Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

209. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 2, 1978

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between Vice President Mondale and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew

PARTICIPANTS

• SINGAPORE

  • Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
  • Mr. Bernard Chen, Minister of State for Defense
  • Mr. Lim Chee Onn, Political Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology
  • Mr. Lim Siong Guan, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
  • Singapore Ambassador Punch Coomaraswamy

• UNITED STATES

  • Vice President Walter Mondale
  • Mr. Denis Clift, Vice President’s Office
  • Mr. Nicholas Platt, National Security Council
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert B. Oakley, Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs, Dept. of State
  • Ambassador to Singapore Richard F. Kneip

Lee expressed his pleasure at visiting Washington and seeing the Vice President again. He would be seeing the Secretary of State in New York Friday.² The Secretary has been very busy on the Middle East.

The Vice President noted that Secretary Vance had also been very busy with SALT. These negotiations are taking longer than expected and the Soviets still need to make some concessions. We want an agreement but not at any price since we will not allow our defense to be placed in doubt. We are closer to an agreement after the talks in New York and Washington;³ some progress has been made.

The Vice President discussed what a good trip he had made to Southeast Asia last May. The ASEAN meeting here had also been good,⁴ and Prime Minister Kriangsak would come for a visit early next year.⁵ We are making progress on base talks with the Philippines, starting with my trip. Mrs. Marcos’ unhappy experience with the critics of the Philippines in Congress were causing problems, despite the efforts the Vice President and President had made to explain the facts of Congressional life to her. Military-to-military talks are going well.

Lee observed that the overall situation in Southeast Asia is much better than at the time of his visit to Washington a year ago.⁶ ASEAN is stronger and more cohesive, while the Communist countries are at odds with each other and likely to be in trouble for a long time. It is up to ASEAN and the West to take advantage of the situation so that ten years from now when the Communists may come out of their trouble, ASEAN will be far ahead. Aside from OPEC, ASEAN’s growth rate is second only to such countries as Taiwan and Korea.

The Vice President asked how the U.S. should react to Vietnam’s desire to normalize relations with the U.S. Should we be eager? Lee replied that the Vietnamese seemed to be the eager ones. The U.S. should not be eager but should not be lethargic. They need you more than you need them and they have met your terms. The Vice President asked if the new SRV desire for recognition was due to the Chinese factor, a wish to obtain U.S. support. Lee said he thought this was a marginal consideration. The Vice President asked whether, in view of the Hanoi-Peking troubles, the U.S. should proceed with normalization now, he said: “Go ahead; you are proceeding cautiously. There is no reason not to do so.”

The Vice President asked whether U.S. businessmen were active enough in Asia. He said they were not. The Vice President noted that he had mistakenly voted for higher taxes on U.S. businessmen overseas. This was causing a loss of exports and needed to be corrected. What about the US-Singapore investment treaty? He replied that they had just received it. The Vice President expressed the hope that it could be agreed soon and apologized for the long delay on the U.S. side. He asked for a memo from the State Department on the treaty and the reasons for the delay.⁷ He said he would see that his government gave an early response.

Lee asked about U.S. policy toward Africa, which seemed to be taking a lot of time. The Vice President explained that the new Administration first had to establish its credibility by identifying with the legitimate aspirations of the black Africans, then to forge personal ties with the leaders of the front line states; and then to tackle problems like Rhodesia and Namibia. There has been slippage. Things are not going as well as they were last year with Rhodesia and there is a new tough government in South Africa.

President Carter entered and greeted Lee,⁸ who congratulated him on Camp David. The President said that the Israeli and Egyptian negotiators would arrive on October 12 and a treaty should be signed without any serious obstacles. We can understand the problems of King Hussein. Maybe after Egypt actually signs the treaty, it will be easier for Hussein but he must be tough until then and insist upon prior agreement on full withdrawal and a resolution of the Palestine problem. The Saudis are being constructive. He noted that some progress has been made on SALT, and should make some more this year. The President then noted Lee’s justified reputation as a world statesman. Ambassador Kneip recalled that the President had told him of Lee’s reputation before anyone knew of his assignment to Singapore.

After the President left, the Vice President again referred to the problem with Mrs. Marcos. Public attacks on the U.S. do not help, Lee said, she has a streak of evangelism and cannot understand her limitations. She had thought she could convert Qaddhafi just as she thought she could persuade critical members of Congress. When it does not work, she becomes very angry. The Vice President asked if Lee could help. He said he would see what he could do.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Platt Chron File, Box 65, 10/78. Secret. Drafted by Robert Oakley on October 5. The meeting took place in the Vice President’s office. Lee was in the United States on a private visit.
2. October 6.
3. Presumably reference is to the September 27–28 and 30 meetings. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Documents 215 and 218.
4. Reference is to the second ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue, August 3–4. The August 4 joint press statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 1978, pp. 24–25. See also Document 131.
5. February 4–8, 1979. See Documents 171 and 172.
6. See Documents 199 and 200.
7. In an October 11 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff explained the reason for the delay and provided a status report. (Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Mondale Papers, Foreign Countries, Box 67, Foreign Countries—Singapore (1978)) An approved U.S. draft treaty was given to the Singapore Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on February 21, 1979. (Telegram 1664 from Singapore, February 22, 1979; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790081–0266) Negotiations on the treaty began in January 1980.
8. Carter met with Lee from 2:40 until 2:51 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)