Office of the Historian

225. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Presidential Review Committee Meeting1

Washington, August 27, 1980, 5–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Indonesia

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • David Newsom (Under Secretary for Political Affairs)
    • Richard Holbrooke (Asst Sec for East Asian and Pacific Affairs)
    • Fred Brown (Office Dir for Indonesia)
    • Robert Blumberg (Rep of Amb. Richardson)
    • David Evans (Dir, International Security Operations, PM)

  • OSD

    • Amb. Robert Komer (Advisor to Sec Def on NATO Affairs)
    • RADM Donald S. Jones (Under Secr for Defense Policy)
    • RADM Jonathan Howe (Dir, Pol-Mil Affairs, Naval Oper)
    • CMDR Dennis Neutze (Legal Adviser to Dep Chairman, Naval Oper)

  • JCS

    • BG James Granger (Dep Director, Pol-Mil Affairs)
    • Capt. Gerald Schroeder (Action Officer for Indonesia)

  • AGRICULTURE

    • Dale Hathaway (Under Secretary)

  • OMB

    • Edward Strait (Dep to the Dep Assoc Dir, International Affairs Div)

  • DCI

    • Amb. John Holdridge (National Intelligence Officer, EA)
    • [name not declassified] (Chief, East Asia Div)

  • AID

    • John H. Sullivan (Asst Administrator for Asia)

  • ICA

    • Charles Bray (Deputy Director)
    • Norris Smith (Director, Office of East Asian and Pacific Affairs)

  • IDCA

    • Guy Erb (Deputy Director)

  • TREASURY

    • Fred Bergsten (Assistant Secretary)
    • Sandra O’Leary (Staff Economist)

  • USTR

    • Jon Rosenbaum (Dir of Latin American and African Affairs)

  • White House

    • David Aaron

  • NSC

    • Roger Sullivan (Notetaker)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Under Secretary of State David Newsom chaired the meeting, the purpose of which was to assess the risk of deterioration in US-Indonesian relations, and to suggest actions we might take to reduce or eliminate irritants in that relationship. (C)

The meeting stressed the key importance of Indonesia as:

—the world’s fifth most populous nation located astride strategic sea lanes;

—a moderate Moslem country which generally follows policies favorable to US interests;

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—provider of 6 percent of US and 13 percent of Japanese oil imports;

—the most powerful member of ASEAN;

—a potentially important interlocutor with Vietnam;

—a major trading partner ($5 billion at two-way trade) and site of large US investments in oil and mining. (C)

The meeting agreed that our decision to terminate in March 1980 our informal courtesy notifications to the Indonesian Government of US naval ship transits of Indonesian straits had become a major issue which threatened to damage seriously the good relationship we have carefully built up over the last 15 years. The Department of State will therefore take the lead in working out, in consultation with Ambassador Elliot Richardson and taking into account the reservations of the JCS, a procedure which will enable us to include specific information on ship transits in our periodic intelligence briefings for the Indonesian Government. It was thought this would assuage Indonesian resentment with minimum damage to our Law of the Sea policy. (S)

The meeting also concluded that President Suharto’s resentment over our failure to invite him for a state visit during the past four years had reenforced his reaction to other US actions, such as termination of ship transit notification and declining security and economic assistance over the past four years. The Department of State will prepare a memorandum for the President recommending that we issue an invitation for a 1981 visit to President Suharto in the President’s name as soon as this can be done. The Department of State is aware that in making this recommendation it will have to consider what other state visits it may propose during that same period. (S)

The meeting reaffirmed that Indonesia is eligible for concessional assistance, and that Indonesia is not being given the priority it deserves in view of its strategic importance in the allocation of our assistance resources. No effort was made in the meeting to discuss specific amounts of economic and security assistance that might be appropriate for Indonesia. The participants acknowledged that it was unlikely there would be new resources available for Indonesia, and that therefore the question of where cuts would have to be made to increase allocation to Indonesia would have to be studied further on an interagency basis. (C)

The meeting gave Indonesia due credit for the progress it has made in the human rights area, but recognized that Timor remains a public issue which we will have to take into account. (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Sullivan Subject File, Box 26, Mini-PRC on Indonesia, 8–9/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting have been found.↩