about it by the end of September. (TS)

Brown . We require that the Soviets change what they are doing. We must not be satisfied with mere camouflage. (TS)

Turner. You cannot tell a Soviet from a Cuban tank. (TS)

Vance. Let me then try to summarize what I will be saying tomorrow morning at my press conference and tomorrow afternoon when we meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. First of all, I will convey that we will be talking to the Soviets about this as soon as Dobrynin arrives in Washington and that we will be making a parallel demarche in Moscow. At that time I will ask for an explanation of the purposes and the intentions of the Soviet unit in Cuba. Our next steps will depend on how we assess the purposes and intentions of the brigade.⁵ (TS)

Brzezinski. Don’t you want to indicate that it is impossible for us to accept a permanent military combat base in Cuba and that given the rapidly rising public crescendo, we will have to respond to the issue? (TS)

Vance. We will have to be very clear about it. (TS)

Brzezinski. As we have discussed, we should be hinting to them what we can live with, as well as what we plan to do about it if they are not responsible. (TS)

Brown . There are other alternatives. We might, for example, consider reinforcement exercises in Guantanamo and perhaps suggest a trade. (TS)

Brzezinski. This would create problems for us in that it would pit a big United States against a small Cuba in a public confrontation. Sympathy would therefore be generated for the Cubans from many of the non-aligned nations, especially in Latin America. Furthermore, that kind of action makes the continuation of a Soviet presence even more likely. (TS)

Aaron. What kind of guard forces do we have in Guantanamo? (TS)

Jones. Really not too much. Those 40 Soviet tanks would probably run right over them. (TS)

Vice President. Most Americans do not know about the 20,000 troops that were in Cuba in 1962. It may well be that this Soviet unit is no threat to us at all. Nevertheless, we must make it clear that we are not taking this matter lightly. (TS)

Newsom. How much do we tell the Soviets about what we know of this unit? (TS)

Vance. I think we have to go quite far. (TS)

Brzezinski. I think we have to be very careful on that. But to recapitulate, (1) you will be calling in Dobrynin; (2) you will be asking for an explanation of the purposes and intentions of the brigade; (3) you will draw for him a picture of the domestic consequences if we do not get some satisfaction on this issue; (4) you will note that we are serious about our concerns and that we expect reciprocity from the Soviets, i.e., that we expect them to be as sensitive to our concerns as we are to theirs; and (5) you will convey that there are concrete steps we might have to take if we do not get satisfaction.⁶ (TS)

Aaron. The MIG–23 incident suggested that it would be helpful to let them know what we want so that our discussions do not get off on the wrong track. (TS)

Brzezinski. We should explain that if we are not satisfied on this, there will be a massive public outcry, which will inevitably jeopardize SALT. Underlying our approach would be the intimation that we are not necessarily calling for formal withdrawal of the brigade from Cuba, but rather for a disaggregation of the brigade and a non-continuation of brigade headquarters. (TS)

Vance. That may not be enough. But at the same time we would be asking the Congress not to force us to take positions with the Soviets which would not help us move toward some solution to the problem. We now have to work out a statement for my press conference tomorrow, and figure out what we are going to say to Senate leaders. At this stage we should avoid expressing our view as to whether the Soviet facility is or is not a base. (TS)

Aaron. Our objective should be to get the Soviets to clarify whether this is a permanent installation and whether we are dealing with a permanent functioning combat unit. Concrete steps we might ask for as meeting our needs would be no further exercises and removal of brigade headquarters. (TS)

Brzezinski. Cuban activism is our problem, and at some point soon we have to get at this issue. (TS)

Jones. Our biggest concern is that the Soviets are getting a combat foot in the door in the Western hemisphere. How we handle this is a real dilemma. (TS)

Cutler. Stone is going to demand removal of those troops. We will have to convince Dobrynin that this is new information to us and that we have not created this issue. Whatever happens, it is terribly important for the President to be seen as strong on this issue. (TS)

Brzezinski. We must not be seen as in any way excusing what the Soviets have done on this. (TS)

(Since both Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski had four o’clock appointments, the meeting broke up at this point.)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 77, PRC 122, Soviets in Cuba, 9/04/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
2. See footnote 2, Document 55.
3. See footnote 5, Document 36.
4. Vance responded to Stone for Carter; see footnote 2, Document 55.
5. Regarding the Secretary’s September 5 press conference, see footnote 4, Document 68. After Vance’s testimony at the closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Church commented, “I see no likelihood that the Senate would ratify the SALT–II treaty as long as Soviet combat troops remain stationed in Cuba.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops in Cuba Could Imperil Ties,” The New York Times, September 6, p. A1)
6. For the discussions with Soviet officials between September 10 and September 14, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 221, 222, and 223.