Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

316. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter¹

Washington, April 13, 1978

SUBJECT

• Philippine Election Aftermath and Options for Pacific Trip

President Marcos’ conduct of the legislative elections,² his arrests of some opposition leaders in Manila, and his threats to U.S. correspondents in the Philippines complicate planning for my visit to the Pacific in your behalf. At Marcos’ instruction, the Philippine Foreign Minister informed our Embassy on April 12:

“We welcome the visit of the Vice President but wish him to know beforehand that any visit to Aquino or any dealings with the opposition would have explosive and seditious effect. Accordingly, we would not want any such visit or dealings.”

Clearly, we cannot accept these conditions. When I go to the Philippines, I would not plan to visit Aquino in prison, but I must have the latitude to have contact with Cardinal Sin and members of the opposition who request a meeting. I believe that whether the visit goes forward as currently planned or is postponed, we will have to make sure that President Marcos understands this requirement. A proposed message to him on this subject is at Tab A.³

There are three basic options for handling the visit.

1. Proceed with visit as currently scheduled. This would have me arrive in Manila on May 2–4 with subsequent stopovers in Jakarta, Bangkok, Canberra and Wellington, and with return to Washington on May 10. We have been advised that these dates are acceptable to all the host governments (the Thailand and Indonesian visits would have to be switched to accommodate the Thais). This scheduling would permit us to follow-through with the visit as soon as possible after the vote on the second Panama Canal Treaty⁴—an objective we had earlier agreed was desirable.

The principal drawback is that we cannot control events in the Philippines between now and May 2. Further opposition protests are planned for this weekend. In the aftermath of the election, announcement of my visit for early May could fan the flames, rouse the opposition to even greater protests and possibly cause Marcos to take more repressive actions both against the opposition and against foreign correspondents. It would be a mistake to announce the early May schedule and then have to cancel the Philippine stopover because of unacceptable developments in late April.

I am advised by the State Department that in terms of the base negotiations—in which we are presently awaiting the Philippine response to our compensation offer—there is no reason why my visit need take place in early May, as it is highly unlikely that there will be progress sufficient to reach an agreement in the next two weeks.⁵

2. Proceed with Pacific visit excluding the Philippines. This option would enable me to travel to Bangkok, Jakarta, Canberra and Wellington, perhaps with the addition of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, to underscore your commitment to the Pacific. However, it has very major drawbacks. The Philippine stopover is the most important leg of this trip. Our military presence in the Pacific is centered in the Philippines. Other leaders of the ASEAN countries do not interpret the human rights issue as we do, and they would not understand why I was snubbing Marcos, nor would the Japanese or Chinese. The press story from start to finish would be my omission of the Philippines.

3. Postpone visit until early July. Taking into account scheduling difficulties with New Zealand and Thailand, we could inform host governments that we prefer to make the visit during July 1–9 (the next Congressional recess), and state publicly that we have put the trip off until July because of scheduling complications. There would, of course, be press reports suggesting that the situation in the Philippines caused the postponement. I believe that would be manageable, and might even have a salutary effect on Marcos.

An early July schedule would give Marcos time to digest our message on my need for latitude in terms of the people I may wish to see. It would allow the post election temper of the Philippines to cool, although whatever the dates for the visit, they will still spur the opposition parties into action and lead to requests for meetings with me.

By July, we will have a new Ambassador in place and there is the possibility that the base negotiations may be brought to a point where an announcement of agreement might be possible. This, timed to my visit, would be important in terms of your strategic objective of demonstrating our commitment to the Pacific and to a continued military presence.

Cy and Zbig concur in the above review of the issues that have to be taken into account. My own inclination would be to postpone the visit until early July pointing publicly to scheduling difficulties. I would greatly appreciate your guidance.⁶

Schedule visit for early July

Proceed with visit in early May

Proceed with visit, minus Philippines, in early May⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Mondale Papers, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–1980, Box 20, VP’s Visit to the Pacific, 4/29/78–5/11/78: Background [2]. Confidential. Mondale did not initial the memorandum.
2. Legislative elections were held on April 7.
3. Not attached.
4. The Senate approved the second Panama Canal Treaty on April 18.
5. An unknown hand wrote, “No Ambassador,” in the margin adjacent to this paragraph. Newsom left post on March 30.
6. An unknown hand drew a line from this paragraph to the bottom margin of the memorandum and wrote, “What do Cy & Zbig want?”
7. No option was selected.