63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
228582. Subject: Demarche to Soviets on Soviet Combat Forces in Cuba. Ref: State 227407.2
1. Secret (Entire text).
2. Summary: Undersecretary Newsom called in Soviet Charge Vasev August 29 to express concern over presence in Cuba of Soviet combat forces, indicating Secretary would be raising this issue with Gromyko at UNGA. End summary.
3. FYI: We have had inconclusive evidence for several years of the presence in Cuba of what appeared to be a Soviet unit of some type. Until very recently we were uncertain as to the size, nature, and configuration of the unit—which the Soviets refer to in their communications as a “brigade”. We have now confirmed through a variety of intelligence means that the unit is indeed Soviet, numbers from 2,000 to 3,000 men, and has organic armor, artillery, and motorized infantry components. We remain uncertain as to its mission and the precise date of its placement in Cuba. End FYI.
4. Undersecretary Newsom called in Soviet Charge Vasev August 29 and read to him the following talking points.
—Marshall Shulman informed Bessmertnykh on July 27 that we would regard the presence of organized Soviet combat units in Cuba with deep concern.3
—Our concern is not theoretical. We know that there are Soviet combat forces in Cuba.
—We regard this as a serious matter which cannot help but burden our relations.
—The Secretary sees the meeting with the Foreign Minister in New York as an early opportunity to have comprehensive discussion on the trends in our relationship of which this deployment is one significant element.
5. Vasev asked what the legal basis for our representation was. Newsom replied that he thought the Soviets could appreciate that the presence of organized Soviet combat units was of obvious interest and [Page 130] concern to the U.S. He thought the technical basis of this concern and the history of its development could best be left to the Secretary, Dobrynin and Gromyko to discuss. His purpose had been simply to invite the attention of the Soviet Government to this issue. Vasev persisted, arguing that we had attempted to widen the scope of existing understandings. He asked whether this was indeed our purpose, whether we had any new proposal to make. Newsom promised to convey this question to the Secretary. Vasev predicted that if this was not clarified the discussion between the Secretary and Gromyko could be over in two minutes. Newsom hoped this would not be the scenario. We felt justified in bringing this to Soviet attention. He was sure Vasev had seen suggestions in the press about an organized Soviet brigade in Cuba. This speculation has been found to have a basis in fact. We could hear more about it when Congress returned. A public discussion was possible. Our desire, however, was to discuss the matter in official channels first.
6. Vasev then pointed out that the discussion concerned Soviet-Cuban relations and questioned whether we would permit a similar discussion with the Soviets of our relations with other countries. Newsom pointed out the history of previous discussions between us with the implicit recognition that the subject of Soviet forces in Cuba was a legitimate subject to discuss. Vasev conceded this but argued that previous talks had been limited to particular circumstances and restricted in scope. They had dealt with weapons directed against U.S. physical interests. A brigade was not of the same nature. The Soviets could not accept this. He noted that historically the U.S. had penetrated the Cuban border. He concluded that the best solution was normalization of US-Cuban relations. He denied that the Soviets were opposed to this. To the contrary, they were much in favor and expected us to take a similar attitude toward Soviet relations with countries on the Soviet borders. Newsom conceded that Cuba had the right of defense but Cuba already had large and capable armed forces. We would be concerned naturally if these forces reached a level which created an offensive danger to us, however, we found it unusual that combat elements were being introduced into another country when there was no legal or other basis for this.
7. Vasev concluded by saying he had simply tried to be helpful in clarifying certain points and promised to convey our presentation to Moscow.4
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2439. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shinn; cleared by Goodby and Bremer; approved by Newsom.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 61. The text is identical to the text Newsom read to Vasev.↩
- See footnoe 4, Document 61.↩
- On September 5, Vasev gave Christopher a reply to the démarche in the form of an oral message from the Soviet leadership, which called the U.S. assertions about a Soviet military unit in Cuba “without foundation.” See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 219.↩