3. Memorandum From Michael Armacost of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam: Some Wider Aspects of the Problem
You asked me for some further thoughts on the proposed Yost mission to Hanoi, focusing in particular on wider regional implications. Here they are.
1. One of our consistent failings over the past fifteen years has been to lose all sense of proportion when it comes to thinking about Vietnam. We have generally exaggerated its importance to our interests; we have regularly allowed domestic political considerations to overwhelm foreign policy concerns; we have invariably been impatient for results.
2. Unfortunately, our policy toward Indochina has frequently provided for Asians the central litmus test of our broader intentions in the region. To some extent that remains the case, though most Asians now recognize we have larger fish to fry.
3. With their long time perspective, Asians have become accustomed to seeing the United States go through periodic cycles of intense involvement in the Pacific, as in the past decade, followed by indifference toward the area. They anticipate that this Administration will have a strong “Europe-first” orientation, and consequently, they are particularly attentive to evidence of retrenchment in our Asian policy. Clearly this Administration recognizes the enormous economic and security stakes we have in fostering the delicate balance of power that has begun to take shape in the area in recent years.
4. But from the vantage point of Asia, the first impressions of the Carter Administration are not terribly reassuring. Alert Asian officials and commentators have noted: the special emphasis Secretary Vance has given to U.S.-Soviet ties and the muted interest displayed to date toward China; Administration efforts to cut the Defense budget; the President’s announced desire to withdraw ground forces from Korea;2 [Page 11] hints that we are reconsidering our base requirements in the Philippines; a more outspoken stance on human rights question (which puts us at odds with virtually every Asian Government save Japan, Australia, and New Zealand); a more critical attitude toward arms transfers; and AFL/CIO pressure for tax deferral legislation which would diminish the incentives for U.S. investments overseas.
5. Many of their concerns are exaggerated. Mondale’s trip to Japan3 was helpful in reaffirming the importance we attach to that relationship and our intent—despite Vietnam—not to turn our backs on the Asian-Pacific region. But the Vice President’s trip will by itself neither dissipate Asian fears that we are significantly downgrading our stakes in the Pacific, nor their confusion as to the priority we ascribe to particular relationships and interests in the area.
6. This latter concern is especially pertinent to our approach to Indochina. In Asia—as in our larger global design—the Administration needs to establish its credential with our allies and friends before undertaking initiatives to achieve reconciliation with our adversaries. To dispatch a mission to Hanoi before we have made any significant gestures of goodwill toward key allies like the Filipinos and the South Koreans would suggest an inexplicable reversal of our priorities. Such an impression would be further reinforced if OMB should eliminate grant military assistance to Thailand and Indonesia in FY–78—as it apparently wishes to do. The last Administration concentrated too much of its attention in the 1969–73 period on former adversaries, too little on our most important friends. We should not repeat that on a smaller scale in Southeast Asia this year.
7. Obviously, we must seek to normalize relations with Vietnam. Normalization could serve a variety of U.S. interests. It might enable us to limit Soviet influence in Indochina, inhibit Vietnamese adventurism toward its neighbors, and open up commercial and economic opportunities for American businessmen. Most Asian governments—e.g. Japan, China, and all the ASEAN states—hope to see us overcome our differences with the Vietnamese. But they will also be sensitive to our style in pursuing that objective. None would be favorably impressed if we displayed excess zeal in pursuit of Hanoi; if we allow the Vietnamese to manipulate U.S. policy through our overemphasis on the MIA issue; if we provide significant economic assistance; or if we fail to give them advance warning of major U.S. moves.
8. I would draw two conclusions from this. First, at a minimum, we must inform the Japanese, the Chinese, and ASEAN countries in advance of any mission to Hanoi. Second, I believe we should relax [Page 12] and proceed in a more deliberate way vis-à-vis the SRV, postponing dramatic initiatives until we (a) probe Vietnamese intentions quietly through the Paris channel, and (b) consider more fully the views of our Asian friends regarding U.S. policy in Indochina. We need not give them a veto over our Indochina policy; we do have a stake in making clear to them that we know what we are doing before we set forth.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Vietnam, 1/77–12/78. Confidential. Sent for information. Inderfurth and Denend initialed the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum.↩
- Carter first announced his intention of moving ground troops out of South Korea when he spoke to the Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976. For the full text of this address, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 6.↩
- January 30–February 1.↩