Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

38. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, January 8, 1979, 1651Z

4604. Subject: Kampuchea SitRep.

1. Following is INR’s assessment of the situation in Kampuchea. Except for paragraph 5, this may be shared with friendly governments.

2. According to Radio Hanoi and the clandestine radio of the Vietnamese-supported Khmer rebel front (the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation—KNUFNS), Phnom Penh fell to Khmer “rebel forces” on January 7. In addition to taking Phnom Penh, the Front claims to have liberated virtually all provincial capitals in eastern and southwestern Kampuchea and to have gained control of provinces further west including Battambang, Koh Kong and Siem Reap. We are able to confirm the capture of Phnom Penh and that Vietnamese forces have been active as far west as Siem Reap, but have no further details at this time concerning Vietnamese advances west of the capital.

3. Vietnamese forces had been advancing rapidly towards the capital on several fronts for forty-eight hours and by January 6 had effectively cut off the vital rail and road resupply routes connecting Phnom Penh with the deepwater port of Kampong Som. On January 7 Vietnamese troops advanced under cover of the heaviest air attacks since the conflict began, including sorties flown against the port city of Kompong Som and Phnom Penh itself. Although some Kampuchean forces are still operating behind the rapidly advancing Vietnamese, most appear to have withdrawn after offering only token resistance.

4. The fate of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and other Democratic Kampuchean officials is unclear at this time, although they probably evacuated the city in advance of its capture. Radio Hanoi has reported that Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were flown to Peking by the Chinese, but we are unable to confirm this. Pol Pot had pledged to continue to fight a guerrilla war if Phnom Penh were lost. If so, he may hope to marshal his remaining forces to launch a protracted guerrilla campaign against the Vietnamese and rebel forces possibly from a “temporary” headquarters in western Kampuchea. It is conceivable that anticipating Hanoi’s victory, the Kampucheans stockpiled weapons and supplies in the west to maintain their ranks until new supply channels can be established.

5. For US officials only: Since the Kampucheans have lost the port of Kampong Som, resupply of a guerrilla campaign would almost certainly require an agreement between China and Thailand to permit overland transit through Thailand of Chinese aid. During Deng Xiaoping’s (Teng Hsiao-p’ing’s) visit to Bangkok last November, he reportedly indicated that at some point Peking might ask the Thais for such transit rights. This would be very difficult politically for Bangkok, but the Thai may not have ruled out the possibility. The Thai Government has considered various options of its own in the event of a Vietnamese takeover of Kampuchea, including the insertion of Khmer insurgents based along the Thai-Kampuchea border into the western border provinces to act as a kind of buffer. There is no indication the Thai have implemented this plan although press reports state that the Thai military is on alert along its five hundred mile border with Kampuchea. End For US officials only.

6. The structure of a new Khmer rebel government has not yet been announced.² We believe the most likely candidate to head it would be Heng Samrin, former division commander under the Pol Pot government and President of the fourteen member Central Committee of KNUFNS announced last Dec. 3. Our only indication of the policies to be implemented by such a government is an eight point policy statement issued by the rebel news agency on January 1.³ Among other things the statement advocates the return of former city dwellers to the urban areas, reunification of families separated under the Pol Pot regime, and relaxation of restrictions on religion as well as the restoration and repair of Buddhist temples and pagodas damaged by the Pol Pot regime. Initially, local affairs are to be administered through a series of “peoples self management committees” to be elected throughout the country. The statement emphasizes that there are to be no reprisals against enemy troops although “reeducation” may be required in some cases.

7. Prince Norodom Sihanouk who arrived in Peking on January 6 is supposed to head a Kampuchean delegation to New York this week to “acquaint the world with Vietnam’s aggressive attack on his country.” In a January 8 press conference in Peking,⁴ however, Sihanouk seemed less certain of his travel plans saying that statements he made critical of the Pol Pot government appeared to throw doubt on whether he could represent it in international forums.⁵

8. Chinese Reaction: China has condemned Vietnam for its aggression against Kampuchea but it remains unclear what if any retaliatory action Peking may take. A People’s Daily commentary on January 6 declared that “the Chinese people can never remain indifferent to the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea” and that the “Chinese people will continue to provide the Kampuchean people with various forms of support.” A PRC official statement of January 7 denounced Vietnam’s aggression, asserted continued support of the Kampuchean Government, and expressed hope that “all countries and people interested in peace and stability in Southeast Asia would take measures to stop the aggression.” In a speech at the welcoming banquet for Sihanouk Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-P’ing) called upon the United Nations to uphold the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Kampuchea. This imprecise rhetoric and emphasis on the role of international organizations and other countries suggests that China has not yet decided what action if any, to take against Vietnam. At the same time, the Chinese are reportedly continuing military preparations along Vietnam’s northern border, by augmenting air, air defense, and ground forces there.⁶

9. Soviet Reaction: Moscow has welcomed the KNUFNS victories. A January 7 TASS article alleged that “the birth of an independent and free Kampuchea will be an important factor for peace and stability in Southeast Asia”, and condemned the “three years of barbaric genocide” in Kampuchea under the Pol Pot regime.⁷ A KNUFNS victory would represent an extension of the influence of the Soviets’ ally Hanoi while at the same time raising doubts in the minds of other Asian leaders, especially in Thailand, about the ability of the Chinese to support its ally. Should China take any military action against Vietnam, the Soviets would likely hold immediate consultations with Hanoi under the provisions of their recently concluded Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790009–1052. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Thomas P. Hamilton (INR/REA); cleared by Melvyn Levitsky (IO/UNP) and Lyne; cleared in draft by Martha C. Mautner (INR/RSE); approved by David Dean (INR/REA). Sent Immediate to Bangkok, Canberra, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, Paris, Singapore, Tokyo, Vientiane, Wellington, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Sent for information Immediate to Hong Kong, Beijing, USNATO, and USUN.
2. Communist rebels took control of Kampuchea on January 8. See “Rebels form new Cambodian regime,” Chicago Tribune, January 9, 1979, p. 1.
3. Not found.
4. See Fox Butterfield, “Cambodia’s Regime Reported in Flight,” New York Times, January 8, 1979, p. A1.
5. Sihanouk did lead the Kampuchean delegation. For a summary of the Security Council meetings January 11–15, which considered the situation in Kampuchea, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 273–275.
6. Telegram 92 from Beijing, January 8, outlined the Chinese reaction to the fall of Phnom Penh. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790009–0620)
7. Telegram 537 from Moscow, January 8, summarized the Soviet media reaction to the situation in Cambodia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790011–0481)