Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

66. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 3, 1979

SUBJECT

• Kampuchea Relief

The response of the Congress and of other nations to the intensifying human crisis in Kampuchea has been encouraging. However, I believe continued high level initiative will be needed to keep our efforts from bogging down in the bureaucracy. Moreover, I am concerned that the net result of our current approach will be that the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin strategy of starving out their opposition will succeed. This will not only work to our disadvantage in the region but will take untold lives as well.

The international relief agencies are working through the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh. The relief agencies have preserved their formal position that food should go to all and that they be allowed to monitor the distribution of food. This, however, is only a fig leaf. The Heng Samrin regime has rejected providing food to Pol Pot and there are only about a dozen international “monitors” located in Phnom Penh and they have not the capacity to assure that food goes to the people in the contested areas.

The situation is increasingly growing critical for the people in the contested areas and on the borders in Thailand. I believe that our government and the international agencies are doing a good job but these efforts are inadequate to the human and political challenge. I have discussed this with Zbig and Henry Owen and as a result we are giving serious consideration to the following steps which we might take beyond our continued support of the international relief efforts.

First, we need to make a major effort to mobilize medical and paramedical help for the Kampuchean refugees crossing into Thailand. For this purpose we need to draw on (a) U.S. military capabilities, (b) Peace Corps volunteers who could be withdrawn from their current assignment for TDY in Thailand, and (c) a public call in the United States and elsewhere for interns, nurses and paramedics to join in a temporary effort to meet the medical challenge of the Kampuchean refugees in Thailand.

As a first step, we must establish what the real needs are. For this purpose, we are considering sending the Surgeon General Julius Richmond to Thailand. I would appreciate your reaction to the idea that Mrs. Carter might also make that trip. Subsequently, she could host a meeting of the leading figures in the health field to develop a coordinated public/private medical relief program.

This meeting could be set up before Mrs. Carter’s departure in order to underscore the substantive importance of her trip. (If this idea appeals to you, please let me know. Henry Owen will be in contact with Mary Hoyt.)

Second, we are giving serious consideration to unilaterally dropping food into the areas of Kampuchea not controlled by the Heng Samrin regime. The DOD will have contingency plans prepared by Monday.²

This would be a dramatic move. It would demonstrate bold leadership on our part and meet a very severe human need. There are a number of logistic problems to be overcome if we choose this course, but having consulted with military planners, I believe they can be overcome.

Such a step will be controversial within our own government. But frankly I do not believe that the people in the Pol Pot areas will receive any food from the international relief efforts as they are currently structured. I also believe there would be widespread Congressional and public support for such a dramatic action. I discussed the idea with Zbig before he left and he was generally favorable toward it.

The principal argument against flying unilateral food drops into Kampuchea is that the Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin regime might then reject the international efforts currently under way. However, since only the Heng Samrin regime will benefit from the international relief efforts, they are not likely to cut their nose off to spite their face.

Another problem is that our aircraft could well come under attack and American lives could be lost. This in turn could lead to an escalation of our military involvement. I believe this is a real risk. But whether we would inexorably become involved in a military way depends on our own choice. I think the stakes are worth the risk.

Third, we need to address this issue with the Soviets at a high level. State is preparing a letter from you to Brezhnev.³ I think we need to be very careful about this. The Soviets are not likely to be helpful and a rebuff could work to the disadvantage of SALT. If you decide to send Mrs. Carter to Thailand and undertake unilateral food drops, I think we can keep our approach to the Soviets at the Foreign Minister level without being subject to criticism that we are not doing enough.

We do not need to decide the issue of unilateral food drops until next week. However, I would appreciate your guidance on whether to continue considering the possibility that Mrs. Carter could go to Thailand with the Surgeon General and whether you wish us to prepare a draft letter from you to Brezhnev.

Decisions⁴

Mrs. Carter to visit Thailand.

Letter to Brezhnev.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 42, Kampuchea, 11–12/79. Confidential. Sent for action. Carter wrote at the top of the first page, “Zbig, Let Rosalynn go w/Richmond. Warren [Christopher] agrees. J.” Rosalynn Carter visited Thailand, November 8–10. See Document 71.
2. November 5.
3. Not found.
4. Carter checked the “yes” option for both decisions.