Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

288. Telegram From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State¹

Canberra, February 21, 1979, 0538Z

1429. Subject: Pacific Islanders Voice Concerns to Australians. Refs: A) Canberra 0366; B) Canberra 0122.²

1. As Department is aware, Australians have maintained that Pacific Island states remain nervous about renewed US interest in their area, and are concerned about what this implies for their emergent independence and general security. Australians most recently made this clear to DAS Colbert during her consultations here in early February.³ We have been inclined to believe that Australians are overly sensitive on this subject, perhaps more reflecting their own doubts than concrete expressions from the Islanders themselves. DFA Officer in Charge of Pacific Affairs has shared with Embassy officer three confidential messages from Australian Missions in the Pacific (protect) which support this Australian thesis.

2. One report, concerning the Gilberts and dating from December, discussed a conversation with Chief Minister Tabai, held just prior to his talks with US officials in Hawaii during January.⁴ Tabai said his main objective was to secure US renunciation of sovereignty claims over disputed islands, adding that the Canton situation was of secondary importance. Should the US balk on the sovereignty question, Tabai was sure the Gilberts would have overwhelming support for its cause in the world community. He said there would be no problem negotiating a new agreement on Canton, however Tabai indicated that the price would be higher, and Air Tungaru (the Gilberts airline) would wish to have use of Canton’s air field. Tabai claimed he detected a possible State-Defense “conflict” in USG thinking about the future of its Canton facility. Finally, Tabai assured his Australian listener that the Gilberts were not really interested in a security clause for its treaty with the US, adding he felt Tuvalu “was taken for a ride by the US” regarding the US-Tuvalu Treaty.

3. The second report originated in Honiara, and included a discussion with two senior public servants in the Solomons Government. Reference was made to a recent speech in Parliament by Finance Minister Kinika,⁵ in which he welcomed US friends but said the Americans “have more in mind than handshakes and cocktail parties.” According to one of the senior civil servants, this statement was a genuine reflection of at least mild concern over US intentions, and was “not a throwaway line.” Some threat to Solomon interests and to those of other Island states was perceived because of increased levels of US participation in Pacific affairs. Until the Solomons can feel confident of handling the US, in terms of protecting its own interests, the Solomons would prefer to see the United States at a “benevolent distance.” The conversation mainly focussed on fishing matters, and both Solomon officials felt more time was needed to assess the US presence on fisheries. In effect “the US is too big for micro-states and could bulldoze small states into accepting US positions inimical to their interests”, one declared. To conclude, the officials said that basically US-Solomons relations were good. Kenilorea’s meeting with President Carter in September⁶ had been “excellent”, and they praised the efforts of DAS Colbert and William Bodde. The Solomons wants to keep a low public profile in dealing with the US. Thus while it opposed US participation in SPRFO it would not openly attack US membership, as Ratu Mara and others have done.

4. In a recent report from Suva, [1 line not declassified] complained that Tuvalu was “unwise” to have signed its treaty with the US, thus compromising Tuvalu’s “nonalignment.” The GOF is not happy with Tuvalu’s action, but will refrain from public comment about it.

5. This information is reported at some length to indicate that DFA feels there is genuine [garble] to its claim about Islander concern over US intentions in the South Pacific. There do appear to be instances where, presumably out of traditional concepts of courtesy, the Islanders are positive with us, while revealing inner doubts to their perhaps more familiar Australian friends. This ambivalence is natural and its importance should not be exaggerated. However, in calculating our moves regarding the expanding Pacific family we cannot ignore the fact that nervousness about our real intentions lies below the surface in some if not all of the micro-states with which we deal.

Alston

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–86–0054, 1, Bilateral Defense Consultations, 1979. Confidential. Sent for information to Port Moresby, Suva, Wellington, and CINCPAC also for POLAD.
2. Telegram 366 from Canberra, January 15, addressed Australian interest in U.S. policy toward the emerging Pacific states. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790019–0932) Telegram 122 from Canberra, January 5, described a recent meeting in the Australian Foreign Ministry concerning Pacific Island affairs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790006–1090)
3. Reports on Colbert’s February 12 meetings are in telegrams 1133 and 1152 from Canberra, February 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790066–0667 and D790068–0768)
4. Ieremia Tabai. See footnote 2, Document 286.
5. Benedict Kinika.
6. See Document 284.