Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

250. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 8, 1977

SUBJECT

• U.S. Australian Defense Officials Consultations

1. Background

a. Upon completion of the 9 January 1974 meeting between Australian Minister of Defense Barnard and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger,² both parties agreed to extend and strengthen bilateral contacts to include periodic meetings between appropriate ministers and officials concerning strategic and operational developments relative to the U.S. Naval Communications Station Harold E. Holt at Northwest Cape (NWC).

b. The first round of bilateral talks took place in the Pentagon 4–6 September 1974³ and covered U.S. nuclear policy and nuclear balance, deterrent role of PACOM Polaris SSBNs, use of NAVCOMSTA Harold E. Holt in support of U.S. nuclear posture, and U.S. nuclear powered warship visits.

c. The second round of bilateral talks was also hosted by ASD/ISA in the Pentagon 10–12 May 1976.⁴ This conference covered a wide range of defense policy and operational issues in the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans.

d. The third round of bilateral talks took place in Washington on November 14–15, 1977. The DASD/ISA hosted the meeting. See Tab A for the conference agenda, and Tab B for the Australian-U.S. attendees.⁵

2. Discussion

There was a striking contrast in attitude by the Australian delegation this year compared with 1976. They were satisfied with the global strategic balance with the Soviets and with United States policies toward Asia.

They were not worried about U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea and were confident that a satisfactory agreement would be reached with the Philippine Government over U.S. basing there. There were no contentious issues raised nor were there any areas of serious disagreement.

The most heated discussions were with Mr. Gelb, Asst Sec State, PM, over Indian Ocean negotiations, arms control policies and over policy on Human Rights (see memo, Tab D). In contrast to the two previous consultations, the third meeting was scheduled for two half days. The remaining time of the two weeks spent by the Australian Delegation in Washington was devoted to meetings with various DOD and State Department Agencies. See Tab C for meeting schedule.

The first session commenced at 0930, Monday, 14 November 1977, in the Pentagon OSD Conference Room (1E801–RM2). After welcoming the delegates, Mr. Abramowitz turned the meeting over to Mr. Slocombe, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs, who presented an overview of U.S. defense strategy. Mr. Slocombe stated that the current nuclear balance between the superpowers dominates the US-Soviet relationship and strong elements of competition still exist between the two countries. In this competition, the U.S. has two clear cut advantages (1) a significant lead in technology, and (2) genuine Allies. To offset these advantages the USSR has built a huge nuclear force. It is very unlikely that the Soviet force will be used for a strategic attack against the U.S. but the possibility of such an attack must drive our defense preparations. The most vital defense task of the U.S. is to maintain the present strategic balance. The U.S. must also be able to respond at any level to control the situation. It is vital that neither the Soviets or our allies perceive the U.S. posture as inferior to that of the Soviets. We would prefer to maintain the current balance between our country and the Soviets through a SALT agreement, but the balance must be maintained by any means possible if such an agreement is not reached. If an agreement is reached along the line we desire in our SALT negotiations, we will: (1) keep the USSR far below the levels they would achieve in the absence of such an agreement; and (2) we will maintain the full range of technical options necessary to protect our European allies. Mr. Pritchett responded to this overview by stating that although Australia is a keen advocate of nonproliferation as a means to the end, they realize the importance of maintaining the nuclear balance that exists. Mr. Mathams questioned what effect the extensive Soviet Civil Defense (CD) program would have in upsetting the nuclear balance. Mr. Slocombe replied that the Soviet CD effort will have little effect due to two factors: (1) we do not target the civilian population; and (2) the best protection is evacuation and Soviet plans are little better than ours in that vital area. The great danger is that the Soviets may perceive that they have an advantage because of their CD efforts and attack. Mr. Mathams then asked if there was a possibility that the Soviets could lock in the numbers of weapons in an agreement and later increase their technology to build an advantage over the U.S.? He was assured that the U.S. would not sit by and let this happen. The Australians also asked that if a SALT agreement freezes the nuclear forces, doesn’t this give the Soviets an advantage in building their conventional forces? This is not foreseen as a problem, but again, the U.S. would not let this happen. Mr. Pritchett finished the session by stating that the Australians have a greater confidence this year in U.S. actions than last year. He also added, in response to a question, that he does not believe Pine Gap, or any other defense facilities used by the Americans in Australia, would be a campaign issue.⁶

Mr Abramowitz led off the second period with a review of U.S. defense policies in Asia. He noted that a comprehensive review of our strategies, conducted since President Carter took office,⁷ has confirmed the validity of our previous policies. This fact is obscured somewhat by two major announcements made prior to the completion of the study—the withdrawal from Korea and the Indian Ocean negotiations. The sequence of events in these two cases have caused some concern among our allies that there has been a major shift in our basic policy, which is not the case. Mr. Abramowitz then went on to discuss four countries—Korea, the PRC, Japan, and the Philippines.

The decision to withdraw major portions of our ground forces from Korea had its roots in two factors: (1) the exceptional growth in South Korea’s military, technical, and economic capabilities; and (2) the U.S. cannot remain in Korea forever. The first factor is the principal one, but the second one is also significant. The U.S. recognizes the dangers of such a withdrawal, but a very good program has been developed to minimize the risk. This program includes: (1) back-loading the withdrawal to the 1981/82 timeframe; (2) significant U.S. increases to the South Korean defense capabilities; and, (3) the maintenance of U.S. air and sea power in the region both during the withdrawal and into the foreseeable future. What Congress will do to support the administration is still unclear and this factor could become a problem.

The Japanese attitude towards developing security forces is based on: (1) the Japanese do not feel threatened; and, (2) the U.S. fills the security void by providing protection. The Japanese attitude is changing and there will be a slow but steady increase in Japanese efforts to improve their defense posture over the next few years, but nothing spectacular.

The Sino/Soviet split has had worldwide benefits. We have been able to reallocate defense resources and East-West tensions have been reduced. We would like very much to normalize our relationship with the PRC to perpetuate this trend, but Taiwan is still a major obstacle. Another obstacle is political. Administration setbacks with Congress regarding SALT, the Panama Canal, and the Korean withdrawal has slowed the Administration’s plans. Normalization is a goal, but it cannot be predicted when this will occur.

We have a very strong desire to maintain our bases in the Philippines. We recognize that bases cannot be maintained in a hostile atmosphere and the issues will have to be negotiated. We have noted, however, a major shift in the Philippine attitude since last year. This year they are talking more in terms of mutual benefits. The principal issues in any negotiations are Philippine sovereignty of these bases and what it will cost the U.S. On the negative side—there may be congressional problems due to: (1) human rights issues; (2) high cost; and, (3) lack of conviction in Congress that the bases are of value in view of the lack of an immediate SEA threat. The outlook is not rosy, but hope exists that a settlement can be reached.

In discussing the PRC, it was noted that the PRC will require modernization to remain a major power and this modernization will require foreign assistance. The belief that the PRC is self-sufficient is a myth. The PRC will make major efforts to obtain dual use technology from the West and arms from Europe (but not the U.S.). The Chinese will use cash, rather than utilize foreign credits or investment. This modernization will require at least a decade and the Chinese will not put themselves in a position to be dictated to either politically or in the technical field.

MGen Fish arrived at 1155 and gave a presentation on President Carter’s Arm Transfer Policy (of 19 May).⁸

The consultations adjourned at 1230.

The consultations on 15 November commenced at 0900 in the Australian Embassy. Membership was basically the same. Mr. Pritchett reviewed some of Australia’s perceptions of the US-Australian relationship and pointed out that the lack of a clear threat to Australia made the formulation of an Australian force structure difficult. Australia has confidence in the superpower nuclear balance and there is no threat from any major power. Indonesia has neither the inclination nor the power to mount an attack on Australia and will not for at least a decade. Indonesia could be in the future either an adversary or an ally. Australia desires a medium technology defense force (not top level) for economy purposes with forces not built for a specific contingency. They realize that a war in Europe would have tremendous impact on allied assistance to Australian security. They realize that, even without a change in U.S. policies, the assignment of priorities could draw significant allied support away from Australia in a crisis.

Mr. Abramowitz then discussed several factors. He pointed out that the Soviet fleet in the Pacific performs a certain way because it is a defensive fleet due to U.S. presence. It was also pointed out that the Soviet Pacific fleet has more aviation and naval infantry than other Soviet fleets.

At this point, Mr. Pritchett wanted to make clear that when he stated yesterday that Australia had confidence in American policy, it was not a blanket approval. There are some aspects of concern. He also mentioned that the Australian defense goal is 3% of the GNP, a rather modest sum. The question was asked if the Melbourne, the Australian aircraft carrier, would be replaced. The Melbourne is presently programmed until 1985. He replied that the decision has not been made but may be made in the next 18 months. The cost of a new carrier replacement would be about 1/2 of the annual defense budget which makes it a significant decision.

The question was asked what changes would occur if the Australian Labor Party returned to power. Mr. Pritchett pointed out that the Labor Party did not neglect defense and that most of the current procurement was initiated under the Labor Party. The return of the Labor Party would, therefore, have little effect.

The Australians are enthusiastic about the steps they have taken to increase military cooperation with their Asian neighbors. This increased emphasis includes intelligence gathering, military exercises and exchange of military visits.

The Indian Ocean negotiations were reviewed by Mr. Lyle Breckon, Deputy Director of Office of Arms Control and Disarmament, State Department. Mr. Breckon stated that the third in this series of talks would be 1–10 December and that the U.S. objective remains stabilization of past and current levels.⁹ The thrust of the talks is to form an agreement to limit future activities and reduce tensions. After this initial agreement we will then discuss possible reductions. We believe that we have a meeting of the mind with the Soviets on many issues but the U.S. will not agree to: (1) include allies; (2) include bases outside the area, or (3) expand the definition of the Indian Ocean outside the actual area. Mr. Breckon assured the Australians that their concerns are being taken into account and that exercises with Australian forces and U.S. naval calls to Western Australian ports will be continued. It was also stressed that an escape clause will be included in any agreement to insure that our commitments to Australia under the ANZUS Treaty will be protected. Transit rights would not be affected by an agreement and we have not agreed to a restriction on any specific type of weapon systems. We have, however, made certain agreements which may lead to restricting certain weapon systems. In response to a question by AVM Jordan, Mr. Breckon stated that the Diego Garcia construction presently scheduled would be completed. Mr. Pritchett stated that since the next Indian Ocean Talks would be 1–10 December, these talks will have no political impact on the 10 December elections in Australia. The impact on Australian interests that result from these talks, however, has significant political impact on Australian politics. The Australians are, therefore, very sensitive to the agreements we reach with the Soviets.

3. 1978 Consultations

In his final meeting with Mr. Abramowitz prior to returning to Australia, Mr. Pritchett expressed his appreciation and complete satisfaction with the consultations. Mr. Abramowitz recommended and the Australians agreed that the next round of meetings would be held in Canberra in about a year. This will enable Mr. Abramowitz’ replacement to become familiar with our defense facilities in Australia and to meet Australian defense and foreign affairs officials.

LTC George H. Douse
Assistant for Australia

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–86–0054, 1, AUST-US 1977 Defense Consultations. Secret.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 45.
3. No record of these talks has been found.
4. No record of these talks has been found.
5. None of the tabs was found attached.
6. Malcolm Fraser won the national election for Prime Minister on December 10.
7. Not further identified.
8. PD/NSC–13, Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, May 13, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271. For the text of Carter’s statement on the policy, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 931–932.
9. See footnote 2, Document 248.