310. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hannifin) to Secretary of Defense Brown1
SUBJECT
- Joint Use of Philippine Bases (C)
1. (C) Reference a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), I-24165/77, 12 October 1977,2 subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs [Page 1015] of Staff on joint use with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) of US facilities at bases in the Philippines.
2. (S) Joint use arrangements with countries in the Pacific generally have been successful. This is due to the establishment of proper terms of reference and to a clear understanding by the host governments of benefits derived from a US presence. The major pitfall to be avoided is a lack of, or imprecise, delineation of the jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility of each party over joint use areas and services. Joint use agreements with allied governments, including those currently in effect between the US Air Force and the AFP, are discussed in Appendix A.3
3. (S) Among the principal advantages of joint use are that it encourages the Government of the Philippines (GOP) to continue the mutual defense relationship with the United States and to reach an accord on a new Military Bases Agreement. It also would improve AFP capabilities and the relations of US Forces with the GOP. On the other hand, expanded joint use would have an adverse effect on operational flexibility and mission performance, create cost-sharing problems, and limit the ability of the United States to expand capabilities to meet war or contingency requirements. Additional views on advantages and disadvantages of joint use are contained in Appendix B.4
4. (S) In order to minimize the impact on US Forces, additional joint use arrangements with the GOP must insure that activities undertaken by the AFP do not hamper US operational effectiveness. Terms and conditions which should be contained in a joint use agreement are outlined in Appendix C.
5. (S) US installations in the Philippines play an essential role in supporting US interests in WESTPAC and the Indian Ocean. Although some operational flexibility exists to relinquish or share US Air Force facilities in the Philippines, the scope of such joint use would be greatly constrained by current and programmed use. No operational flexibility exists to relinquish US Navy facilities, but some sharing might be accommodated. Details on relinquishing or sharing US facilities are contained in Appendix D.
6. (S) Most US facilities are presently being used to capacity; therefore, increased joint use would require major expenditures to expand or replace shared facilities. Expanded joint use would also necessitate increased training to raise Philippine managerial and technical skills to a level which would minimize the disruptive effect of relinquishment or sharing on US Forces.
[Page 1016]7. (S) Overall, substantial joint use with the AFP of US facilities does not appear feasible due to the adverse impact on the US capability to support its forces operating in WESTPAC. With careful planning and thorough preparation, however, some limited joint use could be implemented at US Navy facilities and further expanded at US Air Force facilities. It should be noted that the GOP has not requested any broadening of the scope of joint use currently in effect at the bases. Accordingly, the United States should offer expansion of joint use arrangements only to gain major Philippine concessions during the base negotiations.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, 78, [untitled]. Secret.↩
- The memorandum is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0035, 27, Philippines 560–680.1 1977.↩
- Appendix A, attached but not printed, is entitled “Joint Use Agreements with Allied Governments.”↩
- Appendices B, C, and D were not attached.↩