274. Letter From the Australian Ambassador (Parkinson) to President Carter1
I have been asked by the Prime Minister of Australia, the Right Honourable Malcolm Fraser, C.H., M.P., to pass to you the following message dated 29 April 1980:
BEGINS:
“My Dear Jimmy,
I would like to say how much we have all been thinking of you in recent days. Your decision to attempt the rescue of the American hostages in Iran3 was a courageous and bold one, and it is a tragedy for all of us that it was not successful. You know how much and how strongly we have supported your various actions in respect both of the situation in Iran and of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but I want you to know now that you have the sympathy and support of the Australian Government and people in your attempts to secure the release of the hostages and to contain the Soviet Union.
Australia has warmly supported your efforts in recent times to provide the leadership that our world so sorely needs. We are thankful that in the midst of the most extraordinarily difficult circumstances, the United States is providing leadership in meeting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We recognise your deep concern and your grief, and that of your fellow Americans, about your own people held hostage in Iran. We continue to support your efforts on both fronts, which we regard as essential to the survival of the world we know.
There are, however, some matters that cause me very real concern and I wanted therefore to put one or two suggestions to you. I hope you may find them constructive.
I well understand the problems that you have had in achieving an adequate, appropriate and continuous process of consultations with your major European partners: [2 lines not declassified].
[Page 907]Because of the way in which events are unfolding, my Government believes that it is an over-riding imperative for the prevention of what could develop into a third world war to establish now a totally unified approach, a common strategy in seeking the achievement of shared goals and objectives. I know this has been your objective in the past and I know you have tried many times to consult with our European friends, but with varying results.
However, especially at times of crisis like the present, any perceptions of divisions among the Atlantic Alliance members are critically dangerous. Now, especially, there need to be both the private reality and the public perception of a common approach and a common strategy.
I believe that a more visibly united alliance would enormously strengthen the United States in the containment of the Soviet Union, and would substantially contribute to the ultimate resolution of the difficult problems in Iran. Otherwise, there is a very real risk that misconceived or divided approaches to the Iran issue could result not only in the continued captivity of the hostages, but in moving Iran closer to the Soviet Union and thus helping to achieve what many of us feared from the outset: that the Soviet Union’s move into Afghanistan could become just a first step in a wider approach to gain control over Middle East oil supplies.
There can be no uncertainty about the results of divisions between Europe and the United States; there can only be the cold certainty of a disaster that could lead to a third world war.
I am sure we are at one in our assessment of the problem and in the need for unity in meeting it. How then to overcome the dilemma, which I know has concerned you very much? How to establish a common position, a common shared strategy, and how to share burdens in pursuit of common objectives? It will be difficult to achieve these results, but I believe they must be achieved. I see them as an overriding imperative affecting the credibility of the Western world, the containment of the Soviet Union and your own valiant efforts to secure the ultimate release of the hostages.
I wonder, therefore, whether you would consider seeking a meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Giscard d’Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt to discuss these issues with the objective of achieving and demonstrating the common purpose that I have referred to? What I have in mind is not necessarily just one meeting, but a framework and process of consultations which might be begun by an early first meeting in the United States, and which should be carried on at all levels of ministerial and official contact. Such a process would so establish the strength of the Western alliance, led by the United States, that the Soviet Union would know with total certainty that when policies were announced, [Page 908] they were shared policies, that the Iranians would know also that Europe stood absolutely with the United States in securing the release of the hostages.
I fully recognise that what I suggest is not a strategy in itself for dealing with the Soviet Union or for achieving the release of the hostages, but I do believe that it will provide a framework within which that strategy can be established and within which policies for the containment of the Soviet Union and for securing the release of the hostages can be achieved. I certainly believe that the kind of unity of which I am speaking is an absolute prerequisite to the survival of your world and mine.
So I urge you once again to try to establish that kind of unity which I know you have wanted between Europe and the United States. Matters are more urgent now, and more serious, and your approaches might be better received than they were in the past. It is a time for the major free world nations to act as one in the policies and approaches that they adopt for the prevention of a third world war—just as Britain and the United States acted as one in securing victory in the second.
While I urge the need for common strategies and the sharing of burdens in achieving objectives about which there is no possibility of dispute, I know quite well that the United States could not ever, in an emergency, forgo the right to use its strength or give to another the power to veto its use. Ultimately, that responsibility rests with you and your country. But the likelihood of having to use that power will, in our view, be so much less if America, Britain, France and Germany can achieve the kind of unity, both at the private level and in public perception, which I urge.
You should know that I am writing also to Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing, emphasising the need for unity and suggesting that they participate in a fuller process of consultations with you.
With my warmest personal regards and good wishes.
(Malcolm Fraser)
ENDS
Yours sincerely4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 4, Australia, 1980. Secret. Carter initialed the top of the page.↩
- Parkinson handwrote the salutation.↩
- Reference is to the April 24 failed attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–January 1981.↩
- Parkinson handwrote “Yours sincerely.”↩