Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

261. Letter From the Australian Deputy Chief of Mission (Birch) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 10, 1979

Dear Mr President,

I have been instructed to deliver to you as a matter of urgency the following text of a letter which my Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, has addressed to you on the Indo-China situation. The signed original is on its way.

“My dear Jimmy,

I know that you and your Government are deeply concerned about recent developments in Indo-China.² This is a concern which my Government shares. These events have implications not only for the region but also—because of the introduction into the region of Sino-Soviet rivalries—for world peace.

Despite the abhorrent nature of the former Kampuchean Government, Australia can under no circumstances condone Vietnam’s violation of the independence and sovereignty of that country. I have made this clear in public statements in Australia, as has our Ambassador to the United Nations during the Security Council debate.³

Nevertheless, up to this time it must be said that Vietnam has on balance clearly profited from its aggression. There is a continuing question, on which I would welcome your thoughts, of what further courses of action are possible to put pressure on Vietnam to give up the gains it has made through the use of force. It might also be desirable to look at ways of building up the confidence and strengthening the economies of the other countries of the region.

Moreover, I am sure you will agree that Vietnam’s actions supported as they are by the Soviet Union, have important strategic implications extending well beyond the Asia/Pacific region. The Soviet Union has sought to extend its influence in the developing world—in Africa and Asia—by a carefully calculated series of steps, which taken in isolation have not been sufficient to evoke a Western response, but which, taken together, threaten to upset the global balance of power. It has made a significant incremental gain in South East Asia which it would hope to enlarge.

We share your concern that the present fighting in Indo-China might spill over into a wider conflict, involving China and even the Soviet Union, and pose a serious threat to world peace. At the very least, I believe that we face the prospect of a period of mounting tension between the chief protagonists. If, as now appears likely, Vietnamese forces become absorbed in a protracted struggle in Kampuchea, there must always be a danger of China, which has greatly built up its forces in the border area, being provoked into action against Vietnam. This could in turn draw a Soviet reaction which could escalate into hostilities between the two major powers.

My Government welcomes your Government’s endeavours to impress on all concerned the dangers of precipitate action and to counsel moderation and restraint. I have no doubt that the highly successful visit to your country by Vice Premier Deng⁴ was most timely in this regard, and I have today read—and warmly applaud—your public comments to Prime Minister Kriangsak during his present visit to the United States.⁵

I want you to know that my Government is doing what it can to encourage moderation. We have suspended our aid to Vietnam as an indication of our deep concern, and we are urging the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea and to devote their energies to peaceful purposes. We are also talking to the Chinese Government in the hope of dissuading them from taking action that might draw the Soviet Union more directly into the conflict, and to other Governments—both within and outside the Asia/Pacific region—which possess some influence that might be brought to bear in this situation.

We are urging the Soviet Union to use its status as a world power responsibly and to do what it can to contribute to world peace and stability in the area.

You can be assured of my Government’s full support for your efforts to prevent the present dangerous situation from worsening. I think it is important for like minded countries such as ours to work closely together in seeking to ease tensions such as those arising from the events in Indo-China, and I know that your Government will continue to take whatever action is open to it to influence Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China. You should know that my Government—like yours—will not be shirking its responsibilities in this regard.⁶

My warmest personal regards,

(Malcolm Fraser)”

Yours sincerely,

R.N. Birch
Minister
Deputy Chief of Mission

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Platt Chron File, Box 66, 2/1–13/79. No classification marking. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner, “Zbig—Expedite reply. J.”
2. Reference is to Vietnam’s occupation of Kampuchea and the subsequent build-up of Chinese forces on the Sino-Vietnamese border. See Documents 36–41.
3. See footnote 5, Document 171.
4. See footnote 9, Document 259.
5. Kriangsak was in Washington February 4–8 for an official visit. See Documents 171 and 172.
6. In the margin of the first page, Carter wrote a note for his reply to Fraser, “Reply: Diplomatic isolation, Widespread condemnation, Stopping of economic aid by [illegible—all?] nations, Commitment to Thailand, etc., [illegible] acceptable, Republican leadership.” For Carter’s reply, see Document 263.