113. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State1
5232. Subject: US Gestures To Strengthen Hand Of Moderates. Ref: A) Havana 5218 B) Havana 4844 C) Havana 4980.2
1. S—Entire text.
2. The Cuban leadership’s decision not to load the Kirk Dale/Blue Fire was the first indication in months of a more reasonable attitude on their part—and the first time since April 43 that Castro seems to have accepted the counsel of moderates such as Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. It is eminently in our interests to push the leadership further in this direction. Two quick steps which would contribute to that objective come immediately to mind:
A) Make immediately the long-delayed public statement condemning maritime hijacking. Such a statement in any event is needed and [Page 247] would be consistent with our present efforts to halt illegal maritime activity of all kinds between Cuba and the US.4
B) Answer the two protest notes on violation of Cuban air space by planes from the Guantanamo Naval Base (see Havana 4844 of June 10 and Havana 4980 of June 17), probably by indicating that if there were incursions on the part of our planes at the base, they were inadvertent and are to be regretted. We would, of course, not mention the SR–71 overflight also protested in the first Cuban note.5
3. These two steps, and/or others like them, would strengthen the hand of the moderates by suggesting that favorable actions such as halting the loading of the Kirk Dale/Blue Fire, which they recommended, will be met by positive gestures on our part. They will thus also enhance a solution to the USINT refugee problem, a solution which will depend very much on those same moderates.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, 7–8/80. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- For telegram 5218, see footnote 8, Document 110. In telegrams 4844 and 4980 from Havana, June 10 and June 17, the Interests Section forwarded Cuban protest notes regarding alleged U.S. violations of Cuban airspace on June 9 and June 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800283–1039; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800296–0282)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 92.↩
- According to a memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, July 11, the President approved a plan to 1) condemn forcible hijackings, 2) guarantee an investigation in each hijacking case, 3) inform the Cuban Government of the change in U.S. policy regarding hijacking. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Material, Box 128, Cuba) The Justice Department issued a statement on July 18 that it would prosecute persons who hijacked boats or planes to come to the United States. Telegram 189380 to Havana, July 18, transmitted the statement to the Interests Section. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800346–0028)↩
- In telegram 183946 to Havana, July 12, the Department transmitted a message for the Cuban Government that maintained that U.S. officials were unable to confirm whether the United States had violated Cuban airspace on June 9 and June 12, but nonetheless vowed “to take all possible steps to avoid such incidents,” adding that had any U.S. aircraft strayed, “the U.S. can assure the Cuban Government that such actions were regrettable errors on the part of the aircraft pilots and do not reflect U.S. policy.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Cuba, Refugees, 8/80)↩